VZCZCXRO3958
RR RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #0218/01 0570834
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 260834Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6629
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1828

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000218 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2020 
TAGS: PARM PREL NATO GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN DEPUTY NSA BELIEVES TIMING COULD UNDERMINE 
MD EFFORTS AT NATO SUMMIT 
 
Classified By: Political M/C George Glass for reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
¶1. (C) Begin Summary.  During a February 12 meeting with U/S 
Defense Flournoy, German Deputy National Security Advisor 
Rolf Nikel said he was doubtful that allies could reach 
agreement on the issue of territorial defense in time to make 
a final decision at the NATO Summit in Lisbon.  Specifically, 
he pointed to French concerns and noted that feasibility 
studies on missile defense would still be in the works by the 
time of the summit.  On the removal of tactical nuclear 
weapons in Germany -- advocated by the German MFA -- Nikel 
emphasized that it should be a NATO decision and agreed that 
the U.S. should not shoulder the entire burden of assuring 
extended deterrence in Europe.  Nikel believed the 
discussions toward achieving Iran sanctions were moving in 
the right direction -- though he was skeptical that sanctions 
would change Tehran's behaviour.  He also lauded Chancellor 
Merkel's efforts to boost German troop contributions to 
Afghanistan despite public opposition.  End summary. 
 
----------- 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
¶2. (C) Nikel noted that additional German troops should 
arrive in Afghanistan during the summer -- assuming the 
Bundestag approves the troop ceiling increase on February 26, 
as expected.  He also stressed that the troop increase had 
been a heavy lift for Chancellor Merkel given broad public 
opposition.  However, Nikel emphasized that there was now a 
renewed sense of determination within the German government 
to succeed in Afghanstian.  Beyond an additional 850 troops 
(including 350 held in reserve), Nikel underscored Germany's 
aid contributions of about USD 2 billion per year. 
 
¶3. (C) In response to U/S Flournoy's inquiries, Nikel 
explained that the 350 reserve troops would be used for 
contingency operations -- such as to support Afghan 
elections.  Flournoy stressed that the allies now had the 
right strategy and leadership on the ground and were 
approaching the necessary level of resources.  However, she 
said there was still a shortfall of about 2000 institutional 
trainers for Afghan security forces. 
 
--------------------------------- 
NATO Reform and Strategic Concept 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Nikel underscored that the deep global financial 
crisis -- felt acutely by NATO nations -- would spur the 
alliance to institute reforms and better set priorities.  He 
recognized the value of having the new strategic concept 
steer the way forward on NATO reforms.  However, Nikel 
emphasized that these efforts were on parallel tracks such 
that it would prove difficult to sequence the two -- 
particularly given the tight timeframes at play.  He added 
that Germany was on board with SYG Rasmussen's package deal 
for priorities.  With regard to drafting of the strategic 
concept, Nikel stressed the need to maximize at least the 
"perceived" inclusion by member nations. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Russia, Missile Defense and Lisbon Summit 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶5. (C) Nikel pointed to some aspects of Russia's European 
security proposals as potential kick-off points for 
discussion -- for example, talks on the definition of 
"substantial forces" as a way to re-start the CFE dialogue. 
However, he stressed that Moscow's proposals also included 
significant non-starter topics -- such as Russian "spheres of 
influence" and a de facto veto over European security issues. 
 Nikel noted that there was simply no appetite in Berlin to 
explore these European redlines.  Nevertheless, Nikel said 
that the allies needed to work on confidence-building with 
Russia. 
 
¶6. (C) Flournoy flagged missile defense as an opportunity for 
engagement with Russia and pressed for an endorsement of 
territorial defense during the NATO summit in Lisbon. 
However, Nikel was doubtful that the allies could reach a 
final decision by Lisbon because of ongoing French concerns 
and the fact that feasibility studies on missile defense 
would still be in progress.  He further stressed that NATO MD 
should meet four criteria: 1) cover all of NATO territory; 2) 
be viable; 3) not antagonize Russia; and 4) fit into a 
broader arms control architecture.  For his part, Nikel 
believed a NATO MD system could check all of these boxes. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe 
 
BERLIN 00000218  002 OF 002 
 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) On the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from 
Germany -- as advocated by the German MFA -- Flournoy 
stressed that this must be an alliance decision and 
emphasized that the upcoming U.S. Nuclear Posture Review 
would not make any judgement on the issue.  She noted that 
the USG was open to a discussion about how NATO's security 
architecture should be structured, while still underscoring 
the need to maintain extended deterrence.  However, Flournoy 
expressed concern about German FM Westerwelle's public 
comments against tactical nuclear weapons as well as 
Germany's planned divestment of the dual-capable aircraft -- 
aircraft needed to remain a part of NATO's extended 
deterrence architecture.  She further stressed that it would 
be unhealthy for the alliance to have the U.S. as sole 
underwriter of NATO's nuclear deterrent. 
 
¶8. (C) Nikel agreed that the U.S. should not shoulder the 
entire burden for NATO's nuclear deterrent.  Furthermore, he 
underscored that several preconditions -- such as a 
post-START agreement, successful NPT Review Conference, and 
relevant considerations from Russia -- should play a role in 
moving forward with discussions on NATO tactical nuclear 
weapons.  Above all, Nikel stressed that decisions on 
tactical nuclear weapons in Europe must be made at NATO and 
reassured U/S Flournoy that the German Chancellery was clear 
on this point. 
 
-------------- 
Iran sanctions 
-------------- 
 
¶9. (C) On Iran, Nikel believed it clear that officials in 
Tehran would not respond to engagement and agreed it was time 
to pursue the pressure track.  He reiteratied the need to 
sequence the approach to sanctions -- starting with efforts 
at the UN.  However, Nikel had the clear feeling that 
national efforts would also be needed -- which, for Germany, 
would require an EU decision.  He hoped to see movement at 
the EU by the end of the month, but was not sure there was 
enough time to reach agreement by then.  Nikel flagged the 
March 25 European Council meeting as another opportunity and 
underscored that any UN text could influence the parameters 
of an EU decision.  He also noted that Chancellor Merkel had 
already begun reaching out to non-permanent UNSC members to 
prepare the way forward. 
 
¶10. (U) This cable was cleared by U/S Flournoy. 
Murphy