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C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 000145 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PNAT PINR SOCI KDEM LE
SUBJECT: CHRISTIANS OBJECT TO BERRI'S PROPOSED 
DECONFESSIONALIZATION COMMITTEE 
 
REF: BEIRUT 0061 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Thomas F. Daughton for 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The 1989 Taif Accord that ended the Lebanese 
civil war called for "deconfessionalization," the abolishment 
of the quotas for sectarian representation that undergird the 
Lebanese political system.  Like many tenets in Taif, the 
proposal has yet to be implemented.  Recently, Speaker of 
Parliament Nabih Berri, a Shia, publicly proposed forming a 
committee to study the issue.  His advisors argue that the 
discussion should begin now in order to capitalize on the 
current period of domestic and regional reconciliation, even 
if implementation takes "at least a generation."  The 
Christian community, including Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah 
Sfeir and Berri's nominal ally Michel Aoun, has strongly 
rejected Berri's proposal.  In particular, Maronite 
Christians, who would lose some of their disproportionate 
political clout in a deconfessionalized system, insist that 
Christian privileges must be protected despite evidence of 
Christians' declining demographic weight.  Christian leaders 
like Lebanese Forces head Samir Geagea also accuse Berri of 
raising the issue to distract the government from dealing 
with Hizballah's weapons.  Meanwhile, the Sunnis sit on the 
sidelines in support of their Christian March 14 allies, 
while the Druze favor Berri's plan.  Like many significant 
issues in current Lebanese political culture, Berri's 
proposal will likely be postponed for future decision.  End 
Summary. 
 
BERRI CALLS FOR COMMITTEE TO 
STUDY DECONFESSIONALIZATION 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Speaker Berri challenged the basis of the political 
status quo during the late November parliamentary debate to 
grant the newly-installed government a vote of confidence 
when he called for the formation of a committee to study 
"deconfessionalization."  Article 95 of the Lebanese 
constitution, as amended by the 1989 Taif Accords, calls for 
the "abolition of political confessionalism according to a 
transitional plan" under the leadership of the parliament, 
whose representatives are currently elected on a formula of 
equal seat distribution between Christians and Muslims.  All 
political positions in Lebanon are currently divided equally 
between Christians and Muslims, with the Maronite Christians 
taking the lion's share of the Christian half despite 
demographic estimates that suggest that their numbers are 
significantly less that half of the Lebanese population. 
Berri's proposal only addressed "political" 
deconfessionalization -- such as ending confessional quotas 
for MPs, ministers, and senior civil servants -- not the 
creation of civil family law to end religious authorities' 
control over matters of birth, marriage, death and 
inheritance.  As called for by the constitution, Berri 
proposed forming of a committee headed by President Michel 
Sleiman that would include representatives of all 
confessions, members of civil society, religious figures, and 
academics as a first step to implementing Article 95. 
 
¶3. (C) Berri's senior advisor, Ali Hamdan, explained to 
poloffs in late January that Berri sought to urge the 
Lebanese political establishment to capitalize on regional 
and domestic reconciliation efforts to begin addressing the 
controversial issue.  When asked why Berri launched his 
aggressive campaign in the media at this time, Hamdan 
rhetorically answered, "Why not now?"  Full 
deconfessionalization, as called for in the constitution, 
would still take "at least a generation," but there would be 
no better time than the present to begin the dialogue, Hamdan 
argued.  Among the recent positive developments opening the 
door to Berri's proposals, Hamdan listed regional 
reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Syria, the two 
parties who pushed for the 1989 Taif Accord; the formation of 
a national unity government; and reconciliations among the 
primary confessions since the June 2009 parliamentary 
elections. 
 
TIE COMMITTEE FORMATION 
TO NATIONAL DIALOGUE? 
----------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The sectarian divide on the topic of 
deconfessionalization is stark.  A recent poll commissioned 
by Berri from the Lebanese research firm Information 
International showed that 75% of Muslims support the concept 
of eliminating sectarianism from political life, with Shia 
support rising to 89%.  Meanwhile, a mere 35% of Christians 
support addressing the topic now.  In response to accusations 
from March 14-allied Christian leaders that Berri was using 
the deconfessionalization issue as "political theater" to 
divert attention away from Hizballah and its arsenal, an 
exasperated Hamdan complained that "the Christians never want 
a resolution" to confessionalism, preferring instead to use 
sectarianism as a "coat rack to hang every problem on."  He 
challenged the Christians to "be brave" by exhibiting 
creativity and seizing Berri's proposal in order to link 
their greatest fear -- domination by Hizballah's weapons -- 
with their most valuable negotiating card, their 
disproportionate strength in the confessional system.  The 
Speaker, he said, had discussed his proposal with President 
Sleiman to explain that it was meant to take a step forward 
in constitutional implementation, but he would not pressure 
Sleiman to include it on the National Dialogue agenda. 
(Note: Sleiman, who will lead the Dialogue, was the first to 
call publicly for the formation of a deconfessionalization 
committee during his remarks to celebrate Lebanese 
independence day on November 22, but sicne then he has not 
declared any intention to expand the Dialogue's agenda to add 
deconfessionalization to discussion of the national defense 
strategy (a euphemism for Hizballah's weapons).  End note.) 
 
CHRISTIANS REACTING TO FINAL RESULT 
RATHER THAN COMMITTEE FORMATION 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Christian opposition to Berri's plan, although clearly 
linked to existential Christian fears, has followed two lines 
of reasoning.  Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir and Berri's 
nominal Christian ally Michel Aoun argue that "now is not the 
time" to discuss deconfessionalization, revealing an 
unwillingness among Maronites in particular to reconsider the 
basis of a state in which they hold disproportionate control. 
 Aoun told the Ambassador in mid-January (reftel) that his 
Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) was working toward the full 
secularization of the Lebanese state, but he insisted that 
the first step is granting "full civil rights to all 
citizens" before moving to confessional electoral reform.  In 
his view, ending the confessional quotas is the "last step" 
in the reform process, not the first, and he has posited 
repeatedly that sectarianism should be "eliminated from 
citizens' souls" before being changed on paper. 
 
¶6. (C) A second argument against deconfessionalization is 
championed by Christians affiliated with March 14, especially 
Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea (also a Maronite), who 
echo Aoun's argument while also raising the specter of 
Hizballah's arms playing an even more prominent role in local 
political dynamics without the current constitutional 
guarantees of Christian parity.  Geagea instead advocates 
that each confession vote for its own representatives in the 
parliament instead of voting by district.  Similarly, Kataeb 
party MPs insist that disarming militias should come before 
"the last page of Taif" (i.e., deconfessionalization). 
 
¶7. (C) Other objections to Berri's proposal center on his 
methods or suspicion about his intentions.  FPM MP Ibrahim 
Kenaan asserted to us that Berri should have asked parliament 
to determine its priorities in implementing Taif before 
calling for a committee to study deconfessionalization.  Ali 
Hamdan, who proposed that the committee's work could be done 
"behind closed doors," assessed that the Christians were 
afraid to "take from Berri's hand even though he's offering 
something good."  Any change to the status quo, Hamdan 
pointed out, would have to be approved by cabinet and 
two-thirds of parliament, thus guaranteeing Christians a 
veto.  Meanwhile, some non-Maronite Christians, such as Greek 
Orthodox and Catholics, privately express support for Berri's 
proposal, arguing that Berri is willing to negotiate the 
issue instead of trying to impose change.  If the debate is 
delayed further, Orthodox political figure Marwan Abu Fadel 
assessed, the next speaker of parliament -- who he believed 
would likely be a Hizballah appointee -- would not be as 
friendly to the protests of an even more diminished Christian 
community. 
 
 
SUNNIS NON-COMMITTAL, 
DRUZE SUPPORTIVE 
-------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) While the Shia and the Christians spar over 
deconfessionalization, Sunni political leaders have been less 
vocal, with Prime Minister Saad Hariri carefully avoiding the 
subject in his public statements.  Hamdan claimed that Hariri 
does not oppose Berri's proposal himself, but Hariri's Future 
Movement officially opposes Berri's initiative, saying "the 
time is not right" for discussions on the contentious issue. 
Sunnis nonetheless acknowledge that deconfessionalization 
will be an important step towards the implementation of Taif, 
although the personal sentiments of Future Party 
representatives vary.  MP Jamal Jarrah fears that through 
deconfessionalization, the Shia will take over the country, 
while MP Mohammad Qabbani told poloff that he personally 
supports deconfessionalization, which he assessed would 
actually benefit the better-educated Christians competing in 
a system rewarding "competence and expertise" instead of 
religious affiliation.  Other majority Sunnis explain 
privately that Future's official opposition to Berri's 
proposal is a result of pressure by Hariri's Christian March 
14 allies, most notably Geagea, and not from the Sunni base, 
which the Information International poll showed supports the 
idea by 63%. 
 
¶9. (C) Meanwhile, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt has publicly 
supported Berri's proposal, perhaps because a Druze is tipped 
to head the senate called for in the Taif Accord.  Although 
the Druze account for less than 12% of the Lebanese 
population by most estimates, 66% are in favor of taking 
steps to eliminate sectarianism, according to the Information 
International poll. 
 
¶10. (C) COMMENT: Berri, who acknowledges that 
deconfessionalization could take "at least 20 to 30 years," 
made a smart move by calling for the formation of a committee 
to examine it -- a move that will shore up his Shia base by 
showing him to be championing full constitutional 
implementation.  His proposal is unlikely to gain much 
traction, however, given broad and vocal Christian 
opposition, even from Berri's own allies.  In the face of 
that opposition and despite his early support for the idea, 
President Sleiman has not sought to take the lead on this 
issue of national importance.  As a result, the question of 
deconfessionalization will likely continue to be postponed 
for a decision at some unspecified time in the future. 
Berri's proposal and the ruckus it provoked have had one 
notable short-term effect: they have diverted attention away 
from discussion of Hizballah's arms.  Maybe that's what he 
intended all along. 
DAUGHTON