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RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 3909
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4315
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 000123 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UNSC MARR MOPS PBTS KPAL EAIR
LE, SY, IS 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR UNDER SECRETARY BURNS' FEBRUARY 
16-17 VISIT TO BEIRUT 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4(b) 
and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Embassy Beirut warmly welcomes your February 
16-17 visit to Lebanon.  As the country emerges from a 
six-month struggle to form a new national unity government, 
your meetings with President Michel Sleiman, Prime Minister 
Saad Hariri, and Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri will 
reinforce the message that the U.S. is committed to 
supporting Lebanon's state institutions and new government. 
Your possible meeting with UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon 
Michael Williams will illustrate U.S. commitment to the 
fulfillment of UN Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701. 
 A dinner with March 14 representatives will give you an 
opportunity to reaffirm our support for Lebanon's 
sovereignty, independence, and moderate political forces. 
Our support to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the 
Internal Security Forces (ISF), along with our other robust 
U.S. assistance programs, aims to strengthen state 
institutions, promote economic growth, support education and 
build civil society. 
 
¶2. (C) Your visit to Lebanon will show continued U.S. support 
for Lebanon's sovereignty and stability while underscoring 
the state's obligation to exert control over all of its 
territory.  Your visit will also highlight the U.S. desire to 
gain a better understanding of the Lebanese perspective and 
role in securing a comprehensive and lasting peace in the 
region.  President Sleiman and PM Hariri, in particular, will 
seek assurances that the U.S. remains committed to supporting 
Lebanon and that Middle East peace negotiations will take 
into account their concerns about Palestinian refugees 
resident in Lebanon.  End Summary. 
 
NEW UNITY GOVERNMENT BASED ON CONSENSUS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) The new prime minister, Saad Hariri, was able to form 
a national unity government in December only after he granted 
the opposition key concessions following nearly six months of 
negotiations.  Although the contentious cabinet negotiations 
weakened March 14 and strengthened those allied with Syria 
and Iran, most Lebanese leaders appear to be seeking a period 
of calm after years of tumult following former Prime Minister 
Rafiq Hariri's assassination and the withdrawal of Syrian 
forces from Lebanon.  Your interlocutors will be keenly 
interested in U.S. engagements in the Arab world, with an 
emphasis on the U.S. relationship with Syria and our role in 
restarting Middle East peace negotiations.  They will likely 
emphasize Lebanese opposition to settling Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon under any such deal. 
 
KEY U.S. OBJECTIVES 
------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Strengthening key Lebanese state institutions 
continues to be the primary U.S. objective in Lebanon.  The 
U.S. has committed over $600 million in security assistance 
($530 million in assistance to the LAF, $86 million to the 
ISF) to the military and police since 2006 to help the GOL 
gradually extend its control over all Lebanese territory, 
including areas dominated by Hizballah.  President Obama 
underscored this objective by emphasizing the importance of 
controlling arms smuggling into Lebanon during President 
Sleiman's mid-December visit to Washington.  Your visit here 
offers an opportunity to reaffirm U.S. support for the 
various Lebanon-related UN Security Council resolutions 
(UNSCRs), especially 1559 and 1701, that call for extending 
the state's control over all its territory. 
 
HARIRI GOES TO DAMASCUS 
----------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Prime Minister Saad Hariri, leader of Lebanon's Sunnis 
and heir to his assassinated father's political and 
business legacy, assumed his new role after a grueling 
negotiation with his political opponents.  As the head of the 
primarily Sunni Future Movement, Hariri was a key leader of 
the March 14 coalition and an opponent of Syrian influence in 
Lebanon.  After finally forming a national unity government 
in December, he visited Damascus to establish a relationship 
with Syrian President Bashar al-Asad as part of a regional 
 
detente between Syria and Hariri's primary backer, Saudi 
Arabia.  As part of this process, he also extended his hand 
to Syria's allies in Lebanon, including Hizballah and 
Christian opposition leader Michel Aoun.  Hariri said he went 
to Damascus "seeking a new relationship, with a neighbor" and 
cast his December 19-20 visit as "a new form of achieving 
sovereignty and independence." 
 
¶6. (C) According to the PM's advisors, Hariri "heard all the 
right things" from al-Asad, who sought a new paradigm based 
on economic cooperation rather than ideological conflict, on 
the model of Syria's blossoming relationship with Turkey. 
The PM said he was optimistic following the talks with 
al-Asad, although he did not expect that all GOL bilateral 
goals would be achieved.  Hariri planned to launch an 
initiative to demarcate the Lebanese-Syrian shared border and 
said he had discussed with his Syrian interlocutors plans to 
construct a railway from Tripoli to Homs and to transfer gas 
from Turkey to Lebanon through Syria.  Hariri advisors said 
the Syrian president sought to establish a "personal 
relationship" with the PM, and Hariri divulged to visiting 
Special Envoy Mitchell that, following the visit, he called 
al-Asad "every week." 
 
¶7. (C) In your meeting with the him, Hariri will seek 
assurances of continued U.S. support for his country, and you 
will have the opportunity to urge him to strengthen and 
reform Lebanese state institutions that have been weakened by 
years of neglect, foreign occupation and internal strife. 
You will meet with Hariri two days after the fifth 
anniversary of his father's assassination and can assure him 
that U.S. support for Lebanese sovereignty and independence 
remains as strong now as in 2005.  Despite our extensive 
security assistance -- including the provision of high-tech 
items such as the Raven UAV -- Hariri will likely outline his 
desire for a "Marshall Plan" for the LAF under which the U.S. 
would give more advanced equipment so that the LAF can be a 
credible force compared to Hizballah. 
 
SLEIMAN SEEKS THE MIDDLE 
------------------------ 
 
¶8. (C) President Sleiman, the former army commander elected 
as a consensus candidate in 2008, has committed himself to 
representing all Lebanese and to striving for unity among 
Lebanon's sectarian groups.  Although the Christian 
president's powers are limited by the constitution, Sleiman 
has emphasized that his absolute priority is maintaining 
stability in Lebanon by balancing internal and external 
political forces.  Sleiman has also sought to return Lebanon 
to its place among the international community, as evidenced 
by his push for Lebanon's UN Security Council seat.  During 
his December 14-15 visit to Washington, Sleiman publicly 
emphasized the need for continued U.S. assistance to Lebanon, 
complained of Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty, and 
called on the U.S. to ensure that any peace agreement between 
Israel and the Palestinians addresses Lebanese concerns on 
Palestinian refugees.  Sleiman's advisors tell us that the 
message he heard in Washington on the danger that arms 
smuggling to Hizballah poses to Lebanon continues to resonate 
with him. 
 
¶9. (C) It is widely assumed that Sleiman, as a consensus 
presidential candidate and former LAF commander, has the 
blessing of the Syrian regime.  With visiting U.S. 
interlocutors, Sleiman often stresses Syria's good intentions 
towards the United States and the regime's seriousness in 
improving the bilateral U.S.-Syria relationship.  We expect 
that Sleiman, who met al-Asad in Damascus in August 2009 and 
calls him regularly, will emphasize the challenges that 
Lebanon faces in implementing relevant UNSCRs and ask for 
U.S. commitment to constrain any escalation arising from 
security incidents along the Israeli border. 
 
BERRI AS LEGISLATIVE POWERBROKER 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Nabih Berri, first elected speaker of parliament 
under the Syrian occupation, has held the position for 18 
years and exerts a strong measure of control over the 
institution.  He also heads the Amal Party and partners with 
Hizballah to represent the Shia community in Lebanon.  Since 
 
the formation of the new government, Berri has publicly 
advanced a series of reforms, including the abolition of 
sectarianism in the Lebanese political system.  Berri has 
launched a media campaign against UNSCR 1559, which he sees 
as unfairly targeting Syria, and he is a vocal opponent of 
international resolutions aimed at Hizballah's arms, which he 
believes should be addressed through the National Dialogue 
process.  Berri will likely lobby for U.S. pressure on Israel 
to restart peace negotiations with Syria. 
 
INFORMAL BILATERAL RELATIONS 
CONTINUE WITH SYRIA 
---------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Although Lebanon and Syria exchanged ambassadors in 
October 2008, Syria maintains strong informal relations with 
key Lebanese politicians who push Syrian interests on the 
Lebanese political scene.  Christian opposition leader Michel 
Aoun is expected to meet with President al-Asad in Damascus 
for the second time in three months on February 9, and other 
opposition figures frequently make the short trip to the 
Syrian capital.  Even previously virulently anti-Syrian 
politicians have read the international winds as shifting in 
Syria's favor, following overtures by Western countries, 
including the United States, to Damascus.  Since last August, 
former March 14 stalwart and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt has 
courted Damascus extensively for an invitation to visit.  The 
continued existence of the Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council -- 
charged with overseeing economic and security treaties signed 
following the Taif agreement -- has also complicated GOL 
efforts to formalize bilateral ties. 
 
STALLED BORDER DELINEATION 
------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Although Hariri told visiting S/E Mitchell that he 
hoped to moved forward with an initiative to demarcate the 
Lebanese-Syrian border, Lebanese interlocutors remain 
skeptical that progress will happen quickly.  Hariri has told 
us that in preparation for initiating formal border talks 
with Syria, which will begin in the north, he has asked the 
Lebanese border team to study the issues at hand.  While 
Hariri supported demarcation, he said the goal was not "to 
build walls," but to "open a relationship," suggesting that 
he may hesitate to push al-Asad to halt weapons transfers to 
Hizballah across the porous boundary.  The Palestinian 
military bases that straddle the border remain unaddressed 
despite Lebanon's 2006 National Dialogue decision to disarm 
Palestinians outside refugee camps. 
 
GHAJAR: IMMINENT WITHDRAWAL UNLIKELY 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶13. (C) Last year the GOL informally affirmed its support for 
the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) proposal for an 
Israeli withdrawal from the occupied northern half of the 
village of Ghajar in the context of UNSCR 1701 
implementation.  However, as UNIFIL has continued discussing 
the logistics of such a withdrawal with Israel, the Israeli 
side has raised additional security, legal and humanitarian 
concerns, suggesting that an imminent withdrawal is unlikely. 
 After UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams' 
recent consultations in Israel, he believed that Israel was 
"looking for something" from Lebanon before withdrawing from 
Ghajar.  Williams, with whom you might meet, did not believe 
that the GOL had the political cover -- or inclination -- to 
negotiate over Ghajar, and we have also reiterated to the 
Israelis that a withdrawal should be expeditious and 
complete.  We expect Williams will seek your assistance in 
pressuring the GOI to find a solution on Ghajar.  He will 
also brief you on his meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister 
Walid Mouallem, currently scheduled for February 16, and his 
consultations with the new UNIFIL Force Commander, MGen 
Alberto Asarta Cuevas of Spain. 
 
SEAT ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
---------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Lebanon was unanimously elected to a rotating 
two-year UN Security Council seat beginning in January 2010. 
President Sleiman fought personally for the seat, which he 
views as an opportunity to bolster his and Lebanon's 
 
international prestige and reconfirm its sovereignty.  While 
Lebanon's vote will generally follow Arab League consensus, 
some issues, especially those related to Iran, Middle East 
peace, or Lebanon itself, could cause significant political 
friction in Beirut.  While we understand Lebanon's delicate 
domestic environment, we want to stress that membership on 
the Council is an opportunity for the Lebanese to demonstrate 
responsible leadership. 
 
RECENT SECURITY INCIDENTS 
------------------------- 
 
¶15. (C) As the new government has begun its work, several 
security incidents have highlighted the inability of its 
security forces to operate in certain areas.  In late 
December, the LAF was initially prevented by Hizballah from 
investigating the scene of a explosion at the Hamas 
headquarters in the Hizballah-controlled southern suburbs of 
Beirut.  In early January, fighting between Palestinian 
factions inside the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp also 
underscored the Lebanese security forces' limited ability to 
access the camps, which are a safehaven for extremist 
militant groups.  More recently, on January 23 a UNIFIL foot 
patrol in southern Lebanon was harassed by an angry crowd of 
locals, in violation of UNSCR 1701.  While none of these 
examples led to wider violence, the constant rhythm of 
security incidents has the potential to spiral out of 
control, especially if any aggression aimed at Israel results 
in casualties. 
 
ETHIOPIAN AIRLINES CRASH 
------------------------ 
 
¶16. (C) Your Lebanese interlocutors will likely express 
thanks for U.S. assistance in the aftermath of the January 25 
crash of Ethiopian Airlines flight 409 off the coast of 
Beirut just minutes after takeoff.  The tragic event 
magnified the limitations of the GOL to address emergency 
situations and highlighted its weakness in conducting search 
and rescue operations.  At the request of PM Hariri, the U.S. 
mobilized resources to provide the destroyer USS Ramage, a 
contingent NAVCENT dive team, and technical expertise from 
the National Transportation and Safety Board and the Federal 
Aviation Administration to assist in the ongoing 
investigation.  A second U.S. Navy ship, the USNS Grapple, is 
currently en route to Beirut and will remain until a 
commercial salvage ship arrives on or about February 11.  Our 
immediate and ongoing support to GOL requests for assistance 
allowed us to provide real-time training to the LAF and 
exhibited goodwill in a time of national crisis. 
SISON