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C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 000116 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2020 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KPAL PINR PTER SY IS LE
SUBJECT: MARADA'S FRANJIEH CALLS FOR INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS 
WITH ISRAEL 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Marada leader Sleiman Franjieh reported to 
the Ambassador on February 2 that he had established a 
rapport with Prime Minister Saad Hariri, whom he described as 
"a man you can deal with."  Franjieh, a strong Syrian ally, 
expressed his support for indirect negotiations between 
Lebanon and Israel in tandem with the Syrian track.  In such 
negotiations, the pro-Aoun opposition leader argued, 
Hizballah's weapons could be used as a strong negotiating 
card with Israel and prevent Palestinian resettlement in 
Lebanon instead of in a Palestinian state.  Franjieh urged 
privatization of the electricity and telecommunications 
sectors in addition to linking Lebanon to regional countries 
to import electricity.  He voiced support for several 
proposed reforms to the electoral law and described a civil 
state is being in the best interests of Lebanese Christians 
in the long term.  End Summary. 
 
A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH HARIRI 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) Despite the tense political atmosphere that prevailed 
in Lebanon following the 2005 assassination of former PM 
Rafik Hariri, Franjieh established a rapport with new PM Saad 
Hariri during cabinet formation negotiations, he told the 
Ambassador on February 2.  As a result of this rapprochement, 
relations between the Sunni population of Tripoli and 
Christians from Franjieh,s home district of Zgharta had 
improved tremendously, Franjieh reported.  He praised Hariri 
as "a man you can deal with," but he assessed that the PM 
made a mistake in sponsoring a March 14 gathering at the 
Bristol Hotel on January 31 because such a partisan activity 
undermined him as a national figure.  The February 14 
commemoration of Rafik Hariri's assassination, which was 
announced at the Bristol, should be organized by the Hariri 
family and not the March 14 alliance, Franjieh asserted, so 
that all parties could participate in remembering a national 
martyr.  If Hariri sponsored a non-partisan event on February 
14 , Franjieh argued, he would still have leeway to 
participate in a formal March 14 coalition rally on March 14. 
 
 
SUPPORT FOR INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Franjieh, a close friend and ally of Syrian President 
Bashar al-Asad, expressed his support for indirect 
negotiations between Lebanon and Israel.  But, he noted, 
Lebanon should maintain unity with a Syrian track in its 
peace talks with Israel since Lebanon could not sustain a 
peace treaty unless Syria also signed a peace treaty with 
Israel.  Otherwise, he argued, "Lebanon will pay the price if 
Syria signs a peace treaty independently from Lebanon." 
 
USE HIZBALLAH'S WEAPONS AS A BARGAINING CHIP 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The Lebanese state should have the monopoly on 
weapons, Franjieh underscored, but he felt that Hizballah's 
weapons could be used as a strong negotiating card with 
Israel and play an important role in preventing Palestinian 
resettlement in Lebanon.  Noises made by "some parties" about 
Hizballah's weapons while those same parties ignored 
Palestinian weapons inside the refugee camps indicated bad 
intentions, Franjieh believed.  "Such arguments imply that 
the main aim is to disarm the Shia and keep Sunni weapons to 
impose a Palestinian resettlement by force," he said. 
 
PALESTINIAN STATE IS THE SOLUTION 
TO PALESTINIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) The Palestinian presence in Lebanon remained his main 
concern, Franjieh emphasized, and he pointed to the creation 
of a Palestinian state as the best solution to the issue. 
"Palestinian demography scares not only Israel but us also. 
Creating a Palestinian state would dissipate these fears," 
Franjieh explained.  Not all Palestinian refugees would 
return to such a Palestinian state, he admitted, but he 
argued that Palestinian refugees remaining in Lebanon would 
 
be treated like any citizen of a foreign country residing in 
Lebanon.  Those who obtained permission could also immigrate 
to third countries, he said.  The living conditions of 
refugees must be improved, he added, but he underscored that 
the government must create economic growth first. 
 
PRIVATIZATION KEY TO GROWTH 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Franjieh expressed his support for privatization in 
general and called for privatizing the electricity and 
telecommunications sectors.  He further advocated linking 
Lebanon to regional countries in order to import electricity. 
 Lebanon should buy electricity cheaply from Syria or Turkey, 
he said, instead of producing it domestically using expensive 
and polluting fuel oil.  He also supported changing Lebanese 
laws in order to attract foreign investments, which in turn 
could provide job opportunities for youth. 
 
SUPPORT FOR ELECTORAL REFORMS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) The voting age should be lowered to 18, Franjieh 
argued, despite the "opposition of my ally, Michel Aoun." 
Opposing lowering the voting age to 18 is like "hiding behind 
your finger" since those citizens would be voters in a few 
years, he pointed out.  Establishment of a full-fledged civil 
state should precede political deconfessionalization, he 
advocated, although he pledged his support for abolishing 
political confessionalism.  A civil state is in the best 
interest of Lebanese Christians in the long term, Franjieh 
maintained, despite the possibility that initial stages of 
the process could be appear to disadvantage Christians. 
 
¶8. (C) With regard to the cabinet discussion over revising 
the municipal electoral law, Franjieh said he had asked his 
Marada representative in the cabinet, Minister of State 
Yussef Saadeh, to propose dividing Beirut into three 
electoral districts, the same way Beirut was divided in the 
parliamentary elections.  PM Hariri,s opposition to the 
proposal was unjustified, Franjieh complained, because Hariri 
had accepted the concept of division in the parliamentary 
elections.  Under the plan, he said, each of three districts 
would elect eight members to the municipal board and the 
mayor would be a Sunni in order to allay Hariri,s concerns. 
"Dividing Beirut would ensure that all communities would be 
represented on the municipal board," Franjieh argued. 
 
¶9. (C) Franjieh ruled out reconciliation with Lebanese Forces 
leader Samir Geagea since "the people are not ready for such 
a process."  Nevertheless, he allowed, the ground could be 
prepared for such a move in the future if neither the 
Lebanese Forces nor Franjieh's Marada raised controversial 
issues at the political or media levels. 
 
¶10. (C) COMMENT:  This meeting was our first with Franjieh in 
over a year.  Despite his position as the leader of a small 
regional party, he played a key role in negotiating a 
solution to last fall's cabinet formation crisis and he has 
avoided ideological battles.  While Franjieh is primarily 
concerned with the issue of Palestinian resettlement in 
Lebanon, his opinions on regional peace negotiations are, of 
note, given his close alliance with Syria.  He was direct and 
thoughtful throughout the conversation. 
 
SISON