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C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 000115 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2020 
TAGS: MARR MOPS PTER KPKO PINR SY IS LE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FEBRUARY 9-13 JOINT MILITARY 
COMMISSION 
 
REF: 08 BEIRUT 1390 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The February 10-12 Joint Military Commission 
(JMC) meetings in Washington are the second in the series of 
bilateral military discussions that began in October 2008 
(reftel).  As Lebanon emerges from 2009's  six-month struggle 
to form the new national unity government, the JMC will 
reinforce the message that the U.S. is committed to 
supporting Lebanon's state institutions.  Our support for the 
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Internal Security Forces 
(ISF), with a committed total over $600 million since 2006, 
is a vital part of our comprehensive assistance program aimed 
at strengthening key state institutions, promoting economic 
growth, supporting education and building civil society.  The 
JMC is an opportunity to show continued U.S. support for 
Lebanon's sovereignty and stability while underscoring the 
state's obligation to exert control over all of its territory. 
 
¶2. (C) Recent security incidents along the southern border 
with Israel and in the Palestinian camps have not detracted 
from the effective cooperation in the Tripartite mechanism 
between the LAF and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) through 
the mediation of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). 
Furthermore, Lebanese leaders regularly call for continued 
U.S. assistance to the LAF, despite disagreements about 
Lebanon-related UN Security Council resolutions.  The 
Lebanese delegation will likely express thanks for rapid U.S. 
assistance in the aftermath of the crash of Ethiopian 
Airlines Flight 409 on January 25.  End Summary. 
 
NEW UNITY GOVERNMENT BASED ON CONSENSUS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) The new prime minister, Saad Hariri, formed a cabinet 
in December 2009 only after he granted the opposition -- 
which includes Hizballah -- key concessions following six 
months of negotiations.  Although the contentious cabinet 
negotiations weakened Hariri's March 14 alliance and 
strengthened those allied with Syria and Iran, most Lebanese 
leaders appear to be seeking a period of calm after years of 
tumult following former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri's 
assassination and the withdrawal of Syrian forces from 
Lebanon in 2005. 
 
¶4. (C) The LAF, deliberately neglected during the 1990-2005 
Syrian occupation, plays an essential role in ensuring 
stability in Lebanon, primarily through its anti-terrorism 
efforts.  The value of the LAF was clearly demonstrated 
during its 2007 battle with terrorists from Fatah al-Islam 
inside the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp, and the army has 
continued its vigorous anti-terrorism efforts.  Nevertheless, 
the organization struggles in the face of its local 
competition: Hizballah, armed rejectionist Palestinian 
groups, and groups inspired by global jihadists.  The LAF is 
also regularly called upon to provide internal security 
services that should fall to the ISF, particularly when 
sectarian tensions flare up.  For these reasons and more, the 
overstretched and conflict-averse LAF has failed to exert 
exclusive control over the Hizballah-dominated south and the 
Bekaa Valley, as well as the Palestinian refugee camps and 
military bases. 
 
KEY U.S. OBJECTIVES 
------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Strengthening key Lebanese state institutions 
continues to be the primary U.S. objective in Lebanon.  The 
U.S. has committed over $600 million in security assistance 
($530 million in assistance to the LAF, $86 million to the 
ISF) to the military and police since 2006 to help the GOL 
gradually extend its control over all Lebanese territory, 
including areas dominated by Hizballah.  President Obama 
underscored this objective during President Sleiman's 
mid-December visit to Washington by emphasizing the 
importance of controlling arms smuggling into Lebanon.  The 
Lebanese delegation's participation in the JMC presents an 
opportunity to reaffirm U.S. support for the LAF and 
emphasize U.S. commitment to full implementation of all 
Lebanon-related UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs), 
including 1559, 1680, and 1701, that call for extending the 
 
state's control over all its territory. 
 
¶6. (C) The LAF is top-heavy, resource-poor, and subject to 
intense political pressures.  Although the second two factors 
are unlikely to change in the near future, the JMC is an 
ideal opportunity to urge the GOL to streamline the LAF to 
make it a lighter, more agile force designed to address 
Lebanon's primary security priorities.  Our assistance has 
been designed with these priorities in mind, but our efforts 
would be more effective if the LAF were to develop a 
comprehensive, long-term strategy document to which we could 
link our training and equipment assistance.  Lebanese 
leaders, and Defense Minister Elias Murr in particular, have 
been open to previous offers of U.S. assistance in designing 
such a strategy, but the institution lacks the necessary 
technical skills to follow through.  Thus, the JMC presents 
an opportunity to renew our offer to lend assistance 
specifically to that effort. 
 
MURR ENERGIZED 
-------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Deputy Prime Minister Elias Murr, who has also been 
defense minister since 2005, will lead the Lebanese 
delegation to the JMC.  Murr appears to be starting his 
return to the cabinet in action mode following his 
mid-December visit to Washington with President Sleiman. 
Murr visited UNIFIL headquarters in southern Lebanon on 
December 23, publicly affirming the GOL's commitment to UNSCR 
1701, which is a linchpin in efforts to undermine non-state 
actors in Lebanon.  Murr recently told us he plans to 
restructure the LAF to make it more agile and less top-heavy, 
and he has an ambitious plan to equip the army with the 
advanced weaponry so it can operate more effectively.  The 
LAF itself has also recognized the benefit of reorienting, 
through programs such as civil-military cooperation training, 
to better accomplish its mission.  Despite our robust ongoing 
train-and-equip assistance to the LAF, Murr will likely press 
the U.S. to provide additional equipment to the special 
operations units that he intends to be the core of a retooled 
LAF.  Murr's attendance at the JMC will provide an 
opportunity to emphasize to him our hope that our assistance 
will enable the GOL to exert control over all its territory 
in order to maintain regional stability. 
 
¶8. (C) Murr, who sometimes exaggerates his level of influence 
over the institutional LAF, will nevertheless arrive at the 
JMC with the full backing of President Michel Sleiman, PM 
Saad Hariri, and Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, who all 
have requested continued U.S. military assistance to the LAF. 
 While in Washington, Sleiman publicly emphasized the need 
for continued U.S. assistance to Lebanon, complained of 
Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty, and called on the 
U.S. to ensure that any peace agreement between Israel and 
the Palestinians address Lebanese concerns on Palestinian 
refugees.  Sleiman's advisors tell us that the message he 
heard in Washington on the danger that arms smuggling to 
Hizballah poses to Lebanon continues to resonate with him. 
PM Hariri has outlined for recent visiting USG officials his 
desire for a "Marshall Plan" for the LAF, under which the 
U.S. would give more advanced equipment so that the LAF could 
be a credible force compared to Hizballah.  Syrian-allied 
Speaker Berri welcomes continued U.S. assistance, but remains 
a vocal opponent of international resolutions that target 
Hizballah's arms, which he believes should be addressed 
through the National Dialogue process.  Berri continues to 
lobby for U.S. pressure on Israel to restart peace 
negotiations with Syria. 
 
RECENT SECURITY INCIDENTS 
------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) As the new government began its work, recent security 
incidents highlighted the inability of Lebanese security 
forces to operate in certain areas.  A bomb exploded at the 
Hamas headquarters in the Hizballah-controlled southern 
suburbs of Beirut on December 26, and Hizballah initially 
prevented the security forces from reaching the scene.  While 
the LAF took on the investigation once Hizballah gave it 
access, the incident highlighted the army's inability to work 
freely in areas under Hizballah control.  Fighting on January 
2 between gunmen from Fatah and Jund al-Sham in the Ain 
al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp similarly displayed the 
 
Lebanese security forces' inability to access the camps and 
the resulting potential for radicalization and violence to 
develop and spread beyond their boundaries and destabilize 
the country. 
 
¶10. (C) More recently, UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon 
(UNSCOL) Michael Williams reported to the Ambassador a 
January 23 act of aggression against a UNIFIL foot patrol in 
the southern Lebanese town of Bint Jbeil involving an angry 
crowd and denial of the UNIFIL patrol's freedom of movement, 
a violation of UNSCR 1701.  Williams called the incident 
"clearly worrying" because of its quick escalation and its 
occurrence during a routine patrol.  Similarly, tensions rose 
between the GOL and the GOI after the IDF detained and 
questioned a Lebanese shepherd on January 31 when he 
allegedly crossed the Blue Line into Israeli-occupied 
territory.  Williams remains concerned that such small 
incidents, if not rapidly contained, have the potential to 
destabilize the border region. 
 
¶11. (C) The Lebanese delegation will likely decry Israeli 
occupation of both Shebaa Farms and the Lebanese portion of 
the village of Ghajar.  Recent aggressive GOI statements that 
the IDF will target all of Lebanon instead of only Hizballah 
in any future conflict have also raised concerns in Beirut. 
The delegation may also point to ongoing Israeli overflights 
of Lebanese territory as evidence that Israel is not serious 
about respecting UNSCR 1701, which halted the 2006 war 
between Israel and Hizballah.  UNIFIL has proposed a plan for 
IDF withdrawal from Ghajar, but neither the GOL nor the GOI 
has yet signed on to the proposal. 
 
THE TRIPARTITE MECHANISM 
------------------------ 
 
¶12. (C) Despite escalating political rhetoric from both the 
GOL and the GOI, on a technical level the Tripartite 
mechanism continues to work well, by all accounts.  The 
Tripartite, the only official mode of communication between 
the LAF and the IDF via UNIFIL's mediation, has been a key 
factor in mitigating the impact of security incidents along 
the Blue Line and establishing a level of trust between the 
parties, UNSCOL Williams believes.  The head of the Lebanese 
Tripartite team is Brigadier General Abdulruhman Shehaitly, 
who is also scheduled to participate in the JMC. 
 
SEAT ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
---------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) Lebanon was unanimously elected to a rotating 
two-year UN Security Council (UNSC) seat, beginning in 
January 2010.  President Sleiman fought personally for the 
seat, which he views as an opportunity to bolster his and 
Lebanon's international prestige and sovereignty credentials. 
 While Lebanon's vote will generally follow Arab League 
consensus, some issues, especially those related to Iran, 
Middle East peace, or Lebanon itself, could cause significant 
political friction in Beirut.  Multiple sources also indicate 
that Syria has launched a committed, although thus far 
unsuccessful, campaign to coopt Lebanon's vote on the UNSC 
for its own ends.  While we understand Lebanon's delicate 
domestic environment, we want to stress that membership on 
the Council is an opportunity for the Lebanese to demonstrate 
responsible leadership. 
 
ETHIOPIAN AIRLINES CRASH 
------------------------ 
 
¶14. (C) The Lebanese delegation will likely express thanks 
for U.S. assistance, including assistance from the U.S. 
military, in the aftermath of the January 25 crash of 
Ethiopian Airlines flight 409 off the coast of Beirut just 
minutes after takeoff.  The tragic event magnified the 
limitations of the GOL to address emergency situations and 
highlighted the GOL's weakness in conducting search and 
rescue operations.  At the request of PM Hariri, the U.S. 
government mobilized its resources to provide the USS Ramage, 
a contingent NAVCENT dive team, and technical expertise from 
the National Transportation and Safety Board and the Federal 
Aviation Administration to assist in the ongoing 
investigation.  A second U.S. Navy ship, the USNS Grapple, is 
currently en route to Beirut and will remain until a 
commercial salvage ship arrives on or about February 11.  Our 
 
immediate and ongoing support to GOL requests for assistance 
allowed us to provide real-time training to the LAF and 
exhibited goodwill in a time of national crisis. 
 
SISON