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INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
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RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 000382 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2035 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PARM ECON KN KS CH
SUBJECT: CHINA-ROK RELATIONS: MINOR TENSIONS, POSITIVE 
OVERALL 
 
Classified By: Deputy Political Section Chief Ben Moeling.  Reasons 1.4 
 (b/d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  In a round of recent meetings on the state 
of Sino-ROK relations, Chinese and ROK officials agree that 
the overall trend of the bilateral relationship is positive. 
Chinese leaders are quite pleased at the appointment of Yu 
Woo-ik, the former Chief of Staff to ROK President Lee 
Myung-bak, as the new ROK Ambassador to Beijing.  Chinese 
officials point to the unprecedented frequency of high-level 
exchanges as a sign of the growing importance of Sino-ROK 
ties and note that President Lee has tentatively agreed to 
attend the opening ceremony of the Shanghai World Expo. 
Total bilateral trade slowed in 2009, but China still hopes 
to conclude a bilateral FTA with Seoul soon. 
One ROK Embassy contact said that even though many South 
Koreans believe China has strategic political motives for 
pursuing a bilateral FTA with the ROK, China's enthusiasm for 
the FTA contrasted with the U.S. delay in ratifying KORUS 
(South Korea-U.S. FTA).  On mil-mil ties, China's priority 
remains reminding the ROK to avoid taking any actions that 
might affect the Taiwan issue.  Chinese and ROK officials 
both maintain that the handling of DPRK defectors residing in 
ROK diplomatic missions remains an area of contention between 
the two countries.  End Summary. 
 
PRC-ROK Ties 
------------ 
 
¶2. (C) In a round of recent meetings on the state of Sino-ROK 
relations, Chinese and ROK officials agreed that the overall 
trend of the bilateral relationship was positive.  Despite 
some initial concerns that ROK President Lee Myung-bak's 
campaign promise to emphasize the U.S.-ROK alliance might 
come at the expense of its ties with China, ROK Embassy 
contacts told us that Beijing had been pleasantly surprised 
that it had been able to continue developing a strategic 
relationship with Seoul.  MFA Asia Department DPRK, ROK and 
Mongolia Division Deputy Director Bao Xuhui described 
Sino-ROK ties as friendly and smooth during a January 25 
meeting.  He noted that Seoul had sent Yu Woo-ik, President 
Lee's former Chief of Staff, as South Korean Ambassador to 
Beijing in December in a clear sign of the importance of the 
relationship to Seoul.  PRC MFA officials were quite pleased 
at the appointment of Yu and suggested it had been well 
received by senior Politburo officials, said ROK Embassy 
Counselor Lee Heon during a January 19 discussion.  Chinese 
scholars and MFA officials had frequently reminded Seoul that 
the ROK Ambassador to Washington was a former Prime Minister 
and had hinted that Seoul should send a similar political 
heavyweight to Beijing, maintained Lee.  It would be 
interesting to see if the next Chinese Ambassador to Seoul -- 
rumored to be announced after Lunar New Year -- would be 
similarly well received in Seoul, said Lee. 
 
¶3. (C) Bao highlighted the fact that Sino-ROK ties had 
undergone tremendous development since the establishment of 
diplomatic relations in 1992 and had been "upgraded" roughly 
every five years.  The bilateral relationship was upgraded to 
"cooperative partnership" in 1998, to "comprehensive 
cooperative partnership" in 2002, and most recently to 
"strategic cooperative partnership" in 2008.  Bao told PolOff 
that Beijing and Seoul closely cooperated on a variety of 
global issues such as UN reform, climate change, the global 
financial crisis and, of course, North Korea. 
 
High-Level Exchanges 
-------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The frequency of high-level exchanges and meetings 
between China and the ROK was unprecedented, claimed Bao. 
PRC Premier Wen Jiabao was scheduled to visit the ROK in May 
to participate in the China-Japan-ROK Trilateral Summit and 
President Hu was expected to meet with President Lee at the 
G-20 Summit in November.  In 2009, recounted Bao, Politburo 
Standing Committee member Li Changchun and Vice President Xi 
Jinping paid separate visits to South Korea.  And in 2008, 
President Lee met with President Hu a record three times 
(President Lee visited Beijing for an official visit in May 
and again in August for the Olympics, and President Hu paid 
an official to Seoul in August). 
 
¶5. (C) According to Bao, ROK President Lee had agreed "in 
principle" to attend the opening ceremony of the Shanghai 
World Expo in April.  He noted that 2010 had been designated 
the "Visit China" year in South Korea.  Bao added that China 
 
BEIJING 00000382  002 OF 003 
 
 
had tentatively agreed to reciprocate by sending a senior 
Chinese leader to attend the opening ceremony of the Yeosu 
World Expo in 2012 and would designate 2012 the "Visit South 
Korea" year.  ROK Deputy Chief of Mission Lim Sungnam 
confidentially confirmed to PolOffs on February 10 that ROK 
President Lee had agreed to visit Shanghai in April but said 
that there had been no quid pro quo agreement with China to 
guarantee a Chinese leader's participation at the Yeosu World 
Expo in 2012.  Lim complained that the Chinese often seemed 
to link unrelated items in an effort to force their preferred 
outcomes (e.g. you visit my expo and I'll visit your expo). 
 
¶6. (C) High-level exchanges with the Chinese were not without 
risks to the host country, said ROK First Secretary Jin Nam 
on January 28.  Nam told us that Vice President Xi's visit to 
Seoul in December had gone well.  Fortunately, said Nam, the 
ROK had decided to provide Xi with a level of security 
protection normally reserved for heads of state.  Japan, 
however, had declined to upgrade Xi's security, and was later 
embarrassed when a loose coalition of anti-China protestors 
shouted slogans such as "go home" and "go to hell" during his 
visit to Japan.  While Xi remained calm throughout this 
incident, MFA Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei and the PRC 
security detail became extremely agitated and flustered.  Nam 
said that former PRC Ambassador to Tokyo and newly appointed 
VFM Cui Tiankai reportedly was sent back to Beijing for a 
scolding after Xi's visit. 
 
¶7. (C) In addition to the numerous high-level exchanges 
between China and the ROK, Bao noted that there had been an 
explosion in people-to-people contact in recent years.  China 
was the ROK's most popular tourist destination, with over 
5.53 million South Koreans visiting China in 2008.  There 
were more than 330 flights per week between the two countries 
and 110 Chinese cities had sister-city agreements with ROK 
cities.  There were also more than 60,000 Chinese students in 
the ROK and 65,000 ROK students in China; both groups were 
the largest foreign student populations in the two countries. 
 All of these official and unofficial exchanges helped the 
two countries better understand each other, asserted Bao. 
 
Economic Agreements Lead to Enhanced Political Ties 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶8. (C) While the political relationship between Beijing and 
Seoul was important, said Bao, the foundation of the 
bilateral relationship was economic cooperation.  According 
to Bao, there was "consensus" in Beijing and Seoul that South 
Korea's economic growth was now tied to China's economy and 
would develop and benefit along with China's growth.  Bao 
confirmed that there had been some tension in the Sino-ROK 
commercial relationship last year when Chinese workers 
complained about unpaid wages after numerous ROK factory 
owners abruptly shut down operations in order to avoid 
complying with new labor regulations.  The two governments 
have since dealt with this issue and continue to educate ROK 
investors about China's new labor regulations, said Bao. 
Currently, Beijing was focused on improving the quality of 
ROK investments in China and hoped to attract more high-tech 
investments in the environment and communication sectors. 
Due to the global financial crisis, total bilateral trade 
between China and South Korea had slowed in 2009, but China 
still hoped that bilateral FTA talks would move into the 
negotiation phase soon, said Bao. 
 
¶9. (C) ROK DCM Lim confirmed that China was enthusiastic 
about concluding a bilateral FTA with South Korea.  China's 
efforts to sign a bilateral FTA with the ROK and a trilateral 
FTA with the ROK and Japan might be part of China's strategic 
efforts to improve ties with its neighbors, said Lim. 
Unfortunately, these Chinese efforts might come at the 
expense of U.S. standing in the region, warned Lim.  China's 
pro-active efforts to pass an FTA with the ROK contrasted 
poorly with the U.S. delay in ratification of KORUS, 
commented Lim.  (In a follow-on point, Lim urged increased 
U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region.  He praised the 
Secretary's January 12 speech in Honolulu, but added that it 
was now up to Washington to fulfill the vision that the 
Secretary outlined.  Lim suggested that the USG needed to 
think long-term and creatively.  For instance, in order to 
increase American awareness of the Asia Pacific region, Lim 
suggested organizing a regular youth exchange comprised of 
students from the U.S., China, Japan and the ROK that would 
tour the region together and might include stops in Honolulu, 
Tianjin, Yokohama, and Incheon.) 
 
 
BEIJING 00000382  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶10. (C) Separately, ROK Embassy First Secretary Jin Nam said 
on January 28 that, as the host of the China-Japan-ROK 
Trilateral Summit in May, the ROK was focused on moving 
forward on conducting feasibility studies for a trilateral 
FTA.  The ROK also had proposed and received positive 
feedback from Beijing and Tokyo on establishing a permanent 
trilateral secretariat in Seoul, according to Jin. 
 
Military Ties 
------------- 
 
¶11. (C) China and the ROK were slowly developing a mil-to-mil 
relationship, said Bao.  Thus far, the two militaries had 
established a hotline in 2008, had conducted joint naval 
search and rescue operations, and exchanged high-level 
military visits.  Seoul and Beijing had not yet conducted any 
joint military exercises.  Bao told PolOff that China's main 
concern on military issues was to remind the ROK to avoid 
taking any actions that might affect the Taiwan issue. 
 
DPRK 
---- 
 
¶12. (C) How to handle DPRK citizens residing in ROK 
diplomatic missions remained an area of contention in the 
bilateral relationship, Bao acknowledged.  Several years ago, 
noted Bao, ROK officials angered their Chinese counterparts 
when they provided assistance to DPRK refugees trying to 
enter ROK diplomatic buildings.  The ROK's actions were 
viewed by the Chinese government as an abuse of their 
diplomatic status and a violation of Chinese law.  Beijing 
understood ROK concerns about getting exit permission for 
these individuals, but China viewed these individuals as 
illegal economic migrants -- not refugees -- and preferred to 
handle them according to domestic immigration law. 
 
¶13. (C) ROK Counselor Lee Heon said that while overall 
Sino-ROK relations had improved over the course of 2009, the 
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) had increasingly become 
inflexible and "arrogant" on granting exit permissions to 
DPRK defectors located in ROK diplomatic buildings.  Lee 
attributed the change in MPS attitude to the controversy 
surrounding General Secretary of the World Uighur Congress 
Kolkun Isa's attempt to enter South Korea in September 2009 
on a flight from Germany.  Once Beijing learned of Isa's 
attempt to enter South Korea, it dispatched a team of five 
MPS officials to the international airport in Seoul to demand 
the repatriation of Isa to China where he would have faced 
criminal charges for running a "terrorist organization." 
Although Blue House officials refused Isa entry into the ROK, 
they also refused to turn Isa over to Chinese officials, 
opting instead to send him back on a flight to Germany. 
Since that time, Lee maintained, MPS had become stricter and 
slower to make decisions when dealing with DPRK refugees at 
the ROK Embassy. 
 
¶14. (C) Separately, Bao, who is an alumnus of Kim Il Sung 
University, said that he believed that North Korea had the 
following motivations in mind for revaluing its currency: 1) 
strengthening its planned economy; 2) strengthening social 
control over the North Korean people; and 3) reorganizing and 
simplifying control of its currency.  It was clear, however, 
that North Korean leaders had not fully considered the 
consequences of the currency revaluation.  North Korea had 
not yet set the foreign currency exchange rates and this had 
affected PRC Embassy operations in Pyongyang.  Bao noted that 
the PRC Embassy in Pyongyang, which had previously accepted 
payment for visa applications in euros and dollars, had 
temporarily suspended visa processing.  The Chinese and North 
Koreans were in discussions to find a resolution to this 
problem, Bao reported. 
HUNTSMAN