VZCZCXRO1161
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH
DE RUEHBJ #0369/01 0421028
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111028Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8089
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 000369 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2030 
TAGS: PREL PHUM MASS PGOV SOCI CH TW
SUBJECT: VFM CUI PROTESTS POTUS-DALAI LAMA MEETING 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor 
Aubrey Carlson.  Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  In a February 11 meeting with the 
Ambassador, Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai 
delivered a "stern representation" and expressed 
China's "grave concern" about the President's 
planned February 18 meeting with the Dalai Lama. 
Such a meeting "would amount to connivance with the 
Dalai Lama's agenda and interference in China's 
internal affairs."  Bilateral ties were already 
"severely damaged" by the announcement of new Taiwan 
arms sales, and the Dalai Lama meeting was "equally 
severe."  The Ambassador responded that the 
President would meet with the Dalai Lama in the 
latter's capacity as an internationally recognized 
religious leader and would urge the Dalai Lama to 
continue the dialogue process with China.  The 
Ambassador noted that differences over Taiwan and 
Tibet were not new and said both countries should 
look ahead to important events in 2010, including 
the Strategic and Economic Dialogue.  Cui repeated 
standard talking points about Tibet and Taiwan being 
China's "core interests."  The Ambassador and Cui 
agreed on the need to find the "right course" to 
move the relationship forward.  End summary. 
 
Nice to Meet You; Let's Get Down to Business 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In an introductory meeting his first official 
day as Vice Foreign Minister in charge of North 
American affairs, VFM Cui skipped pleasantries and 
noted that PRC Ambassador to Washington Zhou 
Wenzhong had been informed that President Obama 
planned to meet with the Dalai Lama February 18.  He 
said the Chinese side had made its points clearly in 
repeated representations expressing China's strong 
opposition to a visit by the Dalai Lama to the 
United States and to any meeting between U.S. 
leaders and the Dalai Lama under any circumstances. 
Despite the fact that the United States "must be 
very clear already" about the Chinese position, the 
President still planned to meet the Dalai Lama. 
Accordingly, Cui said, he had been instructed to 
make a "stern representation and express China's 
grave concern." 
 
¶3. (C) Tibet was a matter that touched on China's 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, Cui 
continued.  Reciting China's well-known 
characterization of the Dalai Lama as a separatist, 
Cui said that any U.S. leader meeting with the Dalai 
Lama at any time "would amount to connivance with 
the Dalai Lama's agenda and interference in China's 
internal affairs."  This was even more true in the 
current context of bilateral relations, which had 
been "severely damaged" by the announcement of U.S. 
arms sales to Taiwan.  The Dalai Lama meeting was 
"equally severe."  Cui urged the United States to 
"honor its commitments to recognize Chinese 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, not support 
Tibet independence, not destabilize Tibet and not 
harm bilateral relations." 
 
You, Too; Let's Move the Relationship Forward 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador noted that the Taiwan arms 
sales issue and the President's meeting with the 
Dalai Lama were not new and their impact on 
bilateral relations had been dealt with successfully 
in the past.  He reiterated U.S. policy that Tibet 
was a part of China, and that the President would 
meet with the Dalai Lama in the latter's capacity as 
an internationally recognized religious and 
spiritual leader.  He noted that the President had 
taken great care to be sensitive to PRC concerns 
regarding his meeting with the Dalai Lama, and that 
in his meeting would stress our desire that the 
Dalai Lama's representatives engage in more dialogue 
and promote greater peace and communication with 
Beijing. 
 
¶5. (C) On Taiwan arms sales, the Ambassador reminded 
Cui that U.S. policy with regard to Taiwan, 
including arms sales, was consistent with the three 
joint communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act. 
U.S.-China relations as a whole were more important, 
and more significant, than one or two issues.  The 
relationship was multifaceted, deep, and of great 
 
BEIJING 00000369  002 OF 003 
 
 
importance to both countries.  In 2009, the 
relationship had reached unprecedented heights, and 
in 2010 we were already looking forward to a visit 
by Deputy Secretary Steinberg, the Nuclear Security 
Summit and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. 
 
"Core Interests" 
---------------- 
 
¶6. (C) VFM Cui said that China had "kept the door 
open" to talks with the Dalai Lama's 
representatives, as evidenced by the January 
invitation to the Dalai Lama's representatives for 
talks with the United Front Work Department. 
Unfortunately, Cui said, "the talks have shown that 
the Dalai Lama's side is sticking to its previous 
rhetoric, specifically its demands for so-called 
genuine autonomy and greater Tibet."  This was a 
"wrong position," Cui said, and there was "no 
future" for them until they "genuinely give up 
separatism."  Until they did that, he said, there 
would be no basis for successful talks.  If the 
United States was interested in the talks' success, 
Cui added, it should "immediately reverse its wrong 
decision on the President's meeting, cancel the 
Dalai Lama's visit to the United States and stop 
giving wrong signals to the Chinese people." 
 
¶7. (C) VFM Cui noted positively the Ambassador's 
statements that the United States "recognizes 
China's sovereignty over Tibet and the one-China 
policy."  If the United States was committed to 
these ideas, he said, "China will wait to see 
concrete results of your statements."  Cui said the 
"important consensus" from President Obama's visit 
to China was the fact that the United States and 
China needed to put each other's concerns in better 
focus, particularly each other's "core interests." 
Tibet and Taiwan were both crucial to China's core 
interests, he said, and China hoped the U.S. side 
would come up with "credible steps" to "truly 
respect" China's core interests. 
 
¶8. (C) Putting aside the paper containing the Tibet 
demarche, VFM Cui noted that China and the United 
States shared many major common interests and had 
the responsibility to overcome the problems and 
differences the relationship was currently 
experiencing.  "But to be frank," he said, "China is 
not to be blamed for these problems and differences 
and we do not want to see such things happening. 
All of these issues bear on China's core interests, 
and so there is no room for concession or compromise 
on China's part."  He said the Chinese public 
reaction to these issues was well-known, and the 
Chinese government had to "adhere to its 
principles." 
 
A Shared Desire to Find the "Right Course" 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶9. (C) VFM Cui praised the "positive momentum" from 
President Obama's November 2009 visit to China and 
said that the United States and China should do 
something positive to promote the benefits from our 
relationship.  Recent events had disrupted the 
momentum and raised doubts about U.S. sincerity in 
the bilateral relationship.  The United States 
should come up with "credible moves" to show 
sincerity.  The United States needed to take 
"positive steps" to improve the relationship and 
should "studiously consider" this issue. 
 
¶10. (C) VFM Cui warned that the tone and content of 
Western media reporting on the U.S.-China 
relationship painted a grim picture of relations and 
raised the possibility of creating a "narrative 
trap" or self-fulfilling prophesy that could have an 
even more negative impact on the relationship.  He 
urged the Ambassador to engage the U.S. Congress and 
media to "keep them on the right course." 
 
¶11. (C) The Ambassador noted that the United States 
and China were "two great countries with different 
histories, traditions and political systems."  We 
had in common the desire for a strong economy and 
security in the region.  In addition, we clearly 
needed to do a good job strengthening our 
understanding of each other's core interests.  In 
that respect, the Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
would be important, and the United States urged 
 
BEIJING 00000369  003 OF 003 
 
 
China to work with us to set a date as soon as 
possible. 
HUNTSMAN