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FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7869
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 000268 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/CM SFLATT 
STATE FOR EEB/TRA/AN JBYERLY, KURS; VLIMAYE-DAVIS 
STATE PASS TO USTR TSTRATFORD 
COMMERCE FOR AHAAKENSEN 
DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION FOR PGRETCH, KGLATZ, NPORTER 
NSC FOR JLOI 
FAA FOR RCICERO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2020 
TAGS: ETRD EAIR PREL CN TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN ARMS SALES:  U.S. FIRMS' EXPOSURE TO 
CHINESE SANCTIONS 
 
REF: BEIJING 260 
 
Classified By: Econ M/C William Weinstein.  Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  Representatives of major U.S. firms involved 
in the Taiwan arms deal (and with significant China 
operations) tell the Embassy they are concerned about 
possible Chinese sanctions resulting from the deal, but have 
not yet been contacted by Chinese authorities.  Chinese media 
have focused on the possible impact to the U.S. aviation 
industry, which recorded USD 6 billion in exports to China in 
¶2009.  However, many of these firms are deeply integrated 
into the Chinese economy, with localized manufacturing and 
supplier relationships that also pose vulnerabilities for 
Chinese interests if sanctions get extreme. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) Econoff spoke with leading involved U.S. firms in 
Beijing to assess their exposure to Chinese sanctions 
threatened in the MFA's January 30 press release.  To date, 
none of the U.S. firms named by the USG as suppliers in the 
Taiwan arms deal have been contacted by Chinese authorities 
over their involvement in the arms package.  Possible 
sanctions were the front page story in the February 2 China 
Daily, with a National Defense University analyst stating 
they have yet to be announced. Per reftel, this is the first 
time the Chinese government has publicly threatened sanctions 
on the specific firms involved, though Boeing noted that in 
the past it was called to meetings intended to discourage its 
involvement in such deals, but so far has not been in this 
case. 
 
BOEING: China Sales of USD 2.5-3.5 Billion 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) Boeing Corporation's China told us today that their 
China revenue ranges from USD 2.5 to 3.5 billion per year 
(slightly lower than estimated reftel).  Sales are primarily 
commercial aircraft, with 50 aircraft delivered to Chinese 
airlines in 2009 -- mostly short-haul, narrow-body Boeing 
737s.  The company also earns limited additional revenue from 
services.  Although Boeing earlier dominated the China 
market, it now shares the market roughly 50/50 with Airbus. 
(NOTE: A Chinese row with France in 2009 over President 
Sarkozy's meeting with the Dalai Lama did not have a 
perceptible impact on Airbus' market share in China, in spite 
of much speculation to the contrary and a threatened 
moratorium on future contracts. END NOTE.) 
 
¶4. (C) Boeing's position in the China market for long-haul 
aircraft is stronger, roughly 75 percent, but has been hurt 
by the two-year delay of the 787 Dreamliner.  Boeing expects 
787 deliveries to begin in late 2010, but initial deliveries 
will go to All Nippon Airways with China-bound deliveries not 
likely until 2011.  Chinese officials have complained 
steadily about the negative impact to Chinese carriers from 
787 delays.  In September 2009, Boeing reached agreement with 
six Chinese airlines to modify 787 delivery dates, and only 
one cancelled its purchase plan. 
 
¶5. (C) Boeing also has a range of supplier relationships with 
China's aviation conglomerate, AVIC, including supply 
of some composite materials components and tail and wing 
components.  Chinese industrial policy specifically 
encouraged these supplier relationships and AVIC values them 
highly.  Boeing has been careful to build relationships 
within this system, while ensuring that it diversifies supply 
beyond China for critical components. This business area may 
therefore be relatively insulated. 
 
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES: USD 2.7 Billion in 2009 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) United Technologies Corporation (UTC) is another major 
aviation conglomerate involved in the Taiwan arms deal 
through its Sikorsky Helicopter division.  UTC generated USD 
 
BEIJING 00000268  002 OF 002 
 
 
2.7 billion in Chinese revenue in 2009.  However, over 60 
percent of that revenue is from UTC's building and 
infrastructure business, with under 40 percent from 
aviation-related businesses.  Moreover, UTC reports that 90 
percent of its Chinese revenue comes from products 
manufactured locally in China. 
 
¶7. (C) Nearly all of UTC's business units are deeply involved 
in China, many through local production ties.  Pratt and 
Whitney supplies aircraft engines to Chinese airlines, 
including some through PW Canada division.  Sikorsky has 
supplied search and rescue helicopters to the Ministry of 
Transport, but lost the most recent bid to Eurocopter in 
mid-2009.  Sikorsky also has manufacturing in China, where 
AVIC manufactures the company's S76 helicopter frames.  Its 
Carrier business unit supplied heating and cooling systems to 
70 percent of the Olympic venues in Beijing.  Otis Elevator 
also delivered 1400 elevators to the Olympics project through 
2008, valued at USD 100 million.  UTC's Fire and Security 
Systems has provided systems to the Beijing subway system. 
 
GE AVIATION 
----------- 
 
¶8. (C) General Electric (GE) Aviation sales in China reached 
USD 800 million in 2009, involving primarily aircraft 
engines.  The division's products are largely imported, with 
only one small manufacturing facility for aviation components 
in Suzhou.  The GE group, however, has sales here of 
approximately USD 5 billion per year, and its energy, health 
care and other units are heavily invested in local production 
throughout China. 
 
LOCKHEED, RAYTHEON AND OTHERS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Lockheed confirmed it had almost no business in China, 
and employs only one full-time representative.  Lockheed had 
dabbled in China's air traffic management equipment market, 
but withdrew two years ago.  The firm maintains a small joint 
venture with the China Meteorological Administration to 
produce weather radar systems.  This small JV in Beijing and 
Xiamen has only 100 employees. 
 
¶10. (C) Raytheon contacts were unavailable for comment, but 
in a visit to the Embassy in 2009 confirmed that it has a 
trickle of business in China from the maintenance of older 
air traffic control (ATC) systems.  Chinese authorities have 
explicitly told the firm in the past that its sales to Taiwan 
would effectively limit the potential of its business in the 
mainland.  Raytheon representatives tell us it comes down to 
a "a simple business decision," military sales to Taiwan were 
much greater than the potential ATC system sales in the 
mainland. 
 
¶11. (C) COMMENT.  At first glance, huge U.S. aviation exports 
to China appear vulnerable to sanctions, but the complex 
customer, supplier, and partner relationships mean sanctions 
could also affect Chinese interests if carried to an extreme. 
 END COMMENT. 
HUNTSMAN