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PP RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHBC #0005/01 0511147
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201147Z FEB 10
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0968
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0544
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 1006

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000005 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/20/2020 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL IZ IR
SUBJECT: BASRAH'S REACTION TO DE-BA'ATHIFICATION 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 266 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 338 
 
BASRAH 00000005  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: John Naland, Leader, PRT Basra, Dept of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
======= 
Summary 
======= 
 
¶1. (C) The conflict over de-Ba'athification has sparked three 
demonstrations in Basrah, and provoked strong reactions from the 
government and influential leaders.  While a demarche to the 
Provincial Council Chair appears to have dampened emotions over 
perceived USG involvement in this issue, the issue remains 
potent and politically useful.  There is no lack of theories 
from prominent Basrawis on who was behind the latest 
de-Ba'athification effort, and who might profit or suffer from 
it.  Basrah's body politic reacted vehemently against the Court 
of Cassation's February 3 ruling staying the parliamentary 
Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) ban on some 500 
candidates, which was later withdrawn on February 7.  Many PRT 
contacts view the de-Ba'athification process as an effort to 
isolate secular and nationalist political entities.  PRT 
intervened with influential local tribal leader Khathem 
al-Ghatrani (Sunni Iraqiyya supporter) to prevent him from 
organizing a boycott in response to the de-Ba'athification 
order.  End summary. 
 
====================================== 
AJC Actions Provoke Two Demonstrations 
====================================== 
 
¶2. (C) Before the AJC finalized the list of disqualified 
candidates on de-Ba'athfication grounds, members of the 
Shi'a-led Coalition of National Unity demonstrated in Basrah on 
January 12 in support of its Secretary General Nehru Mohammed 
Abdel Kareem al-Kasnazani.  They feared he might be barred from 
the March elections by the AJC.  (Note: According to a list 
obtained from IHEC, 21 Basrah candidates were recommended for 
exclusion by the AJC.  Kasnazani's banned Coalition of National 
Unity fared the worst.  Five of its Basrah candidates were 
excluded.  Allawi's Iraqiyya coalition had three on the list, 
and the PM's State of Law coalition had two barred.  End note.) 
Basrah journalist Mahmoud Bachari told PRToffs that 50-80 
protestors were mainly followers of Kasnazani and not people 
protesting the ban as a whole.  That said, a spokesman for the 
group told Radio Sawa that the AJC's expected ban on Kasnazani 
and others was motivated by sectarianism, and risked destroying 
the democratic process. 
 
¶3. (C) On January 21, Basrah was the setting for a larger 
demonstration in support of the ACJ's de-Ba'athification order. 
A journalist who covered the event told us the demonstration 
stretched for several kilometers and drew thousands.  General 
Mohammed al-Huweidi, the head of Iraqi Army security for Basrah, 
confirmed to the PRT that it was a large demonstration, but 
estimated less than a thousand people participated.  During the 
demonstration, pictures of Ba'athists from the prior regime were 
burned, and demonstrators called for criminal proceedings 
against those who had been identified by the ACJ for 
disqualification. 
 
=================================== 
Court Ruling Sparks Strong Reaction 
=================================== 
 
¶4. (C) The Court of Cassation's February 3 decision delaying the 
de-Ba'athification adjudications until after the election 
ignited a strong reaction from the Basrah government and 
population.  On February 7, the Provincial Council (PC) adopted 
a resolution rejecting the ruling.  The resolution also called 
for the Council of Representatives to withdraw all confidence in 
the court, its judges, and the ruling.  The PC condemned all 
foreign interference in Iraqi internal affairs, specifically 
warning of USG and "Arabian country" interference.  On February 
8, PRTOff explained the USG position to PC Chair Jabar Amin 
Jabar (Da'wa Tantheem), underlining USG opposition to the Ba'ath 
party and support for Iraq's independent judiciary.  Jabar 
seemed to understand the explanation and said that he would 
strike references to USG interference from future resolutions. 
 
¶5. (C) A day after the PC adopted its resolution, demonstrators 
took to the street to protest the court's ruling.  According to 
Bachari, some 2,500-3,000 people gathered in downtown Basrah and 
marched to the Governor's Office.  Governor Shiltagh Aboud 
(SLA/Da'wa) spoke to the protestors, as he had during the 
January 21 demonstration.  At the first protest he had rejected 
the return of Ba'athists to government.  He upped the ante 
during the second stating that he would "start a campaign to 
remove the Ba'athists from all departments in all governorates." 
 
 
========================================= 
Officially Neutral, but Personally Biased 
 
BASRAH 00000005  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
========================================= 
 
¶6. (C) PC Chair Jabar Amin Jabar confirmed the reports of his 
and the Governor's appearance at the protests.  He said an 
appearance was standard protocol whenever demonstrators appeared 
outside their office building.  Prior to the court's ruling, the 
PC Chair told PRToff that though he personally favored the AJC's 
ban, he was officially neutral.  He claimed that in the first 
round of protests for and against the AJC ban, he had met with 
representatives of both groups.  The media reported his meeting 
with those supporting the de-Ba'athification ban and his strong 
statements against letting Ba'athist "criminals" into the next 
government.  There were no reports on his meeting with the 
opponents of the ban. 
 
¶7. (C) Jabar's official neutrality, questionable even before the 
Court of Cassation ruling, dissolved completely after it. 
Calling the court ruling a political decision, he drove adoption 
of the PC resolution condemning it, and publicly supported the 
demonstrators protesting it.  In a conversation with PRToff, 
Jabar defended his actions and the PC resolution as a 
"humanitarian response" in support of Basrawis who suffered 
under Ba'athist rule.  Jabar remarked that he was imprisoned for 
seven years and his brother was hanged.  He believed the 
"constitutional" working of the AJC had addressed a real threat 
of Ba'athist resurgence, which was then undermined by the 
"illegal and "political" decision" of the Court of Cassation. 
(Note: The Court of Cassation reversed itself on February 7, and 
agreed to complete all appeals by the first day of the official 
campaign on February 12.  See ref B. End note.) 
 
============================================= ==== 
Public Largely Favors Ban but Concerns Are Voiced 
============================================= ==== 
 
¶8. (C) The disparity between the two large demonstrations and 
one small protest on either side of the de-Ba'athification issue 
mirrors the split in Basrah public opinion.  Taleb al-Baderi, a 
well known local TV reporter, told PRToff that the majority of 
Basrah's largely Shi'a population favors the AJC actions.  Other 
PRT contacts told us that Basrah's relatively small Sunni 
population generally objects to the ban.  One influential Sunni 
tribal sheikh, Khadthem al-Ghatrani, a strong supporter of 
Allawi and his Iraqiyya coalition, threatened to lead a boycott 
of the national elections if Saleh Mutlaq was not reinstated on 
the ballot.  Sheikh Ghatrani reconsidered following an 
intervention by PRT Leader, and said that he would vote in the 
election and urge others to follow suit. 
 
¶9. (C) A sampling of our contacts from across the political 
spectrum reveals a general view that the de-Ba'athification move 
was political.  While several contacts suspected PM Maliki was 
behind it, others saw it as Iran's handiwork, citing Chalabi and 
Lami's prominent roles. 
 
-- Walid Keitan, a Shi'a member of Allawi's Iraqi National 
Movement party, considered the ban as another example of 
Maliki's using the levers of government power to benefit his 
party.  He suggested that Mutlaq's removal would be beneficial 
for the PM by diminishing the chances of the Iraqiyya coalition. 
 
 
-- Awad al-Abdan, a local Sunni leader who heads a Basrah-based 
anti-Iranian group (Movement for Liberation of the South), saw 
the de-certification of "these national, liberal" candidates as 
a blow to everyone who was trying to build a stronger national, 
non-sectarian identity for Iraq. 
 
-- Similarly Sunni Sheikh and PC member Abd al-Karim al-Dusari 
saw the move as Maliki's attempt to exclude nationalist figures 
from the election.  He said the growth of nationalist parties 
that could appeal across sectarian lines threatened the Da'wa 
party and the PM. 
 
-- Basrah business mogul Hatem Bachari viewed the ban as 
Maliki's attempt to stay in power, but said that his 
de-Ba'athification push might ultimately hurt the Prime Minister 
by alienating those who saw him as a budding nationalist.  His 
cousin, Mahmoud Bachari saw Iran behind the ban, but believed 
Maliki would profit from it. 
 
-- Khadim al-Hussein, head of the Basrah branch of the Communist 
Party, said that the fear of Ba'athists is real and widespread 
in the province.  He believed that both Da'wa and ISCI created 
the Ba'athist scare because they believed they were losing 
popular support, and could use it to consolidate their electoral 
base. 
 
======= 
Comment 
======= 
 
BASRAH 00000005  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶10. (C) In this predominantly Shi'a province, it makes sense 
that the public opinion and reaction would be break 
significantly in favor of the de-Ba'athification effort.  That 
said, among the Basrah elite, both Shi'a and Sunni, there are 
prominent players supporting reconciliation and favoring a ban 
limited solely to those Ba'athists who acted criminally in the 
Saddam era.  While some of our interlocutors question the wisdom 
of the latest de-Ba'atification push, all have a ready answer 
for who was behind it and who is likely benefit from it.  A 
demarche to the PC Chair appears to have dampened emotions over 
USG involvement, but Basrah's body politic refuses to let go of 
the de-Ba'athification issue.  Given its potency and political 
usefulness, we can expect the Governor and the PC to keep 
de-Ba'athification alive throughout the election season and 
perhaps beyond. 
NALAND