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DE RUEHGI #0041/01 0471510
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 161510Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BANGUI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1162
INFO RHMFISS/AFRICOM
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0385
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0398
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0297
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0238
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0211
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0587
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0581
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA 0007
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0210
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0004
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1474

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGUI 000041 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/C 
USUN FOR DMUERS 
PARIS FOR RKANEDA 
LONDON FOR PLORD 
NAIROBI  FOR AKARAS 
AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL 
INR FOR JPEKKINEN 
DRL FOR SCRAMPTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT
SUBJECT: LINKAGE BETWEEN DDR AND ELECTIONS COULD SPELL TROUBLE FOR 
THE CAR 
 
REF: A. A- 10 BANGUI 29 AND PREVIOUS 
     ¶B. B- 09 BANGUI 157 
     ¶C. C- 09 BANGUI 237 AND COOK - MAZEL EMAIL 02/04/10 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The 2010 Central African elections and the 
country's Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) 
programs are becoming increasingly linked, which could result in 
serious difficulties for the country in the coming months. The 
opposition continues seek every opportunity to delay the 
elections past the June 11 date required by the constitution, 
and it appears their efforts will likely push the elections past 
the projected April 18 first round date(Ref A). The DDR program 
is the victim of competing political interests, and suffered a 
serious setback on February 9 when teams enacting an information 
campaign were turned back to Bangui by truculent militia men in 
the country's troubled north. The opposition, by insisting on 
the completion of DDR process as a prerequisite for the 
elections seeks to push Bozize into a constitutional crisis 
resulting in a power sharing agreement that will placate major 
donors. The president, though he remains the clear favorite to 
win the elections, knows that a successful DDR process that 
results in the enfranchisement of voters in opposition areas may 
threaten his prospects. Therefore, a devilish catch 22 is 
developing: hold the elections without the DDR and risk an 
election that is not representative, or delay the elections and 
risk an unpredictable constitutional crisis - neither of which 
is in the interest of the CAR or the USG. END SUMMARY. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
The Democratic Opposition: Fighting Over Every Issue 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) After President Bozize's heavily publicized attempt to 
broker a solution between the opposition and the president of 
the Independent Electoral Commission at the end of January (Ref 
A), the Collective of Forces for Change - made up of the 
opposition umbrella organization National Union of Concerned 
Citizens (UFVN), several members of the non-aligned parties and 
one politico-military group, won some serious concessions from 
the President of the IEC and his supporters in the majority. 
Negotiations under the auspices of the National Mediator to 
resolve the stalemate resulted in: 
 
-- The replacement of the UFVN's members in the IEC: the UFVN 
and the Army for the Restitution of Democracy (APRD) militia 
will send new delegates to the IEC Committee (NOTE: The former 
members, who didn't want to lose their IEC salaries and other 
perks, refused to obey the parties' demands that they quit the 
commission. They have since been expelled from their parties. 
END NOTE.). 
 
-- An independent audit of the IEC finances to date, with 
special attention paid to the IEC President's expenditures. It 
is yet to be decided who will complete the audit.  The 
opposition demands an audit by an accredited firm while the 
government insists on using the government's own audit team. 
 
-- The appointment of unspecified civil society representatives, 
who were not previously granted membership in the IEC. 
 
-- The local IEC committees unilaterally established - possibly 
illegally - by the President of the IEC, were annulled. 
 
-- Establishment of the Permanent Political Dialogue Framework, 
recommended by the December 2008 national dialogue but until now 
opposed by President Bozize. (Comment: This may be an attempt by 
the opposition to create a framework which would serve as the 
basis for a transitional government if the elections are not 
 
BANGUI 00000041  002 OF 003 
 
 
held. 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) UFVN members are hoping to send very high ranking party 
officials to take their place on the IEC in an effort to have 
extra influence on the electoral process. However, the 
negotiators did not reach any agreement on the UFVN's request 
for cancellation of decrees which appointed new mayors 
throughout the country (NOTE: Municipal elections were to be 
held this year, but the president abruptly appointed new mayors 
in January 2010 and canceled the proposed elections. END NOTE.). 
In addition, no mention was made of the opposition's ``non 
negotiable'' demand that the President Binguimale of the IEC 
resign. The opposition strongly suspects that he has squandered 
a considerable amount of IEC resources on travel and other 
things.  Opposition representatives said on condition of 
anonymity that Binguimale's position would be discussed at a 
later date. 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) With the first round of the elections scheduled for 
April 18, each delay paralyzes preparations and kills valuable 
weeks that are needed to set up the regional IECs, establish 
voting offices, print ballots, train election workers, etc. The 
audit is expected to take one to two weeks, at which point, if 
the auditors discover impropriety, a new debate will rage about 
the fate of the IEC president. 
 
 
------------------------------------------- 
DDR: Each Side Playing a Dangerous Game 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) The DDR process has been much maligned for a lack of 
direction and because it does not address the root problems of 
the Central African Republic (Ref B): 
 
-- It addresses the fate of 8,000 militia members while ignoring 
nearly 300,000 internally displaced people and refugees. 
 
-- It ignores the challenges of reintegrating people into an 
economy that barely exists. 
 
-- It makes no provision for who will provide law and order once 
the local militias are demobilized.  The Central African Army, 
with 5,000 soldiers, is incapable of securing the national 
territory. 
 
Still, the UNDP has made significant progress over the last year 
and stands ready, from a technical standpoint, to start the 
first two steps of the process. 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Unfortunately, both the militias and the government 
continue to stall the procedure. The largest group the process 
aims to demobilize is the APRD.  Holding sway over two of the 
most populous prefectures of the CAR - the Ouham and Ouham Pende 
make up 20 percent of the CAR's population - many observers 
mistakenly view the APRD's demobilization as the one least 
fraught with difficulties. The most recent dispute is over the 
money provided by the government to pay for three months worth 
of food. The President wants the money to go through the local 
(CARG-appointed) governors in an effort to enforce their 
authority. The APRD wants the money distributed uniquely by 
their representatives. After a week, both sides remain 
intransigent, and the DDR sensitization team returned to Bangui 
just four days into a month-long mission. This is symptomatic of 
 
BANGUI 00000041  003 OF 003 
 
 
the deep seeded lack of trust between the two sides that 
culminates in repeated delays in implementation. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
The Collision between the DDR and the Elections 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) Some informed observers worry that the President, 
knowing that the APRD wants their people to control the funding, 
is insisting on the local governors' authority because he does 
not want the DDR to happen at all before the elections. Though 
he is the odds on favorite to win a second term, the President 
is thought to be advised by people who would rather see an 
unrepresentative election than one in which the Ouham and Ouham 
Pende might turn the vote against him. Some in the opposition, 
particularly the political head of the APRD, Jean Jacques 
Demafouth, feel that the militias are a trump card for them 
going forward. By having an armed force behind them, they may be 
able to demand further concessions from Bozize in a possible 
second round of elections or in a government of national unity. 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) COMMENT: Post suspects that the opposition is playing a 
game it will have difficulty winning. Though there are examples 
of Central Africans taking to the streets, the last seven years 
of Bozize's rule have seen Bangui calmer and safer than at any 
point since the 1980s, and violence in the populous western half 
of the country has decreased substantially. Most observers agree 
that while people recognize Bozize's short comings, the 
opposition lacks cohesion, message, and charisma. Bozize's 
``peace dividend'' is therefore likely to keep people from 
rallying to the opposition's cause if elections delays push the 
country into a constitutional crisis. Even France, who as 
recently as a year ago had taken a hard line with the regime, 
has significantly softened its stand - a leaked cable from the 
French Embassy in CAR called Bozize's rule an ``idyllic grain of 
hope''. This will likely embolden Bozize, who already feels 
strengthened by the attainment of HIPC debt relief and increased 
support from international actors like the IMF and China (Ref 
C), in his dealings with the opposition. END COMMENT. 
COOK