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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 000481 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM SMIG TH BU
SUBJECT: THAILAND: MFA ANTICIPATING OCTOBER ELECTIONS IN 
BURMA, POSSIBLE PM VISIT IN MAY 
 
REF: BANGKOK 381 
 
BANGKOK 00000481  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: DCM James F. Entwistle, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  MFA Burma Unit Chief Arunrung Phothong 
Humphreys told us February 24 that the RTG still believed 
that Burma would hold elections in October of this year, 
despite some rumors that they would be held in May (reftel). 
The RTG intends to increase assistance to Burma for 
development activities following the election.  Arunrong said 
that the MFA had proposed to Prime Minister Abhisit 
Vejjajiva's office that the PM visit Burma in May, a visit 
that the MFA no longer considers contingent on whether the 
GOB permits a meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK), a 
condition which derailed Abhisit's intent to travel to Burma 
in 2009 when Thailand was ASEAN Chair.  Arunrung expressed 
concern that the U.S. would reverse its engagement policy 
with Burma due to the regime's refusal to take positive steps 
towards an inclusive democratic process.  Leaders of the Free 
Burma Rangers (FBR) told us separately February 24 that 
regime/proxy pressure on Karen inside Burma had lessened in 
the 2009/10 dry season even though there had been no 
significant steps by the regime to negotiate with opposition 
groups or ethnic minorities.  FBR suggested that the lessened 
pressure might be due to the GOB's focus on the elections. 
End summary. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
RTG STILL EXPECTS ELECTIONS IN OCTOBER 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) MFA Burma Unit Chief Arunrung discussed the upcoming 
elections, as well as other issues in Burma, with us February 
¶24.  Arunrung acknowledged that she had heard rumors that the 
GOB was considering holding elections in May (Note: see 
reftel for mention of such rumors during DAS Marciel's recent 
visit. End note).  However, she claimed that this rumor 
seemed to be coming from only one source, and the RTG still 
believed that the elections would not be held until October. 
She suggested that it would be risky for the GOB to hold the 
elections in May, as it would not allow adequate time to 
engage with opposition parties, particularly ASSK and the 
National League for Democracy (NLD), or to engage ethnic 
minority groups along the border, specifically in attempting 
to transform ethnic militias into government border guard 
forces. 
 
¶3. (C) Arunrong also shared some details of the MFA's annual 
in-house assessment of Burma.  The MFA assessed that the RTG 
had not placed enough emphasis on explaining to Rangoon its 
expectations of what the upcoming election in Burma should 
look like in order to ensure a more free and fair process. 
The report also concluded that the RTG should implement 
activities that would assist Burma to become a more 
democratic society, emphasizing capacity building and human 
resource development activities.  Arunrung said the RTG 
currently provided assistance to the GOB in the education, 
health, and agricultural sectors.  Arunrung noted that the 
report recommends that the RTG expand the scope of these 
assistance programs after the election. (Note: Reports 
provided to post by the Thai International Development 
Cooperation Agency (TICA) that detail official development 
assistance provided to Burma show a decrease in assistance to 
Burma in 2009 compared to prior years, and indicate that 
Cambodia and Laos regularly receive more assistance from 
Thailand than Burma. End note.) 
 
¶4. (C) When asked about ASEAN efforts to encourage 
transparency in the Burmese election, Arunrong noted that 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers made a clear statement to the GOB's 
Foreign Minister at the ASEAN Retreat in Danang in January 
that the upcoming elections would be a turning point for 
Burma as well as for ASEAN.  The FMs pointed out that the GOB 
must make its own decisions regarding electoral laws and 
processes, but that the regime's approach during this crucial 
time would affect the credibility of the ASEAN community as 
well. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
BANGKOK 00000481  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
PM ABHISIT'S PLANNED VISIT TO BURMA - STILL ON HOLD 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶5. (C) The MFA continued to discuss with PM Abhisit's office 
his long delayed visit to Burma, now aiming for May (note: 
Abhisit initially hoped to travel to Burma in June 2009. End 
note), according to Arunrong.  While the RTG had previously 
made an Abhisit meeting with ASSK a condition for a visit, 
she explained that the MFA no longer considered this a 
non-negotiable issue, since Thailand was no longer the Chair 
of ASEAN.  The MFA had recommended to the PM's office that 
while it would be desirable for Abhisit to meet ASSK, such a 
meeting should be left up to the GOB. 
 
¶6. (C) The PM's Deputy Secretary General and Acting 
Government Spokesman Panitan Wattanayakorn, who had discussed 
the potential visit with DAS Marciel (reftel), acknowledged 
to us February 25 that Thai officials were discussing 
possibly changing the preconditions of the visit in order to 
increase the likelihood of a visit occurring.  While the MFA 
had recommended dropping the ASSK demand as precondition, 
other "advisers" disagreed with this approach.  In any event, 
the Burmese Government would have the final word on any 
visit, in terms of timing and meetings possible.  As a 
result, he emphasized that a May visit was not yet certain. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
RTG VIEWS ON U.S. RE-ENGAGEMENT with BURMA 
------------------------------------------ 
 
6.(C) Arunrung expressed satisfaction that the USG had 
increased engagement with Burma and noted the MFA's concern 
that the engagement policy might be reversed due to a lack of 
signs that the GOB was making positive steps - even small 
ones - towards a more democratic, open society.  Poloffs 
noted that the USG had hoped that Burma would make more 
positive steps towards engaging ASSK, the NLD, and ethnic 
groups in advance of the elections. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
NEGOTIATIONS WITH ETHNIC MINORITY GROUPS 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) In a discussion of ethnic minority groups in Burma, 
Arunrung expressed optimism about the GOB's efforts in this 
regard.  She noted that Beijing could potentially play a 
productive role in these negotiations, as China had 
experience in dealing with the conflict between the Kokang 
minority group and the regime.  The ethnic minority that was 
of the most concern to the Thai was the Wa, as they were 
stronger and more resistant to compromise than the other 
minority groups along the Burma-Thai border. 
 
¶8.  (C) Free Burma Ranger leaders claimed to us separately 
February 24 that 2008-2009 had been the quietest period in 
over 10 years in terms of clashes between the junta and armed 
ethnic minority groups.  They suggested the decrease in 
offensives was likely the result of the GOB's focus on the 
upcoming elections rather than a desire to move towards 
negotiations. (note: This assessment does not entirely track 
with our understanding, since the June 2009 cross border flow 
of refugees fleeing fighting was the single largest 
cross-border movement in a decade). 
JOHN