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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000478 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WALTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: GT200 BOMB DETECTOR FAILURE IGNITES 
DISCUSSION ON CIVIL-MIL RELATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, PROCUREMENT 
 
BANGKOK 00000478  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE, REASON 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva ordered a 
halt to RTG procurement of the GT200 explosive detection 
device on February 16, after tests conducted by the Ministry 
of Science and Technology determined the device was 
ineffective.  The GT200 is used throughout Thailand by many 
agencies, most notably in the conflict-ridden Deep South. 
Shortly after the PM's announcement, Royal Thai Army (RTA) 
Commander-in-Chief Anupong Paojinda and chief forensic 
investigator Khunying Pornthip Rojanasunant jumped to the 
device's defense, while human rights groups used the PM's 
announcement to highlight the questionable use of the device 
to detain alleged insurgents.  PM Abhisit subsequently stated 
the GT200 should not be used against people and ordered a 
probe into the acquisition of the GT200 by various government 
agencies, a decision seen by many as being designed to help 
stamp out corruption in the procurement process. 
Commentators immediately picked up on the potential for 
conflict with those who might have vested interests in the 
continued procurement of the device. 
 
¶2. (C) Comment: Abhisit's willingness to confront the 
military -- to which many commentators assume he is beholden 
-- on a procurement issue with operational implications, two 
areas traditionally seen as military prerogatives, serves as 
the latest indication of his growing confidence as Prime 
Minister.  The military brass' reluctance to abandon use of 
the GT200 may be a combination of concern for and by 
personnel faced with countering an insurgency making 
extensive use of IEDs that have led to dozens of soldier 
deaths/injuries, as well as irritation at being challenged on 
oversight of procurement matters.  Khunying Pornthip's 
defense of the GT200 is more inexplicable, the latest example 
of her increasingly erratic judgment in recent years.  The 
discussion of the GT200 controversy also highlighted how 
financing of expanded operations in the restive South has 
become a cash cow for a wide range of security forces and RTG 
agencies; many commentators also noted a parallel controversy 
involving the RTA's persistence in acquiring a still 
inoperable blimp -- officially intended for surveillance 
operations, but widely viewed as unsuitable for the terrain 
and threat in the Deep South -- at a cost of 350 million baht 
(approximately $11 million).  End Summary and Comment. 
 
PM CALLS OUT MILITARY ON USE OF GT200 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) PM Abhisit announced the government would not 
purchase any more of the British-made GT200 substance 
detection devices on February 16 after testing by the 
Ministry of Science and Technology found the equipment 
correctly identified explosives in just four of twenty 
attempts -- far worse than a random 50-50 flip of a coin 
would.  Criticism of the GT200 came to a crescendo in 
Thailand in January when the British government banned export 
of the device after arresting an executive from the 
manufacturer of another bomb detection device on fraud 
charges.  Abhisit also ordered an investigation into the 
purchase of the GT200 by various state agencies, following 
Thai press reports that some agencies had paid more than 
twice as much for the units as others (note: the first Thai 
purchases of the GT200 occurred by the Thai Air Force in 
2004, when Thaksin Shinawatra was PM). 
 
¶4. (SBU) RTA commander General Anupong and Khunying Pornthip, 
the director of the Institute of Forensic Science at the 
Ministry of Justice, led the chorus urging continued use of 
the GT200 in the immediate wake of Abhisit's decision. 
Anupong and Pornthip both insisted the GT200 was effective 
when used by properly trained personnel, and stated flatly 
that security forces -- in the Deep South in particular -- 
would continue to use it.  Despite such unequivocal support, 
a bomb exploded in a market in Pattani on February 22, 
injuring two soldiers, immediately after troops using the 
GT200 had swept the area and failed to detect any explosives. 
 That same day the Cabinet tasked the Ministry Science and 
Technology to go to the South and discuss discontinuing use 
of the GT200 with security units there, taking an additional 
 
BANGKOK 00000478  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
step beyond Abhisit's suspension of further procurement. 
 
THE GT200'S TROUBLED PAST - INEFFECTIVE, UNFAIR 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶5. (C) Thai human rights activists and their political 
allies, including Democrat Party deputy leader/MP Kraisak 
Choonhavan, have been raising the alarm about the GT200 for 
months, and had engaged us in mid-2009 to see if there were 
any way we could share US bad experience with such equipment. 
 Kraisak's primary concern was that innocent civilians were 
being detained and in some cases charged with assisting 
insurgent efforts solely based on GT200 readings.  Thai media 
began questioning the effectiveness of the GT200 in 
Thailand's troubled southern border provinces after the 
device failed to detect bombs in two separate instances in 
October 2009, an October 6 explosion that killed one person 
and wounded 20 others, and an October 19 bomb that wounded 25. 
 
¶6. (C) To most people, the GT200 appears to be a glorified 
dousing rod: it claims to detect explosives at long range, 
powered by static electricity from the user, without any more 
complicated sample analysis conducted.  The bomb detection 
squad in Yala told us that they never thought it worked, but 
they were ordered to use it.  The squad passed the GT200 to 
Emboff to hold; it looked and felt like a toy.  In contrast, 
the GT200's defenders insist the device was effective when 
used by properly trained personnel.  Failures of the device 
have been explained away as a byproduct of user error; 
operators were too tired, sick, fatigued, or otherwise 
impaired to operate the device properly. 
 
¶7. (C) Srisomphop Jitphiromsri, a professor at Prince of 
Songkhla University-Pattani, director of Deep South Watch, 
and a regular Political Section contact, said that the people 
in the South initially had faith in the GT200.  It was used 
extensively in the security sweeps in late 2007 and early 
2008 that led to a significant reduction in insurgent-related 
violence, he said.  According to Srisomphop, that confidence 
waned as judges dismissed court cases because they considered 
the GT200 evidence unreliable; public support for the GT200 
bottomed out with the October 2009 Sungai Kolok and Muang 
explosions.  The RTA's current defense of the GT200 had 
become a joke in the South, Srisomphop claimed, as everyone 
knew now that the tool was useless.  Prince of Songkhla 
University-Hat Yai professor Zakee Pitakkumpol, a Thai 
Muslim, told us that he had been detained at a security 
checkpoint because a GT200 pointed at his car. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Advocates for greater transparency and human rights 
in the Deep South have criticized security forces for using 
the GT200 to detain people in connection with the insurgency. 
 Angkhana Neelapaijit, head of the Working Group on Justice 
for Peace, and Human Right Watch have both called on the 
government to compensate the people who have been wrongly 
identified as insurgents and detained because of the GT200. 
According to a February 17 report by Human Rights Watch, 
approximately 10 percent of suspected insurgents arrested 
since 2007 have been detained solely on the basis of a GT200 
reading. 
 
HARSH LIGHT ON PROCUREMENT 
-------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) PM Abhisit's insistence on a probe into the purchase 
of the GT200 also raised suspicions of corruption in the 
procurement process, a problem that has plagued multiple 
administrations.  There are currently over 800 GT200 units 
being used in Thailand by the military, the police, the 
Customs Department, and the Central Institute of Forensic 
Science.  The first purchases occurred under former PM 
Thaksin and continued under the interim Surayud 
administration and through to the current Abhisit 
administrations.  Thai news reports indicated that some 
government agencies paid 550,000 thousand baht (approx. 
$16,000) apiece for the machines, while others paid up to 1.6 
million baht (approx. $48,000) per unit, with Khunying 
Porntip's lab paying the highest price; agencies involved 
claimed differing prices were due to different chips that are 
 
BANGKOK 00000478  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
inserted into the GT200 to detect a variety of different 
substances.  Both media and the political opposition have 
called for investigations into the procurement deals. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Criticism of the GT200 coincided with increasing 
public calls for the RTA to justify the purchase of a 
surveillance blimp which the RTA claims would be an effective 
tool in locating insurgents in the Deep South, but which 
critics say cannot accomplish the stated task given the 
terrain in question and the technical capabilities of the 
airship.  The Thai media has widely reported that the blimp 
cost 350 million baht (approximately $11 million); the 
vice-president of Arai International, the US-based company 
which sold the system to the RTA, wrote a letter to the 
editor of the Bangkok Post and said the contracted price was 
$9.7 million (approx. 320 million baht). 
JOHN