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Viewing cable 10BANGKOK434, DON,T CALL IT A COMEBACK: THAKSIN,S PARTY LOOKS TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10BANGKOK434 2010-02-23 00:32 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bangkok
VZCZCXRO0355
PP RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #0434/01 0540032
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 230032Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0018
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 8070
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0476
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 6245
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2398
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0348
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 7677
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0030
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 000434 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WALTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PINR TH
SUBJECT: DON,T CALL IT A COMEBACK: THAKSIN,S PARTY LOOKS TO 
REASSERT CONTROL OF NORTHEAST THAILAND 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 424 (ALL EYES ON THAKSIN CASE) 
     B. BANGKOK 380 (RED HEARTLAND) 
     C. BANGKOK 09 2587 (THAILAND,S LOWER NORTHEAST) 
 
BANGKOK 00000434  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor George Kent, reasons 1.4 (b, d) 
 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT 
------------------- 
 
1. (C) Fugitive former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's 
Puea Thai political party appears poised to reassert its 
political pre-eminence in one of its traditional strongholds 
in Northeastern Thailand, aka Isaan.  Unlike in central Isaan 
(REF B), and south-central Issan (REF C), where the trend 
lines suggest Puea Thai may be waning in influence, in the 
vote-rich easternmost corner of Isaan, the party's current 
popularity vastly exceeds its comparably modest share of the 
area's parliamentary seats.  A recent sweep through the 
provinces of Ubon Ratchathani, Amnat Charoen, and Yasothon 
further revealed that the party's fortunes may also be 
boosted in the area by the explosive growth of Puea Thai's 
ideological partners in arms, the United Front for Democracy 
Against Dictatorship (the UDD, aka the "red shirts").  Puea 
Thai's apparent ascendance in these provinces may well come 
at the expense of the ruling Democrat party, which currently 
holds five MP seats.  While long standing alliances with 
power brokers in the area and evidence of a willingness to 
engage in money politics suggests the Democrats may be able 
to maintain a toehold, the news is not encouraging for the 
Democrat party in the area on balance. 
 
2. (C) Comment: Above and beyond all the political jockeying 
unfolding in advance of the next round of elections, the 
red-shirt movement appears to be gaining steam in Ubon 
Ratchathani, even if the movement has splintered into as many 
as seven smaller groups.  The Ubon Ratchathani red-shirts 
held their largest rally ever -- some 30,000 people -- on 
February 1; local leaders told us they planned to send 
supporters to Bangkok for the next big rally in unprecedented 
numbers.  The contrast between higher red-shirt fervor in 
Ubon and more low key movements in neighboring Amnat Charoen 
and Yasothon mirrors the situation in Udon Thani (vigorous 
red-shirt movement) and Khon Kaen/Kalasin provinces (less so) 
we saw in late January (ref B), suggesting that localized 
dynamics and the quality of local red-shirt leaders remain 
key factors.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
UBON RATCHATHANI -- THAKSIN BACK IN BUSINESS? 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) From February 10-12, we traveled through Ubon 
Ratchathani, Amnat Charoen and Yasothon, three provinces 
which collectively constitute probably the second most 
supportive area for Thaksin after Udon Thani (REF B).  Ubon 
Ratchathani, which dwarfs its neighboring provinces with 
nearly 1.8 million people and eleven parliamentary seats, is 
the fourth most populous province in all of Thailand. 
Despite the widespread support for Thaksin and his Puea Thai 
political party in the province, Puea Thai currently boasts 
only four of the province's MPs elected in December 2007; 
meanwhile, the Democrat party has three seats, Chart Thai 
Pattana holds three, and Puea Pandin holds one.  With the 
Puea Thai firmly on its feet and able to lay claim to 
Thaksin's successful populist legacy (Ref B), the party is 
eager to fence off Isaan from political interlopers once 
again. 
 
4. (C) Ubon Ratchathani University Political Science 
professor Phruk Thaothawin told us February 10 that Puea Thai 
was poised to pick up several seats in the next election. 
According to Phruk, Thaksin remained wildly popular within 
the province; Puea Thai had finally begun to organize itself 
properly, and the red shirt movement had also picked up steam 
within the province, which he believed would inevitably 
translate into increased support for Puea Thai during the 
next election.  The red shirts' "double standards" campaign 
had resonated in Ubon Ratchathani, and an increasingly aware 
 
BANGKOK 00000434  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
and active electorate within the province would seek to mete 
out justice against the Democrat party at the ballot box. 
Finally, key politicians in the province knew which way the 
winds were blowing, and he predicted several MPs would likely 
switch to Puea Thai out of a fear that running under any 
other banner would lead to a loss. 
 
5. (C) Chuwit Pitakpornpunlop, a five-time parliamentarian 
and one of Puea Thai's current MPs, brimmed with confidence 
about the party's prospects moving forward.  Chuwit told us 
February 12 that the people of Ubon were disillusioned with 
the current government's stewardship of the economy and the 
lack of judicial accountability; he predicted Puea Thai would 
win a minimum of seven seats in the next election.  Ubon core 
red-shirt leader Pichet Tabutda, who confirmed to us that red 
shirt support for Puea Thai was unequivocal, asserted that 
Puea Thai would easily win eight seats, a net gain of five. 
Pichet suggested the only truly nettlesome issue for the 
party would be settling on the candidates to represent the 
party.  With so many qualified politicians ready, willing, 
and able to run, the real interesting political battles would 
take place within the party. 
 
REDS RISING IN UBON RATCHATHANI 
------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) According to interlocutors from all sides of the 
political spectrum, the red shirt movement is experiencing 
growth within the province.  Veenus Eiamsa-ard, Chairman of 
the Ubon Journalist Association, told us that the growth of 
the red-shirt movement in the province was organic and had 
occurred without any outside injection of funding from 
Thaksin or the national red-shirt chapter leaders.  Professor 
Phruk told us the red shirt education camps had been wildly 
successful within Ubon, telling us that graduates of the 
camps tended to become active and enthusiastic force 
multipliers for the cause.  Red shirt leader Pichet seconded 
this assessment, adding that the proliferation of red-shirt 
radio stations within the province had become an additional 
boon for the movement.  The red shirts had established three 
separate local red community radio stations; a year ago, 
there were none. 
 
7. (C) Pichet told us the red-shirts in the province were 
divided into seven different sub-groupings, though he 
stressed they came together when it mattered most, as on 
February 1, when over 30,000 filled a soccer stadium for the 
largest red-shirt gathering in the history of the province. 
Pichet claimed that neither Thaksin nor the group's national 
red shirt core leaders had ever provided provincial 
organizers with a single baht to finance their activities, 
and that the Ubon Ratchathani red shirts funded their 
activities through donations and membership fees, which 
generally ran about 100 baht per month ($3).  (Note: Udorn 
red-shirt leader Kwanchai made a similar claim to us in 
January, ref B). 
 
8. (C) During last March-April's red-shirt rallies in 
Bangkok, which had over 100,000 participants, only 700-800 
Ubon supporters had traveled to the capital, according to 
Pichet.  In contrast, he predicted as many as 10-20,000 could 
make the trip to Bangkok for the upcoming red-shirt protest 
tied to Thaksin's frozen assets case, which national 
red-shirt leaders ambitiously have described as a "Million 
Man March." MP Chuwit similarly suggested "at least 20,000" 
would go (Ref A), though journalist Veenus suggested that 
since red-shirts who chose to travel to Bangkok would do so 
on their own dime, numbers might be more limited.  Pichet 
believed a more cost effective strategy to disrupt the 
government would be to keep most of the supporters at home to 
protest in front of provincial government institutions; he 
suggested the red-shirts might ultimately choose to send half 
of their supporters to Bangkok and keep the other half at 
home. 
 
ELECTORAL CHICANERY IN UBON INCLUDES DEMOCRATS? 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
BANGKOK 00000434  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
9. (C) Dr. Nirun Phitakwatchara, a member of the national 
Human Rights Commission, told us February 12 that MPs in Ubon 
Ratchathani, as in other provinces, were primarily interested 
in politics as a way of advancing their narrow business 
interests.  Dr. Nirun, a self professed yellow-shirt, 
admitted all political parties were guilty of this practice 
and estimated that in Ubon Ratchathani, the price for an MP 
seat ran around 30-40 million baht (around $1 million).  Most 
of the MPs had construction businesses, he added, and worked 
to secure preferential contracts for the businesses after the 
election as a way of "getting a strong return on their 
investment." 
 
10. (C) Journalist Veenus alleged to us that the Democrat 
party owed at least a portion of its good electoral fortune 
in Ubon to its success at playing the money politics game. 
Veenus recounted for us her own personal role in revealing an 
alleged vote-buying scandal involving the Democrats in 2007, 
which led to an Election Commission (ECT) investigation.  The 
party -- including Deputy party leader Withun Nambut and 
three party MP candidates from Ubon -- were accused of paying 
voters for their support inside a local movie theater.  The 
ECT ultimately dropped the case against Withun in October of 
2008, however, citing lack of evidence. 
 
11. (C) Veenus told us that while the ECT was still 
investigating the case, she was given a video with clear 
evidence of money being exchanged for votes within the movie 
theater.  According to Veenus, the video clearly implicated 
Withun and others, including former PM Chuan Leekpai.  Veenus 
told us that she flew to Bangkok with the intention of 
handing the tape over to the ECT.  Upon landing in Bangkok, 
however, she said she was forced into a car and driven 
against her will to the home of Democrat MP Kraisak 
Choonhavan, who was not home at the time.  There she met 
Yuthapan Meechai, aka "Joe," Kraisak's assistant, as well as 
Thaworn Senneam, who now serves as the Deputy Interior 
Minister.  Joe and Thaworn supposedly presented her with a 
piece of paper with a statement promising that she would not 
hand over the video, and encouraged her to sign it. 
According to Veenus, given the atmosphere, and the implied 
threat and encouragement, she felt compelled to do so. 
 
WHY CAN'T WE ALL JUST GET ALONG? 
-------------------------------- 
 
12. (C) We traveled to Amnat Charoen and Yasothon, two 
provinces which splintered off from Ubon Ratchathani in 1993 
and 1972, respectively, on February 11.  Amnat Charoen, with 
a population of just 370,000, is one of Thailand's least 
populous provinces, while Yasothon has approximately 540,000 
residents.  Amnat Charoen has only two MPs, one from Puea 
Thai and one Democrat, while Yasothon has four: one from Puea 
Thai, one Democrat, and two from Puea Pandin. 
 
13. (C) Amnat Charoen Vice Governor Pawin Chamniprasat told 
us that unlike in many larger provinces, the red and yellow 
shirts in Amnat Charoen lived and worked side by side without 
incident.  Red and yellow shirts were friends, colleagues and 
even relatives, and a sense of collegiality existed between 
the two groups that he believed was absent in larger 
provinces.  While red shirt supporters far outnumbered their 
yellow counterparts, the rallies they held tended to be very 
civil and low key.  Yellow-shirts were not particularly 
active, he added.  Even the Puea Thai and Democrat MPs worked 
together closely on provincial issues in a relationship that 
he believed symbolized the spirit of partnership in the 
province.  KPI Development Council leader Chartwat Ruamsook 
seconded the Vice Governor's comments, adding that he was 
working to see whether the red-yellow civil dialogue that 
existed in Amnat Charoen could be replicated on a national 
scale. 
 
14. (C) Yasothon Vice Governor Prawat Theethakaew echoed his 
Amnat Charoen counterpart in characterizing Yasothon as a 
model of civility when it came to the red-yellow divide. 
 
BANGKOK 00000434  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
Protests in the province tended to be short and uneventful, 
he maintained, and he hoped the dynamic could be exported 
nationwide.  Even local Puea Thai provincial powerbroker 
Phiraphan Phalusuk agreed that red and yellow shirts worked 
together amiably on the provincial level; he noted, however, 
that red-shirts outnumbered yellow-shirts by a large margin 
in the region.  Phiraphan predicted Puea Thai would capture 
all four Yasothon seats in the next election. 
JOHN