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Viewing cable 10BANGKOK411, ADMIRAL WILLARD'S VISIT TO THAILAND: IMPORTANCE OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10BANGKOK411 2010-02-18 05:04 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bangkok
VZCZCXRO6418
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #0411/01 0490504
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 180504Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9975
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS IMMEDIATE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 8047
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0462
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 6231
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 2384
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 0334
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 000411 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF MARR MASS MCAP TH
SUBJECT: ADMIRAL WILLARD'S VISIT TO THAILAND: IMPORTANCE OF 
BILATERAL TIES HIGHLIGHTED 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  Senior Thai leaders stressed continued U.S. 
engagement in Thailand and assistance to the Thai military as 
extremely valuable during Admiral Willard's February 2-7 
visit.  Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva highlighted his 
desire for continued strong U.S. engagement in Thailand and 
the region as a positive factor for development and for 
balancing regional powers.  Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya 
stressed that Thailand hoped for increased International 
Military Education and Training funding, both to positively 
facilitate the development of the next generation of Thai 
military leaders and to assist the RTG's efforts to develop a 
Coast Guard.  Kasit also underscored Thai hopes to receive 
excess defense articles. 
 
2. (C) Summary, cont: Admiral Willard reaffirmed the U.S. 
commitment to the bilateral relationship and U.S. military 
appreciation for the Thailand's role in providing key 
training and access opportunities.  Despite the U.S. 
engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and approximately 30,000 
PACOM troops serving in both conflicts, the PACOM Commander 
would continue to develop the military to military 
relationship with Thailand.  Admiral Willard said that while 
PACOM had relationships with thirty-six nations, the Thai 
relationship was unique.  Septels address regional foreign 
policy and domestic issues.  End summary. 
 
3. (C) Comment: Admiral Willard's visit in conjunction with 
the multilateral Cobra Gold exercise highlighted the mutual 
benefit of the bilateral relationship and was an important 
signal to the Thai of the U.S. awareness of the value of the 
relationship.  Thai interlocutors expressed strong 
appreciation for the alliance but also recommended that the 
U.S. look to make sure that Thailand continued to benefit 
from the relationship.  End comment. 
 
4. (C) During the February 2-7 visit, Admiral Willard and the 
Ambassador met with Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, Defense 
Minister Prawit Wongsuwan, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya, 
and Royal Thai Armed Chief of Defense Forces General 
Songkitti Jaggabatra.  In addition, Admiral Willard and the 
Ambassador engaged Royal Thai Army (RTA) Commander General 
Anupong Paojinda and RTA Deputy Commander General Prayuth 
Chan-ocha, Deputy Secretary General for Prime Minister 
Abhisit and Acting RTG Spokesperson Dr. Panitan 
Wattanayagorn, CP Group Executive Vice President and former 
high-ranking Thai diplomat Dr. Sarasin Viraphol, and 
Assistant Group Editor of the Nation Multimedia Group Kavi 
Chongkittavorn. 
 
BILATERAL TIES HIGHLIGHTED AS MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
5. (C) PM Abhisit during a February 5 meeting expressed RTG 
appreciation for the Obama administration's commitment to 
re-engaging with Asia, as well as PACOM's long-term relations 
with Thailand, particularly through the Cobra Gold exercise. 
The Thai public looked very positively upon close U.S.-Thai 
ties, specifically the long-standing military to military 
relationship.  Abhisit stated the U.S. had a continuing 
constructive role in the Asia Pacific region, as it provided 
balance to other regional powers.  Sustaining this engagement 
was important to the RTG, Abhisit said. 
 
6. (C) Admiral Willard expressed appreciation to Abhisit for 
Thai leadership in the region, as this had facilitated USG 
and PACOM goals for the region.  There was great benefit in 
the two nations' militaries training and working together. 
In addition, the generous access provided by Thailand to 
facilities greatly assisted U.S. military force flow, Admiral 
Willard said. 
 
7. (C) Separately February 5, FM Kasit highlighted the 
U.S.-Thai military relationship as the key pillar to the 
overall bilateral relationship.  The relationship was unique, 
as the U.S. was Thailand's number one partner.  Kasit 
suggested increased information and intelligence sharing, 
where possible, as a valuable area for enhanced cooperation. 
Kasit also stressed that the International Military Education 
 
BANGKOK 00000411  002 OF 004 
 
 
and Training (IMET) program was important in assisting the 
next generation of Thai military leaders' understanding of 
the importance of the U.S.-Thai relationship, as well as 
global issues.  Kasit also highlighted the U.S.-sponsored 
International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) as a key 
institution in the region.  Kasit underscored close bilateral 
cooperation as having proven particularly beneficial during 
response efforts following the 2004 tsunami and the 2008 
Cyclone Nargis.  Improving civilian-military cooperation for 
disaster response was an essential ASEAN goal. 
 
8. (C) Minister of Defense Prawit Wongsuwan February 5 also 
reinforced the importance of the relationship with the U.S. 
to Thailand.  Bilateral security cooperation had gone far in 
strengthening Royal Thai Armed Forces, Prawit said.  Thailand 
looked to the U.S. as a true friend, and was attempting to 
use the U.S. as a model for the development of Thai 
democracy.  Prawit said Thailand faced significant domestic 
challenges, and the Thai government had been internally 
focused.  Nonetheless, the RTG was trying hard to solve the 
problems, after which Thailand would again become more 
regionally and globally focused.  Admiral Willard said that 
the relationship with Thailand was unique for the U.S., and 
the access provided by Thailand to air and sea facilities for 
the U.S. military was of immense value.  Admiral Willard said 
he viewed as his responsibility promoting an understanding of 
the U.S.-Thai relationship among senior U.S. leaders and in 
Congress. 
 
THAI APPRECIATION FOR COBRA GOLD 
-------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Admiral Willard spent February 4 with the Thai Chief 
of Defense Forces General Songkitti Jaggabatra observing 
Cobra Gold activities, including an amphibious assault 
landing on Thailand's eastern seaboard.  This event 
highlighted the Republic of Korea's initial participation in 
the exercise.  Defense Minister Prawit stressed that Cobra 
Gold was a key mechanism to improving the capability of Thai 
forces.  Furthermore, Prawit said that Thailand viewed Cobra 
Gold as a vital means to promote multilateral cooperation and 
understanding within the region.  As such, Thailand looked 
forward to continuing to promote openness in Cobra Gold. 
Prawit also stressed that the equipment, tactics, techniques, 
and procedures that the U.S. showcased during Cobra Gold were 
particularly important to Thailand.  Admiral Willard agreed 
that Cobra Gold was important exercise for U.S. and the 
region, as it promoted understanding and interoperability 
among regional nations.  Cobra Gold was not only valuable for 
promoting multilateral engagement, but U.S. forces were able 
to learn much from the exercise.  As such, Cobra Gold was a 
unique exercise for PACOM. 
 
10. (C) FM Kasit underscored the Defense Minister's 
sentiments, stating that the RTG was interested in including 
more regional partners into Cobra Gold in the future.  By 
first adding nations as observers, trust could be built 
before considering whether to add additional participants, 
Kasit said. 
 
URGING MORE TIME FOR UNHCR EVALUATION OF KAREN 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
11. (C)  Admiral Willard told Defense Minister Prawit that 
the U.S. understood that Thailand was located in a difficult 
location with neighbors that presented the nation with 
significant border challenges.  One such problem was with 
Burma, and Admiral Willard referenced reports that the Thai 
were planning that same day, February 5, to return to Burma 
displaced Karen who had been forced into Thailand following 
conflicts in Burma in June 2009.  Admiral Willard stressed 
that it would be much appreciated by the international 
community if the RTG were to provide UNHCR with more time to 
interview the Karen to determine whether they were returning 
voluntarily.  The Ambassador explained to Prawit that a quick 
return of the Karen would exacerbate international concern 
regarding Thai refugee policy, and stressed that providing 
UNHCR with more time to assess the Karen was the right thing 
to do.  Both Admiral Willard and the Ambassador pushed the 
Minister to delay the return until the UNHCR could conduct a 
 
BANGKOK 00000411  003 OF 004 
 
 
more thorough review of the cases. 
 
12. (C) The Defense Minister said that Thailand's location 
within Southeast Asia resulted in the nation becoming a draw 
for displaced persons from neighboring countries.  In 
addition, income disparities between Thailand and its 
neighbors added more pressure on the RTG.  Prawit said that 
the RTG cooperated closely with UNHCR, and the Defense 
Minister committed to discussing the issue with the Thai NSC 
Secretary-General Tawin Pleansri after the meeting with 
Admiral Willard.  (Note:  Shortly after the meeting with 
Prawit, the Embassy received word that the return of the 
Karen had been postponed; the Bangkok Post reported February 
6 that the operation had been suspended after a call from the 
Defense Ministry.  End note.) 
 
ASSISTING THE THAI MILITARY'S DEVELOPMENT 
----------------------------------------- 
 
13. (C) FM Kasit stressed to Admiral Willard the Thai 
military's modernization needs, and highlighted U.S. 
assistance as critical to addressing this issue.  U.S. 
support was very important for building the Thai military's 
capacity, Kasit said.  Among the areas that could be of 
significant assistance were improving human resource 
development and information technology connectivity within 
the Thai military.  Kasit expressed distress that Thailand 
needed to request military equipment or excess defense 
articles (EDA) from the U.S.; however, Kasit stressed that 
U.S. assistance would be very valuable.  In particular, FM 
Kasit stated that EDA frigates would benefit the Royal Thai 
Navy (RTN), as the RTG viewed countering piracy as an 
important priority, but efforts in this area were limited due 
to outdated RTN equipment.  (Note: The RTN recently turned 
down a U.S. offer for the transfer of two frigates for fiscal 
year 2012 because the Thai Navy stated that it had neither 
the budget nor the training to support the frigates.  End 
note.) 
 
14. (C) In regards to EDA equipment, Admiral Willard told FM 
Kasit that PACOM would work hard to advocate for Thailand. 
That said, the U.S. Army and the Pentagon were assessing 
equipment that would come out of Iraq, and it was likely that 
excess equipment would not be available for several years. 
 
15. (C) During a February 5 coffee hosted by the Ambassador, 
Dr. Panitan Wattanayagorn, Deputy Secretary General for Prime 
Minister Abhisit and Acting RTG Spokesperson, raised the RTG 
desire for increased U.S. security assistance, in particular 
help for the Royal Thai Navy as it developed a submarine 
capability.  Admiral Willard asked for the Thai perspective 
on the need for submarines.  Panitan said that the RTN 
naturally compared its capabilities with regional navies such 
as Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, India, and China, all of 
whom possessed submarines.  In addition, the RTN assessed 
that a small submarine capacity would provide Thailand with 
important strike capabilities.  During the same coffee, 
Assistant Group Editor of the Nation Multimedia Group Kavi 
Chongkittavorn stressed to Admiral Willard that Thailand 
considered submarines critical due to the nations' trade 
routes, as well as its reliance on gas and oil platforms in 
the Gulf of Thailand.  Panitan agreed with Kavi's assessment. 
 
16. (C) Panitan highlighted technology transfers as 
increasingly important for the Thai military, and encouraged 
U.S. attention to this area.  The Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) 
purchase of Gripens from Sweden was a prime example of this, 
according to Panitan.  While the Gripen was not as proficient 
as the F-16, the overall technology package offered by the 
Swedes had appealed to the RTAF.  According to Panitan, the 
PM's security adviser, the Thai military had received nearly 
one hundred scholarships for study in Sweden, important 
logistics technology, and advanced communication systems with 
the Gripen package.  Panitan also said that both Australia 
and New Zealand were providing Thailand with modern 
technology for use in counter-insurgency efforts in southern 
Thailand.  This was valuable, as the RTA could not afford the 
technology needed for these efforts. 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF A THAI COAST GUARD 
 
BANGKOK 00000411  004 OF 004 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
17. (C) Several Thai officials raised with Admiral Willard 
RTG plans to develop a Coast Guard and expressed hope that 
the U.S. could assist this effort with training.  FM Kasit 
highlighted that increased International Military Education 
and Training (IMET) funding for Thailand was important, as 
these courses could advance Thai plans for a Coast Guard. 
Admiral Willard suggested that the U.S. Coast Guard Academy 
and the Naval Postgraduate School could assist with Thai 
plans to develop the Coast Guard.  Admiral Willard told Kasit 
that he would advocate for increased IMET funding for 
Thailand whenever possible. 
 
18. (C) Dr. Panitan also told Admiral Willard that PM Abhisit 
considered the development of a Coast Guard important, 
particularly after Thailand was criticized following the 
pushback of Rohingya boat people by local defense volunteers 
in early 2009.  U.S. guidance and assistance in the Thai 
effort to develop a Coast Guard would be much appreciated. 
Admiral Willard suggested that Thailand may want to consider 
analyzing the separate legal authorities that provided for 
the U.S. Coast Guard and its independence from the U.S. Navy. 
 
 
19. (U) Admiral Willard cleared this cable. 
JOHN