VZCZCXRO2263
PP RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #0381/01 0431028
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121028Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9941
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 8035
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0449
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 6219
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2372
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0328
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 000381 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM SMIG TH
SUBJECT: DAS MARCIEL ENGAGES THAI LEADERS ON BILATERAL 
ISSUES, CAMBODIA, REFUGEE POLICY, REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE, 
AND BURMA 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 344 (THAI-CAMBODIA) 
     ¶B. BANGKOK 362 (DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS) 
 
Classified By: DCM James F. Entwistle, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  EAP DAS and Ambassador for ASEAN Affairs 
Scot Marciel engaged the Thai MFA PermSec and PM deputy 
SecGen, as well as several prominent Thai thinkers, on key 
regional and bilateral issues during his February 10 visit to 
Bangkok.  Issues included regional architecture, U.S.-Thai 
relations, Burma, Thai-Cambodia relations, and Thai refugee 
policy.  DAS Marciel discussed U.S. engagement in the East 
Asia Summit (EAS) as one way to enhance U.S. engagement in 
Asia; PermSec Theerakul supported increased U.S. engagement 
in Thailand and the region.  On Burma's 2010 elections, 
possibly to occur in May, both sides agreed that such an 
early date left little room for free and transparent 
elections based on dialogue with opposition and ethnic 
groups.  RTG officials noted that they had encouraged Burma 
to engage with opposition groups; patience was necessary when 
engaging with Burma.  DAS Marciel stressed that even with the 
Obama administration modified policy approach, Burma would 
have to make some positive steps before the U.S. could 
consider removing sanctions. 
 
¶2. (C) Summary, cont: DAS Marciel raised U.S. concerns about 
Thai handling of the Lao Hmong and Karen repatriations, and 
warned that if Thailand again forcibly repatriated displaced 
persons, it would lead to a strong reaction from the U.S. 
MFA PermSec Theerakul and PM deputy Sec-Gen Panitan both 
denied that the recent attempt to return displaced Karen to 
Burma would have been involuntary, but noted plans were in 
motion to send independent observers to the camp to interview 
the refugees directly.  Panitan and other interlocutors at a 
group working lunch were very much focused on the state of 
Thai-Cambodian relations in the wake of Hun Sen's latest 
rhetorical attack against Thai PM Abhisit.  End summary. 
 
U.S.-THAI RELATIONSHIP OVERLOOKED BUT STILL PRODUCTIVE 
--------------------------------- -------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) DAS Marciel, MFA PermSec Theerakul, and the DCM 
engaged in a candid conversation about how to enhance the 
U.S.-Thai bilateral relationship February 10.  DAS Marciel 
acknowledged that the U.S.-Thai relationship was occasionally 
overlooked and that the two nations needed to remind their 
publics of the strong bonds and long-standing cooperation. 
He posed the possibility of the U.S. becoming involved in the 
East Asia Summit (EAS) process as one way to enhance regional 
engagement.  PermSec Theerakul replied that Thailand would 
likely support U.S. participation in the EAS but would need 
to consult with the other ASEAN nations. 
 
¶4. (C) PermSec Theerakul believed that increasing 
opportunities for exchanges, official and informal, between 
the two nations could also enhance the U.S.-Thai 
relationship.  He expressed PM Abhisit's interest in making 
an official visit to the U.S. in 2010, and his hope that 
President Obama would visit Thailand as well.  FM Kasit 
wanted to participate directly in the still-to-be-scheduled 
Strategic Dialogue with A/S Kurt Campbell.  Theerakul noted 
that it seemed fewer Thai students were going to the U.S. to 
study than in the past, and he hoped that we might work 
together to address this in order to strengthen people-people 
connectivity. 
 
¶5. (C) The DCM highlighted Thailand's December seizure of 
North Korean weapons at the Don Muang airport as an example 
of how well the two nations work together on high profile 
policy priorities.  He noted that the USG would continue to 
work with Thailand to ensure that they met the UNSCR 1874 
obligation to dispose of the weapons.  The DCM also informed 
Theerakul that the upcoming unsealing of a second indictment 
against Viktor Bout would result in a second extradition 
request to Thailand (previously previewed to working-level 
MFA and Office of the Attorney-General staff). 
 
BURMA ELECTIONS, IF IN MAY, LEAVE LITTLE HOPE FOR LEGITIMACY 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
 
BANGKOK 00000381  002 OF 004 
 
 
¶6. (C) DAS Marciel shared that he had received word from 
senior Cambodian officials that Burma's elections would most 
likely be held in May.  He expressed alarm that such an early 
date left little hope for a credible and free process, adding 
that an election in Burma that was neither free nor fair 
could put ASEAN in a difficult position.  PermSec Theerakul 
said the Thai Embassy in Rangoon had reported the same about 
the May date and that he believed that the junta was serious 
in its intentions to hold an election.  He shared the worry, 
however, that the "groundwork is not there" for a free and 
fair election.  The PermSec further noted that Thailand - as 
the Chair of ASEAN in 2009 - had pushed the GOB to open 
dialogue with the opposition in order to move towards 
becoming a more democratic society.  That said, expectations 
should not be high for change in Burma,  considering the 
nation had been a closed society for over fifty years. 
 
¶7. (C) DAS Marciel emphasized that the USG had modified its 
approach to Burma under the Obama administration, but that 
Burma still needed to take steps in the right direction.  The 
USG would like to see that some steps are made - no matter 
how small - towards democracy.  With such progress, the USG 
could consider reducing sanctions in response. 
Unfortunately, Burma had made no attempts yet to reach out to 
the opposition parties or ethnic groups, DAS Marciel said. 
In a separate group lunch, PM deputy SecGen and Acting 
Government Spokesman Panitan shared DAS Marciel's concerns 
about May elections prior to progress on dialogue.  While PM 
Abhisit had been hoping to travel to Burma for over a year, 
he had made meeting Aung Sang Suu Kyi a precondition. 
Elections in May would not allow time for sufficient 
progress, Panitan commented, and probably push any Abhisit 
trip to the second half of the year. 
 
CONCERNS OVER FORCED REPATRIATIONS: HMONG AND KAREN 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶8.  (C) DAS Marciel shared his concerns in both meetings 
about the February 5 attempt to involuntarily repatriate 
displaced Karen back to Burma (note: 3 families/12 
individuals were returned before further operations were 
suspended after U.S. officials intervened.  End note).  In 
particular, many were concerned about the potential loss of 
life due to landmines in the Karen villages in Burma.  DAS 
Marciel noted previous USG advocacy by the Ambassador and 
others (including Admiral Willard) and strongly urged PermSec 
Theerakul and Panitan to move forward carefully on this 
issue, as both the U.S. Administration and Congress was 
following closely and would react strongly to involuntary 
Karen returns in the wake of the December Hmong repatriation. 
 Even though the reports so far on the treatment of the 
returned Hmong in Laos had been encouraging in some regards, 
the lack of transparency in the return had sparked concern in 
Washington, Marciel reported. 
 
¶9.  (C) Panitan expressed concern about the damage refugee 
policy issues could cause to the U.S.-Thai relationship, but 
stressed that Thailand was acting on principles.  On the 
Hmong, the RTG had been obligated to work with Laos on the 
return of the Hmong but would follow up on adherence to their 
promises of fair treatment and international access back in 
Laos; the Thai military would make a visit in the second half 
of February to a resettlement site to check on the situation. 
 DAS Marciel confirmed that Lao officials had informed him of 
those plans during his recent discussions in Vientiane. 
 
¶10. (C) Regarding the Karen, PermSec Theerakul insisted that 
the recent efforts to repatriate Karen were voluntary.  He 
believed it was the RTG's responsibility to support their 
wishes to return, and to provide security to them if they 
alternately wished to stay.  The MFA did not want local 
military officers making decisions on returns because of the 
potential consequences to the Karen as well as to Thailand. 
Panitan reconfirmed that the return had been put on hold and 
that the RTG would be inviting observers to talk to the 
displaced Karen. 
 
¶11. (C) Human Rights Watch's Sunai Phasuk, in the same lunch 
meeting as Panitan, took issue with the RTG views, predicting 
that the Royal Thai Army (RTA) would continue to seek to send 
 
BANGKOK 00000381  003 OF 004 
 
 
the Karen back.  Sunai expressed concern that  Thai civilian 
officials seemed to be accepting military accusations that 
NGOs and even UNHCR representatives were lobbying the 
displaced Karen against return.  Both Sunai and Democrat 
Party MP Kraisak Choonhavan, a long-time Burma activist, told 
Panitan that he and PM Abhisit needed to expand their sources 
of information on the issue. 
 
THAI-CAMBODIA RELATIONS: TORTURED HISTORY 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) In the wake of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen's 
harsh statements against PM Abhisit (ref A), Thai-Cambodia 
relations were discussed extensively in the meetings. 
PermSec Theerakul expressed concern that Hun Sen's recent 
statements regarding Abhisit would make it difficult to move 
toward a resolution of outstanding border issues between the 
two nations. 
 
¶13. (C) Panitan suggested Hun Sen's increasing malevolence 
towards the RTG might stem from personal resentment toward PM 
Abhisit, the influence of fugitive former PM Thaksin, or 
perhaps fatigue over dealing with a multitude of new Thai 
administrations over the years.  Panitan stated candidly that 
he understood Hun Sen's frustration with Thailand's 
frequently changing governments and bureaucratic procedures, 
making resolution of bilateral issues much more difficult. 
When there were discussions of prisoner exchanges in early 
2009, Hun Sen delivered on the return of several Thai "within 
48 hours"; the counterpart Thai judicial review of 3 
Cambodian incarcerations is still ongoing months later. 
Panitan expressed the RTG's intention to continue to work 
with Hun Sen towards a resolution of border 
disputes/demarcation and to be patient; PM Abhisit had 
intentionally not responded publicly to Hun Sen's outburst. 
The Thai and Cambodian regional commanders maintained good 
relations, which is important for managing incidents calmly. 
 
¶14. (C) Kraisak, who helped dramatically reorient Thai policy 
towards Cambodia during his father Chatchai's 1988-91 stint 
as PM, stated that both Thailand and Cambodia were guilty of 
manipulating the conflict for nationalistic purposes, and 
that the contentious history of recent decades continued to 
affect bilateral relations.  To be fair to Hun Sen, Thailand 
had spent the 1980s funding the joint Cambodian resistance 
seeking to oust his Vietnamese-backed regime from power, and 
Thailand's cultural soft power, through TV soaps and radio 
programming, was significant in Cambodia.  Even Thaksin and 
Hun Sen had a complicated history; Thaksin had been PM in 
2003 when Hun Sen instigated the xenophobic burning of the 
Thai embassy and 38 Thai-owned businesses in Cambodia. 
Kraisak alleged that Thaksin bought Hun Sen's cooperation at 
a 2004 summit in which he made a $125 million donation to Hun 
Sen, but the subsequent Hun Sen pledge to compensate the Thai 
companies for their losses had never been fulfilled. 
 
¶15. (C) Kraisak felt the ultimate shared benefits that could 
overcome the mutual animosity lay in a Joint Development 
Arrangement (JDA) for disputed maritime areas in the Gulf of 
Thailand, akin to the very successful Thai-Malaysian JDA from 
the late 1990s.  Kraisak faulted successive Thai governments 
for not being more flexible in negotiating with Hun Sen, 
suggesting that, like Australia's JDA with East Timor, 
Thailand would ultimately benefit from the lion's share of 
on-shore value-added refinery business. 
 
¶15. (C) DAS Marciel hoped that the RTG would work with 
Cambodia to resolve the issue rather than allow it to reach a 
point where the international community felt compelled to 
intervene.  He also suggested Thailand explore ways to 
publicize collaboration - whether government-led or not - 
between the two nations on other issues in order to build 
trust.  Kraisak mentioned the educational initiatives 
launched by Princess Sirindhorn in Cambodia; Panitan 
confirmed that the most recent Thai Cabinet meeting had 
agreed to expand funding for her Cambodian initiative, and 
also noted the ongoing Thai program to legalize 150,000 
Cambodian (and other) illegal migrants working in Thailand. 
All Thai interlocutors agreed that the conflict building 
between the two nations could have negative implications for 
 
BANGKOK 00000381  004 OF 004 
 
 
both countries and the region. 
 
¶16. (U) DAS Marciel did not clear this message. 
JOHN