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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000380 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WALTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: VIEWS FROM THE RED HEARTLAND - STILL 
LOVE THAKSIN, BUT NOT ENDORSING RED-SHIRT VIOLENCE 
 
REF: BANGKOK 340 (CRACKS IN RED CAMP) 
 
BANGKOK 00000380  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: DCM James F. Entwistle, reason 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: A recent swing through central Isaan, the 
northeast heartland of pro-Thaksin and red-shirt sentiment, 
revealed an interesting set of views on the key political, 
economic, and social issues facing Thailand, both in the 
short-term, with large-scale red-shirt protests expected in 
Bangkok, and in the long-term, addressing rural development 
needs.  A diverse array of contacts in Khon Kaen, Kalasin, 
and Udorn Thani provinces agreed that their provinces still 
loved fugitive former PM Thaksin Shinawatra and would vote 
across the board for his affiliated Puea Thai party if 
elections were held in 2010.  However, by and large Isaaners 
were turned off by the red-shirt violence last April and did 
not support street protests as enthusiastically as before. 
Furthermore, coalition party Phumjai Thai was making inroads 
into the Isaan political base by taking a page from Thaksin's 
political playbook: combining populist policies and budgetary 
disbursements with a political machine based on the network 
of local officials answering to the Ministry of Interior.  No 
one doubted that Thailand's rural denizens had "awoken" 
politically the past decade and expected politicians to 
respond to their needs.  But the issues repeatedly cited as 
mattering most to the people of Isaan were not political, 
rather: crop prices; water (access for irrigation, quality 
for drinking); local transport links; jobs; and what to do 
with bored youth addicted to methamphetamines and on-line 
gaming. 
 
¶2. (C) Comment:  The lack of wide-spread support for violent 
protests suggests that there is no genuine grass-roots 
impulse for a red-shirt action aimed at bringing down the 
government at this time.  Instead the timing and nature of 
the upcoming protest is being dictated by Thaksin, with an 
eye on the expected February 26 Supreme Court decision on his 
frozen assets.  Disarray in the top echelons of the 
pro-Thaksin camp in recent days (reftel) may now delay the 
promised big protest until early March.  End Summary and 
Comment 
 
Still Thaksin country, but only partially transformed 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) A traverse of Khon Kaen, Kalasin, and Udorn 
provinces January 20-22 took the temperature of the heart of 
the still overwhelmingly pro-Thaksin northeast (Isaan). 
Interlocutors ranging from opposition Puea Thai MPs, a 
red-shirt leader, and local officials to election 
commissioners, journalists, and civil society activists all 
agreed that Thaksin remained immensely popular personally. 
They attributed his enduring success to having transformed 
the previously pluralistic political landscape of the 
northeast a decade ago, relying on a mix of populist policies 
and a political machine built on the local networks of 
pre-existing provincial barons.  The key policy planks were 
the Village Fund, 30 baht health care, small and medium 
enterprise development, and limited farmer debt forgiveness 
-- and Thaksin delivered on all once in office.  In the 
process of winning Isaan hearts and minds, Thaksin made his 
personal and party brand much more dominant than any 
pre-existing political baron or network. 
 
¶4. (SBU) While Thaksin's policies transformed the region 
politically, they did not solve the underlying problems of 
rural community development, numerous development activists 
and local elected leaders went on to emphasize.  The village 
fund, intended as a micro-financing scheme, helped monetize 
village economies but in many places fueled new consumption 
rather than productive capacity; as a result of this and 
other unrelated factors, current rural household debt 
(130-140,000 baht) was nearly double the debt load when 
Thaksin took office in 2001 (70,000 baht).  Thaksin's 2003 
War on Drugs was highly popular at the time, but local 
leaders in all three provinces listed drug addiction to 
methamphetamine by bored youth as one of their top five 
challenges.  Thaksin benefited politically from high world 
crop prices while in office, but he did not diversify the 
 
BANGKOK 00000380  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
region's economic base, and most adults in their most 
productive years still seek work elsewhere, particularly in 
the cities, as they have for decades. 
 
Loyal but not forever?  The Phumjai Thai challenge 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Udorn red-shirt firebrand leader Kwanchai and Puea 
Thai MPs naturally focused on a political agenda of bringing 
Thaksin back, bringing down the Abhisit government, and 
forcing new elections.  Apart from acknowledging that local 
residents had awakened politically, however, everyone else we 
talked to said that what really mattered to the people of 
largely agriculture-based Khon Kaen, Kalasin, and Udorn were 
economic and social quality of life issues: crop prices for 
rice, sugar cane and tapioca, the dominant three cultivated 
crops; water, both access for irrigation and quality for 
drinking, since overuse of chemicals in growing sugar cane in 
particular had fouled water sources; local transport links 
and improved roads connecting rural communities to major 
arteries; job opportunities locally as an alternative to 
migration to urban centers; and activities to engage bored 
youth prone to addiction to methamphetamines and on-line 
video games.  Development activists such as former Magsaysay 
winner Dr. Krasae emphasized education, health, and 
environment issues as the systemic challenges Thai 
governments needed to address. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Many of our interlocutors suggested that any 
government which delivered on these needs could win the 
loyalty of Isaan voters away from Thaksin and Puea Thai, 
which for now retain it.  Nearly everyone said that coalition 
partner Phumjai Thai (PJT) was making a serious effort at 
replicating Thaksin's successful plan of mixing populist 
policies and strong networks of local officials, taking 
advantage of PJT control of the key Ministries of Interior 
and Transport to direct budgetary programming and control the 
loyalties of provincial officials.  Even three PT MPs in 
Kalasin gave PJT and its godfather Newin Chidchob, who 
defected from Thaksin's camp in December 2008, their due, 
agreeing with the assessments of others that, while Puea Thai 
would likely sweep any 2010 election, PJT would have a real 
chance to pick up seats throughout central Isaan were the 
next election to happen in 2011. 
 
"Not ready to die" - limited support for violence 
-------------------- ---------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The one major difference between the three provinces 
came in the depth of support for the red-shirt movement 
(formally: the United Front for Democracy against 
Dictatorship, or UDD), which nearly all distinguished from 
near universal personal affection for Thaksin and wide-spread 
support at election time for the pro-Thaksin political party 
(currently Puea Thai).  Udorn is clearly the center of active 
red-shirt sentiment; contacts in Khon Kaen and Kalasin 
repeatedly contrasted attitudes in their provinces with 
Udorn.  However, many of them assessed that support for the 
red-shirt movement dropped noticeably in the wake of the red 
riots in Pattaya and Bangkok last April, and several stated 
bluntly: "people here are not ready to die for anyone." 
 
¶8. (SBU) The universally-cited reason for the difference in 
levels of red-shirt activism/support was the charismatic 
leader of the "Khon Rak Udorn" (People Love Udorn) movement, 
community radio personality Kwanchai Phraipana.  Kwanchai's 
radio station hummed with the energy and bustle of a campaign 
headquarters in full motion when we visited January 22.  By 
outside accounts, Kwanchai has expanded his network over four 
provinces, well outside of Udorn (Nong Khai, Sakon Nakon, 
Nong Bua Lamphu).  He claimed to us that "Khon Rak Udorn" has 
300,000 members and can deliver 100,000 protesters to Bangkok 
(Note: we belive most red-shirt claims are overstated at 
least 3-5 times. End note).  In contrast, the local elected 
leader of a community 30 km south of Udorn city said there 
was very little red-shirt activism in his district due to the 
lack of an effective local UDD organizer, the same assessment 
we heard in Khon Kaen and Kalasin.  One independent Kalasin 
political observer assessed that there were no more than 
 
BANGKOK 00000380  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
600-700 red-shirts province-wide ready to travel to join to 
Bangkok for any political rally. 
 
The Udorn red-shirt game plan: options A, B, and C 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Kwanchai and the Puea Thai MPs claimed they would 
help muster 500,000-million red-shirt protesters on the 
streets of Bangkok in the run-up to the February 26 Court 
decision on Thaksin's frozen assets; the plan was to deploy 
20 teams of 20,000  protesters at key intersections around 
the city, bringing Bangkok to a stand-still.  If authorities 
were to over-react with force, Kwanchai and the MPs vowed the 
red-shirts would be ready to "respond in kind," in contrast 
to last April. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Subsequent comments revealed indirect red camp 
acknowledgment that their latest self-styled "final battle" 
was not likely to achieve its stated goals.  When asked when 
Puea Thai would table its no-confidence motion, one Udorn MP 
replied: "we're letting the street action go first, which 
means parliamentary action in March."  For his part, Kwanchai 
vowed that if the February protests did not "bring back 
Thaksin peacefully," Thaksin would force a return to Thailand 
by the April Thai New Year -- through Udorn, naturally -- 
before assuming his place as the "Commander" of a citizen 
red-shirt army to march on Bangkok (note: there was a 
strongly negative public reaction in early February when the 
red army trial balloon was subsequently floated publicly; see 
reftel). 
JOHN