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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK 000366 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP, NSC FOR WALTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN THAILAND UPDATE: ROLE OF PARAMILITARY AND 
VILLAGE DEFENSE FORCE MILITIAS 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 00147 (MOSQUE SHOOTER TURNS SELF IN) 
     ¶B. 09 BANGKOK 3115 (RED RALLY PEACEFUL) 
     ¶C. 09 BANGKOK 2307 (NOT ALL VIOLENCE INSURGENTS) 
     ¶D. 09 BANGKOK 1508 (JUNE 8 MOSQUE ATTACK) 
     ¶E. 09 BANGKOK 233 (ROHINGYA BOAT PEOPLE) 
     ¶F. 08 BANGKOK 3094 (THAI - CAMBODIAN CLASH) 
     ¶G. 07 BANGKOK 1572 (SECTARIAN PASSIONS RISING) 
     ¶H. 05 BANGKOK 2541 (NATURE OF SOUTHERN TROUBLES) 
 
BANGKOK 00000366  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE, REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: A variety of government, academic, and civil 
society contacts we engaged in Thailand's violence-affected 
southern provinces in late December presented consistent 
perceptions about the various paramilitary groups affiliated 
with military or interior/police structures and operating in 
Thailand's Deep South.  The RTG has armed tens of thousands 
of people in such ad-hoc defense forces to augment the 15,000 
police and 20,000 regular army troops assigned to the three 
southernmost provinces since the resumption of a higher level 
of violence in January 2004.  Our interlocutors helped 
clarify the chains of command, reporting lines, duties, and 
funding for the government-sponsored groups in the 
southernmost three provinces and the effect they have on the 
security situation; it appears that the vast majority of 
militia members are Muslim.  Locals told us they were able to 
easily differentiate between the various groups and hold them 
responsible or assign blame accordingly, based on their 
actions.  One concern consistently highlighted was that the 
emergency decree and martial law governing security 
operations in the South confer immunity to formal security 
forces (army and police) and most of the paramilitaries. 
 
¶2. (C) Comment: The Abhisit government did lift use of the 
emergency decree and martial law in four districts in 
Songkhla province in late 2009, in favor of invocation of the 
Internal Security Act (ISA), which provides for more 
accountability to both civilian officials and security force 
personnel.  This move may be a harbinger for similar action 
in the three southernmost provinces.  Since coming to office 
in December 2008, Prime Minister Abhisit and key advisers, 
such as PM Deputy Secretary General and Acting Government 
Spokesman Panitan Wattanayagorn, have suggested use of the 
ISA rather than the emergency decree and martial law would be 
preferred in part to improve accountability and remove 
blanket immunity for actions taken by security forces.  Not 
surprisingly, security forces have generally resisted this 
effort.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
A MULTIPLICITY OF MILITIAS AND SECURITY FORCES 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶3. (SBU) We made one of our regular visits to Thailand's 
southernmost provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala, and 
Songkhla in late December to speak with academic, government, 
and civil society contacts about the southern security 
situation in general, with a particular focus on the array of 
paramilitary groups.  Such organizations have long been a 
presence in Thailand's often sparsely-inhabited border 
regions, not just in the south near Malaysia but in the west 
near Burma, north near Laos, and east near Cambodia, usually 
drawing on local populations (and linguistic abilities) to 
augment formal military and police personnel. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Our government, academic, and civil society contacts 
presented varying perceptions about the groups operating in 
Thailand's Deep South.  While precise numbers of security 
forces vary depending on sources, most estimates are that 
roughly 20,000 regular Royal Thai Army (RTA) personnel and 
15,000 Royal Thai police are augmented by 9-11,000 rangers 
under RTA authority and between 40-60,000 personnel in 
various village defense forces and other paramilitary 
organizations to provide security in the three southern 
provinces, which have a combined population of 2 million. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Ordered from those closest to the RTA and most 
regularized Ministry of Interior (MOI) forces to the most 
loosely organized groups, the groups include: rangers 
 
BANGKOK 00000366  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
(Thahaan Phraan); Volunteer Defense Corps (Or Sor); Village 
Defense Volunteers (Chor Ror Bor); and Village Protection 
Volunteers (Or Ror Bor).  Other groups without official 
sanction by the central government, such as the Thais United 
(Ruam Thai) have been described as overgrown neighborhood 
watch schemes but have contributed guns and localized 
protection schemes (REF E). 
 
¶6. (C) Some locals we talked to reported feeling strained by 
the presence of multiple armed groups and suggested a 
reduction in security-affiliated personnel would increase, 
not decrease, security.  Students from the southernmost three 
provinces studying at Thaksin University in Songkhla and 
civil society advocates at the Working Group on Justice for 
Peace in Pattani separately told us that reducing the number 
of troops and militias patrolling the South would cause a 
significant decline in the tension and/or number of insurgent 
attacks, a view we had heard during our previous southern 
visit in August Hk 
" Communist 
Party of Thailand in the northeast, the rangers are a light 
infantry force comprised of volunteers but led by RTA regular 
officers; they are principally stationed along all of 
Thailand's borders.  Rangers typically wear black fatigues 
and a colored bandana, similar to Boy Scouts.  Outside of the 
South, rangers have recently been in the spotlight for their 
involvement in activities along the Cambodian border, 
including casualties suffered in skirmishes with Cambodian 
troops in 2008-09 (REF F), the return of a small number of 
Karen to Burma February 5, and participation in one recent 
anti-government rally (REF B).  Since 2000, ranger units have 
reported directly to the RTA Army Area Commander to which 
they are assigned. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Most of the 9,000-11,000 rangers in the South are 
25-35 years old and undergo a 45-day training course upon 
induction, according to a contact in the RTA Directorate of 
Operations.  According to Colonel Noppadon Uttanagool, Chief 
of Intelligence in the Internal Security Operations Command 
(ISOC) Fourth Region, about 70 percent of rangers in the 
South are Muslim.  Rangers salaries start at 12,900 baht 
($390) per month, compared to the 10,700 baht ($325) base 
salary for RTA conscripts and non-commissioned soldiers, 
including combat pay, according to the RTA Supreme Command 
Finance Department and the Ranger Regiment in Songkhla. 
 
¶9. (C) In the Deep South, the rangers had an overall poor 
reputation, according to several critics we talked to in 
December, in large part due to the participation of ranger 
units in the October 2004 incident at Tak Bai and a series of 
attacks 2007 against a mosque and several tea shops (REF G). 
Newspaper reports regularly mention the rangers as frequent 
targets of insurgent attacks.  The Working Group on Justice 
for Peace and separately Abdulkarim Yeekham, a Pattani 
provincial deputy district chief, claimed to us that many of 
the rangers were trouble-makers in their home villages. 
 
OLD SCHOOL: VOLUNTEER DEFENSE CORPS (MOI-AFFILIATED) 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶10. (U) The oldest official paramilitary group in Thailand is 
the Volunteer Defense Corps (in Thai: Kong Asa Raksa Dindaen, 
or Or Sor), sometimes referred to as Village Scouts.  Formed 
in 1954, the Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC) are armed, 
trained, and paid by the MOI and have approximately 20,000 
members nationwide.  VDC's principal responsibility is to 
protect infrastructure, facilities, and MOI officials. 
Provincial governors command VDC at the provincial level, 
while district chiefs have control of district-level units. 
Upon request by the RTA, VDC members in the southern 
provinces can participate in action under military command. 
 
 
BANGKOK 00000366  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
¶11. (C) About 85 percent of all VDC are former RTA, according 
to Abdulkarim Yeekham, and about 60 percent of them have 
college degrees.  New VDC cadre undergo a 45-day training 
course conducted by the RTA and MOI, similar to ranger 
training.  All VDC members participate in scheduled annual 
retraining exercises.  Abdulkarim told us that the VDC are 
required to pass a physical exam twice a year.  Benefits for 
VDC include four head-to-toe camouflage uniforms per year and 
a monthly salary between 4,200-7,000 baht ($130-215) a month. 
 Members are provided with M-16 or HK-33 assault rifles, 
which are kept at unit headquarters to avoid theft either at 
home or when members are off duty and in transit.  VDC in the 
South are also eligible for an additional 2,500 baht ($75) 
per month in danger pay and 800 baht ($26) a month in per 
diem, according to Abdulkarim. 
 
¶12. (C) There were between 4,000-4,500 active VDC in the 
three southernmost provinces, about 80 percent of whom were 
Muslim, according to Abdulkarim.  Most VDC inductees were in 
their early twenties and joined after being discharged from 
the military, according to Abdulkarim.  The MOI's 1954 
Territorial Defense Volunteer's Act specifies who can serve 
(Thai citizens aged 17-60, in good health, and not active 
police/soldier); Narathiwat Vice Governor for Security Issues 
Niphon reconfirmed to us February 2 that authorities in 
practice choose those who are at least 21, having passed the 
conscription process (at age 20).  The Chief of the Personnel 
Section at the MOI Bureau of Village Defense Corps told us in 
December that in practice they enlist people over the age of 
20 because they were more mature and responsible.  The same 
official said because there was no central database of VDC 
cadre, it was impossible to determine whether there were any 
VDC under the age of 18. 
 
¶13. (C) Yala Governor Grisada Boonrach told us the VDC were 
disciplined and reliable, in large part because they receive 
a regular salary.  Deputy District Chief Abdulkarim, who 
worked with VDC in his line of duty, claimed that the VDC 
were the most professional and had the best reputation in the 
South.  Abdulkarim said there have been few disciplinary 
problems with the VDC, and it was a group many locals wanted 
to join; in Pattani, 7,000 people had applied for 200 open 
VDC slots.  The VDC were not universally venerated, however. 
A reporter for the Thai-language Daily News based in Hat Yai, 
alleged to us that many of the VDC had sold illicit drugs and 
moonlighted as hitmen. 
 
MIDDLE GROUND: VILLAGE DEFENSE VOLUNTEERS (MOI) 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶14. (SBU) Also formally under the purview of the MOI are the 
Village Defense Volunteers (in Thai: Chut Raksa Khwam 
Plodphai Moobahn or Chor Ror Bor).  The district chiefs, 
assisted by village heads, have titular responsibility for 
Village Defense Volunteer (VDV) units, with the mandate to 
protect their villages.  In theory, they report to the local 
district chief; in the South, however, in practice they often 
fall under the command of the ISOC.  Unlike VDC, VDV members 
are not paid individually; each VDV unit in the Deep South is 
given a monthly budget of 20,000 baht ($660).  VDV cadres 
receive between three and ten days of training by the RTA or 
Royal Thai Police, according to the MOI Bureau of Internal 
Security Affairs.  VDV are also provided with two navy blue 
uniforms and two pair of combat boots a year, according to 
Abdulkarim.  Each VDV village unit has between five and 
fifteen five-round shotguns, provided by ISOC.  Members are 
authorized to carry the weapons only when they are on duty. 
 
¶15. (C) VDV personnel numbered about 50,000 in the Deep 
South, according to an official at the MOI's Bureau of 
Internal Security, making them the largest 
government-sponsored militia in the region.  Members are 
supposed to be no younger than 20 years old, but Narathiwat 
Vice-Governor Nipon indicated that there were some VDV as 
young as 18, often the result of sons who volunteered to fill 
a village quota in place of their fathers.  The Working Group 
on Justice for Peace and Abdulkarim separately told us that 
most of the VDV in the South are Muslim, which helped 
 
BANGKOK 00000366  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
minimize conflicts with villagers.  Abdulkarim attributed the 
VDV's good reputation in part to the fact that they usually 
worked in their home villages.  Lastly, the VDV are limited 
to patrolling from 8 p.m. to midnight. 
 
PROBLEM CHILD: VILLAGE PROTECTION VOLUNTEERS (ROYAL-MIL) 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) The most recently created, and problematic, militia 
is the Village Protection Volunteers (in Thai: Ratsadorn Asa 
Raksa Moobahn, or Or Ror Bor).  In 2004, in response to 
multiple entreaties from Buddhist villagers seeking 
protection after the upsurge in violence, Queen Sirikit 
ordered the military to provide training for interested 
people.  Deputy Royal Aide-de-Camp GEN Naphol Boonthap 
established the Village Protection Volunteers (VPV) and made 
arrangements to provide each village with shotguns.  Members 
can purchase these shotguns at a 60 percent discount from the 
original cost, according to Nonviolence International's 
Southeast Asia report for 2009.  Phinit Intharaksa, an 
assistant to GEN Naphol, told us that most of the weapons are 
loaned to VPV volunteers, who must purchase their own 
ammunition.  VPV members attend a seven-day initiation 
training course conducted by the military and the MOI and are 
supposed to attend five-day refresher training courses twice 
a year. 
 
¶17. (C) Each Village Protection Volunteer unit received a 
lump-sum payment each month, similar to the VDV.  Funding 
comes from the military budget, as VPV units report to the 
local task force commanders, who then report to the Fourth 
Area Army Commander, according to Pattani deputy district 
chief Abdulkarim.  The widely-held perception on the ground 
is that the VPV answers to GEN Naphol, with a secret budget 
from the military, according to the Daily News reporter who 
spoke with us. Nonviolence International's 2009 report stated 
that each VPV unit received 300,000 baht ($9,900) a month. 
GEN Naphol's representative Phinit also told us that VPV 
members were not individually compensated.  Narathiwat 
Vice-Governor Niphon, however, claimed to us that VPV members 
each received 4,500 baht ($150) per month.  Abdulkarim also 
said that VPV members were given a monthly stipend. 
 
¶18. (C) Phaisan Toyib, President of the Islamic Private 
School Association in Narathiwat, told us that of all the 
militias, the VPV were the most troublesome.  Most notably, 
the June shooting at the Al Furqon Mosque in Narathiwat (REF 
D) was widely attributed to VPV members from a nearby village 
(NOTE: Thai authorities have arrested one suspect, an 
ex-ranger and VPV member, see REF A).  Several of our 
interlocutors attributed this generally negative perception 
of the VPV to the exclusively Thai Buddhist composition of 
the VPV.  The journalist from the Daily News said VPV members 
were most likely to view the insurgency as a religious issue, 
something he said was very frightening.  He also claimed to 
us that most villagers associated the group with the Queen 
and not solely GEN Naphon; while this damaged the Queen's 
reputation in the South, it did not appear to affect local 
reverence for King Bhumibol, in his view. 
 
UNOFFICIAL THORN: RUAM THAI (NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH?) 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶19. (SBU) An unofficial group not under RTG sponsorship known 
as Ruam Thai ("Thais United") started in 1982 in Narathiwat 
province as a neighborhood watch-type program, according to 
the Issara News Institute.  In 2005, Ruam Thai instituted 
military-style training supervised by Police Colonel Phitak 
Iadkaew, then the chief of investigation in Yala Province, 
drawing attention from NGOs like the Coalition to Stop the 
Use of Child Soldiers and Nonviolence International, 
concerned about the age of some participants in the training. 
 However, Phithak has not directly supervised the Ruam Thai 
since November 2007, when he was transferred to RTP Special 
Branch in Songkhla. 
 
¶20. (C) Views on current Ruam Thai activity and numbers 
suggest that Phithak's transfer weakened Ruam Thai 
 
BANGKOK 00000366  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
significantly.  Governor of Yala Province Grisada Boonrach 
told us that since 2007, participation in Ruam Thai had 
dwindled to almost nothing in Yala, where Phitak was most 
active.  Issara News Center's former editor Ayub Pathan told 
us that many previous Ruam Thai members had left the 
movement, preferring the paid positions with the VDC or VDV. 
Human Rights Watch-Thailand researcher Sunai Phasuk likewise 
indicated to us in late January that after Phitak's 2007 
transfer, Ruam Thai went essentially dormant, and should not 
be considered at this point as anything more than a 
neighborhood watch-style organization. 
 
PROSECUTING PARAMILITARY MISCONDUCT 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶21. (C) Pursuing accusations of misconduct or abuse by the 
various security forces in the South can be difficult.  All 
of the official security forces and paramilitaries, except 
for the VPV, benefit from some protection from prosecution 
under the emergency decree and martial law.  Rangers are 
considered official assistants to the regular army and are 
covered by the relevant clauses in the emergency decree and 
martial law in all their activities.  Volunteer Defense Corps 
personnel are covered by the provisions in the emergency 
decree and martial law only when their activities are part of 
joint operations with the military and/or police; unilateral 
VDC operations are not covered by the law.  Similarly, when 
Village Defense Volunteers are tasked by the military or 
police, they have the protection of the law.  Village 
Protection Volunteers never have legal protection under the 
emergency decree or martial law.  Many VPV members hold 
concurrent enrollment with the VDV, however, according to 
Abdulkarim Yeekham, making prosecution for misconduct 
difficult.  Private, unofficial militias such as the Ruam 
Thai have no immunity from prosecution for their activities. 
JOHN