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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 000340 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WALTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: GOVERNMENT PREPARES FOR THE LATEST 
"FINAL BATTLE" AS CRACKS EMERGE IN RED-SHIRT FACADE 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 0319 (AMBASSADOR MEETS BANHARN) 
     ¶B. BANGKOK 0184 (SEH DAENG HOUSE RAID) 
     ¶C. BANGKOK 0149 (RED-SHIRT CORE LEADERS GOALS) 
     ¶D. 09 BANGKOK 3067 (RED-SHIRTS SET THEIR SIGHTS) 
 
BANGKOK 00000340  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE, REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Posturing and positioning ahead of the 
latest "final battle" promised by anti-government red-shirt 
activists at the end of the month picked up pace the first 
week of February, as larger cracks emerged within the 
pro-Thaksin camp.  Finance Minister Korn told Ambassador 
February 4 that the government was worried about the 
possibility of violence, and Foreign Minister Kasit briefed 
the diplomatic corps February 5 on government preparations. 
Core agitators MGEN Khattiya (aka "Seh Daeng") and MGEN 
(ret.) Panlop returned from a meeting with fugitive former PM 
Thaksin in Dubai to announce on February 4 that they would 
form a civilian army as part of a final push to oust the 
current government.  The next day Puea Thai Chair Chavalit 
strongly denied that he would have any role, and United Front 
for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) leaders denounced 
Panlop, leading Panlop to declare that he would no longer be 
associated with the red-shirt movement.  Separately, Puea 
Thai parliamentary leader Chalerm squabbled with banned 
politician Sudarat over control of party personnel and 
tactics. 
 
¶2. (C) Comment: As the February 26 court decision on 
Thaksin's assets draws closer, there are growing indications 
the red-shirts are trying to influence the decision-making 
process through intimidation, while simultaneously laying the 
groundwork for trouble should the court decision go against 
Thaksin.  We have long urged red-shirt leaders to distance 
themselves publicly from the actions and rhetoric of 
Khattiya, yet ultimately it is Thaksin who calls the shots, 
and he continues to summon various UDD leaders to meetings in 
conjunction with Khattiya and Panlop.  Public pronouncements 
by Chavalit and UDD core leaders like Jatuporn saying they do 
not support Seh Daeng and/or Panlop and the violent measures 
those men espouse are helpful but ultimately beside the 
point.  Thaksin's willingness to be photographed with those 
who embrace violence suggests a willingness to condone their 
methods as longs as it suits his purposes.  End Summary and 
Comment. 
 
GOVERNMENT PREPARING FOR CONFRONTATION... 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Finance Minister Korn Chatikavanij told the Ambassador 
on February 4 that February would be critical, underscoring 
the need for vigilance in the face of red-shirt mobilization. 
 It was important for the government to maintain control of 
any red-shirt activities to avoid chaos and forestall 
intervention by the military, Korn said, but if necessary the 
Royal Thai Army (RTA) would deploy under the Internal 
Security Act (ISA) to keep the situation under control.  Korn 
expressed hope that even if Thaksin would not abandon his 
political efforts, his financial and political capital would 
decline over time; the proper way to contest for power was 
through the parliament and the next election cycle, which he 
suggested would take place in 2011.  Ambassador responded 
that the USG reaction would be harsher than in 2006 were 
there to be another coup, but that deployment of the military 
under the ISA, under civilian control, and without the use of 
excessive force, was different. 
 
¶4. (C) On February 5 at a diplomatic corps briefing, Foreign 
Minister Kasit Piromya outlined efforts the government had 
already undertaken to prepare for any eventuality during the 
February 17-28 period.  In anticipation of the protests, the 
Cabinet had already activated the portions of the ISA that 
permit the RTA to work with the Royal Thai Police (RTP) to 
maintain peace.  MGEN Thitiwan Kamlang-ek from the Thai 
National Security Council added that there would be no 
military coup and that the RTA would not allow a repeat of 
the social disorder that occurred in April 2009.  780 key 
red-shirt activists were already under surveillance, MGEN 
Thitiwan said, so the government could act first to head off 
 
BANGKOK 00000340  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
any problems.  Kasit said a "war room" to coordinate the 
government's efforts would be set up at RTA headquarters in 
Bangkok, and movement into Bangkok from the provinces would 
be restricted on the day the court reads the verdict on 
Thaksin's assets case. 
 
...AS RIFTS IN THE RED-SHIRT CAMP EMERGE 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Two of the top pro-Thaksin agitators known for use 
of violence -- former deputy commander of the Internal 
Security Operations Command (ISOC) MGEN (ret.) Panlop 
Pinmanee and suspended Army adviser MGEN Khattiya Sawasdipol, 
aka "Seh Daeng" -- confirmed that they visited former Prime 
Minister Thaksin in Dubai February 1; Khattiya posted a group 
photo on his website indicating that the other two 
participants were the most radical of the UDD leaders, 
Pattaya riot leader Arisman Pongruangrong and Suphon 
Attawong, aka "Rambo Isaan."  Khattiya and Panlop told the 
media they would form a "National Army of Thai People for 
Democracy under the Name of the King" and suggested Puea Thai 
Chairman GEN Chavalit Yongchaiyut would serve as Supreme 
Commander.  Seh Daeng claimed that Thaksin had given the 
group the green light to make an all-out, last-ditch push 
against the government if the House was not dissolved and the 
1997 Constitution failed to be restored. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Faced with an immediate negative reaction to the 
"red army" proposal, key figures in Puea Thai and the UDD 
reacted swiftly to try and distance themselves from Panlop 
and Seh Daeng.  Puea Thai Chair Chavalit denied that he would 
have a role in leading any type of group against the 
government, insisting that he had returned to politics to 
seek peaceful political change.  Jatuporn Prompan, one of the 
UDD core leaders, said the UDD had not sanctioned the 
creation of an army, armed or unarmed.  Panlop responded to 
Chavalit and Jatuporn's public disembrace by saying he would 
no longer be associated with the red-shirt movement, yet 
warning that violence was still a possibility. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The rift between Panlop and Seh Daeng and UDD and 
Puea Thai came right on the heels of a spat between two 
pro-Thaksin politicians.  Chalerm Yubamrung, head of the Puea 
Thai MP caucus, publicly accused banned Thai Rak Thai (TRT) 
executive Sudarat Keyuraphan, long seen as head of the 
Bangkok bloc of pro-Thaksin MPs, of meddling in party affairs 
generally and blocking his career specifically.  Chalerm 
alleged that Sudarat had slandered him and disrupted the 
political career of his three sons.  The two reportedly 
resolved their differences at a Puea Thai party meeting on 
February 2. 
 
¶8. (C) Meanwhile, Thaksin appeared to be putting all his 
options on the table as the February 26 court verdict 
approached.  Our soundings suggest anything could happen with 
the verdict, with some contacts convinced the court will 
strip Thaksin of everything, while others, such as former PM 
Banharn (REF A), confident the court would show him some 
leniency.  Many interpreted Thaksin's February 1 meeting with 
his more radical lieutenants as evidence that Thaksin was 
preparing to instigate serious trouble in an effort to bully 
the courts and government into a favorable ruling, or to 
spark an overreaction in the case of red-shirt disturbances 
in the wake of any decision against Thaksin. 
JOHN