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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000319 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WALTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PINR TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: AMBASSADOR MEETS FORMER PRIME MINISTER 
BANHARN SILPA-ARCHA, DISCUSSES 2010 POLITICAL WAY AHEAD 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 287 (KING RESUMES VISIBLE ROLE) 
     ¶B. BANGKOK 281 (COALITION PARTNERS SUBMIT PROPOSAL) 
 
BANGKOK 00000319  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT 
------------------- 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador met with former Prime Minister 
Banharn Silpa-archa on February 4 at Chart Thai Pattana party 
headquarters to review the latest political developments. 
Countering much press speculation, Banharn told the 
Ambassador he never expected the Democrat party to endorse 
the constitutional amendment initiative (REF B) and said the 
disagreement over the proposal would not affect the stability 
of the coalition.  Banharn expressed worry that the 
government may have "backed Thaksin into a corner" and "gone 
too far."  Banharn suggested King Bhumibol -- who seemed to 
be in much better health -- may have reached the same 
conclusion, as many believed His Majesty's recent 
exhortations to two separate groups of judges (REF A) 
included a plea for the legal system to show Thaksin leniency 
in the former PM's pending frozen assets case.  Ideally, 
Banharn said the RTG would begin to soften its position on 
Thaksin in an effort to move towards reconciliation, though 
he characterized that possibility as unlikely. 
 
¶2. (C) Comment: Banharn came across as being as relaxed and 
sure of himself as ever, despite his December 2008 five-year 
ban from politics due to election violations (Note: his 
brother now formally heads the CTP party, though Banharn 
still calls the shots.  End Note.)  If Thaksin and Puea Thai 
hope to have any chance of dissolving the government through 
parliamentary maneuverings, flipping Banharn and his CTP 
party would form the heart of any successful strategy.  If 
Banharn is to be taken at his word, however, it would appear 
Puea Thai's no confidence motion has only limited prospects 
for success.  Banharn's interpretation of the King's recent 
comments to judges is not authoritative; Bhumibol's 
Delphic-like pronouncements can nearly always be read in 
different, even opposing ways by those seeking political 
import or advantage.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PUSH 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) The Ambassador began the February 4 meeting by asking 
Banharn about the Democrat party's refusal to support a 
constitutional amendment push.  Banharn told the Ambassador 
that although he knew the initiative was doomed from the 
start, he decided to move forward anyway in an effort to see 
whether the Democrat party would be willing to make some 
concessions towards the smaller parties in the coalition. 
Banharn claimed to the Ambassador that the current 
Constitution was crafted for the sole purpose of making life 
difficult for former PM Thaksin, who nevertheless still did 
as he pleased, and that it needed to be replaced or revised. 
Banharn asserted that the 1997 Constitution would be far 
superior to the current version. 
 
¶4. (C) When the Ambassador asked Banharn to explain the 
fundamental differences between his and Democrat views on 
changing the constitution, Banharn said that it boiled down 
to a difference of opinion on single seat parliamentary 
constituencies.  Banharn claimed that while moving from 
multi-seat to single seat districts would have little to no 
practical effect on his party's prospects moving forward, the 
real issue was making MPs more accountable to their 
constituencies.  Banharn argued that the current system, in 
which multiple MPs represented the same electoral district, 
made it difficult for even the most discerning voter to 
understand who truly represented them. (Note: such a 
principled explanation rarely animates the political 
decisions of small parties in Thailand.  It is more likely 
Banharn and CTP have concluded they could be more successful, 
and spend less in an electoral campaign, with single-member 
districts.  End Note.) 
 
BANGKOK 00000319  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) Banharn said that the Democrats, on the other hand, 
believed that elections for single seat districts, in which 
two candidates competed for one seat, were far too easily 
corrupted by money politics.  The Democrats also believed 
that elections for multi-seat districts were superior than 
the ones for single seat districts because they were cheaper 
and easier to manage for both the RTG and the parties 
involved.  Banharn also believed the Democrats stood to win 
more seats with the current multi-seat format, and therefore 
were disinclined ever to support the return to single 
district seats.  Banharn said the coalition had decided to 
table the proposal anyway, and would see what happened. 
 
¶6. (C) On the question of whether PM Abhisit and the Democrat 
party would ever be willing to consider changes to Article 
237 in the Constitution, which was used to ban political 
parties such as pro-Thaksin PPP and his own former Chat Thai 
party, Banharn suggested that it was unlikely.  According to 
Banharn, the Democrat party, not to mention CTP and other 
coalition members, had concerns any such effort would be 
viewed negatively by those close to the monarchy. 
 
GOVERNMENT STABILITY 
-------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Turning to the subject of government stability, the 
Ambassador asked Banharn whether this disagreement on the 
Constitution would lead to fissures in the coalition. 
Banharn stated unequivocally that it would not, and said that 
the small coalition parties were in for the long haul.  In 
Banharn's mind, the greatest impediment to the longevity of 
the government was the Democrat party itself, which Banharn 
suggested ran the risk of "tripping over itself."  The 
coalition partners, which he suggested he could speak for as 
their de facto leader, would not end the government 
themselves. 
 
¶8. (C) The Ambassador noted that PM Abhisit, by parceling out 
cabinet positions on the one hand, but toeing the line on the 
constitutional amendment push on the other, had done a 
reasonably good job of balancing national and party interests 
with those of his coalition partners.  Banharn replied that 
if Abhisit had not handed out the cabinet positions: "he 
would still be in the opposition."  Asked if Banharn and the 
CTP could therefore just pick up and switch their allegiance 
to Puea Thai, provided they could retain their cabinet 
portfolios, Banharn told the Ambassador that it would be 
"very difficult." without elaborating why. 
 
THAKSIN 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) Banharn told the Ambassador that while he considered 
former PM Thaksin a friend, he viewed him as utterly 
unpredictable.  He speculated that Thaksin -- with whom he 
had not spoken in a long time -- was probably even more 
unpredictable than ever, now that the RTG had "backed him 
into a corner."  As with anyone in this situation, this made 
Thaksin potentially dangerous, and Banharn said he wished the 
RTG would adopt a more flexible and compromising approach vis 
a vis Thaksin.  By sticking to the letter of the law and 
remaining so strident in its dealing with Thaksin, the RTG 
had eliminated any possibility for reconciliation.  Now both 
parties had gone "beyond the point of no return." 
 
¶10. (C) When the Ambassador asked Banharn for his 
prescription for dealing with this problem, Banharn conceded 
that there was no one with the requisite stature and 
reputation for impartiality to successfully negotiate between 
both sides.  Thaksin and the RTG had both drawn a line in the 
sand on the question of Thaksin serving time in jail.  In 
Banharn's mind, any successful compromise would have to be 
predicated on the idea of putting this issue aside to start. 
In any case, Banharn emphasized that Thaksin's periodic 
comments to the press stating that he was out of politics for 
good were laughable.  Thaksin was a political animal and 
 
BANGKOK 00000319  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
would always seek to find a way back into the game, a fact 
that helped explain why the RTG was so nervous. 
 
THAKSIN'S ASSETS 
---------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Banharn told the Ambassador that February 26, the day 
of the Thaksin assets case verdict, could represent the next 
flash point in the red-yellow saga.  Banharn and the 
Ambassador both noted that Thaksin already had 35-40 percent 
of the 76 billion baht in assets currently frozen by the RTG 
in the bank when he became PM.  Given that fact, Banharn 
believed that if the court decision stripped him of 
everything, this could provoke a strong reaction from 
Thaksin. Banharn suggested that even the King had reached the 
same conclusion about the perils of taking all of Thaksin's 
frozen assets, pointing to recent public comments to two 
separate groups of judges that "even criminals deserve 
justice," a line that many had interpreted as a signal to 
allow Thaksin to keep a portion of his money. 
 
¶12. (C) On balance, especially given the King's recent 
remarks, Banharn believed Thaksin could stand a chance of 
recovering a portion, though not all, of his assets on 
February 26.  Regardless of the outcome, Banharn believed 
Thaksin had other resources at his disposal, meaning the 
verdict did not represent a make or break proposition for him. 
 
THE KING'S HEALTH 
----------------- 
 
¶13. (C) When the Ambassador asked Banharn for his thoughts on 
the King's health, Banharn said that the King appeared to be 
doing much better, noting that he delivered his two most 
recent public speeches off the cuff and without the halting, 
subdued speech that marked his birthday address last December 
(Ref A).  By all accounts, he appeared on the road to 
recovery. 
 
¶14. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's question about the 
King's continued hospitalization, Banharn suggested that -- 
despite the King's remarkable improvement -- His Majesty's 
medical team had urged him to remain at Siriraj hospital 
until he was fully recovered.  Returning to the Palace would 
introduce major logistical issues for his medical team, 
beginning with the fact that the doctors would be separated 
from the King by one floor, which would unnecessarily 
complicate his full and speedy recovery. 
JOHN