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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK 000298 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PTER MARR MOPS PINS PHUM TH
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE CSA-HOSTED VISIT OF THAI ARMY 
COMMANDER GENERAL ANUPONG 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C)  General Casey, the upcoming visit of Thai Army 
Commander General Anupong Paojinda will be an important 
occasion to demonstrate our appreciation for the U.S.-Thai 
relationship.  Despite ongoing domestic political challenges, 
Thailand's adherence to democratic values should not go 
unrecognized.  General Anupong has been invaluable the past 
two years as he has resisted pressures from all sides for 
military intervention into politics; as a result, a full 
range of actors on the Thai political scene are able to 
openly and vigorously debate policies and the state of 
democracy.  This visit is a prime opportunity to demonstrate 
clearly to our close ally that we intend to engage fully in 
the partnership, at a time when many in Thailand question 
U.S. commitment to the region in comparison to a sustained 
Chinese charm offensive.  As examples of benefits from the 
relationship, the U.S.-Thai partnership has yielded a 
promising new lead in the drive to develop an HIV vaccination 
and the seizure of more than 35 tons of North Korean weapons 
in just the last three months alone, two examples that serve 
to illustrate the depth and breadth of a relationship. 
Furthermore, the Thai Cabinet in December approved a 
supplemental budget to facilitate a peacekeeping deployment 
to Darfur. 
 
¶2. (C) General Anupong is the preeminent military leader in 
our steadfast ally and has been a strong advocate of not 
staging a coup and permitting the democratic process to play 
out, although with the Army ensuring security.  Indeed, if 
you look back at the political turbulence of the past two 
years, he has been one of the more admirable figures in 
Thailand, and this counterpart visit is one way to express 
our appreciation for his actions.  Anupong has had to make an 
extraordinary series of tough decisions over the past 
eighteen months, and his intellect and disposition have been 
key ingredients that have enabled him to make the choice to 
come down on the side of democracy, even as his troops wage a 
counterinsurgency campaign in Thailand's troubled 
southernmost provinces.  We will also want to use this visit 
to send a signal to the rest of the Royal Thai Army that the 
United States values its relationship with the Thai military 
and Thailand.  Anupong will likely be interested in pursuing 
discussions on regional security challenges, and how the 
U.S.-Thai alliance can be focused to assist as Thailand 
prepares for changing threats.  Anupong will also look to 
discuss areas of cooperation, such as bilateral exercises and 
training, whereby we can assist the Thai military modernize. 
Thai government officials and military leaders have also 
expressed strong interest in receiving excess defense 
articles by way of Thailand's status as a Major Non-NATO 
Ally, as Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya raised in 2009 with 
Secretary Clinton and other senior USG officials. 
 
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
--------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The past eighteen months were turbulent for 
Thailand.  Court decisions forced two Prime Ministers from 
office in 2008, and twice the normal patterns of political 
life took a back seat to disruptive protests in the streets. 
The yellow-shirted People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) 
occupied Government House from August to December 2008 and 
shut down Bangkok's airports for eight days, to protest 
governments affiliated with ex-Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra.  The red-shirted United Front for Democracy 
against Dictatorship (UDD), followers of Thaksin, disrupted a 
regional Asian Summit and sparked riots in Bangkok in 
mid-April 2009 after Thaksin, now a fugitive abroad in the 
wake of an abuse of power conviction, called for a revolution 
to bring him home. 
 
¶4. (C) 2010 promises to be contentious as well, with Thaksin 
and the red-shirts having vowed to redouble their efforts to 
topple the government.  In recent weeks, the red-shirts have 
steadily increased a campaign to discredit and undermine the 
government, with promises of a "final battle" in late 
February that has many worried that violence could again 
return to the streets of Bangkok.  Among their activities has 
 
BANGKOK 00000298  002 OF 005 
 
 
been an operation to spread rumors of an impending coup, a 
rumor for which we have seen no basis. 
 
¶5. (C) Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva is a photogenic, 
eloquent 45-year old Oxford graduate who generally has 
progressive instincts and says the right things about basic 
freedoms, social inequities, policy towards Burma, and how to 
address the troubled deep South, afflicted by a grinding 
ethno-nationalist Muslim-Malay separatist insurgency. 
Delivering results has proved more elusive, though the Thai 
economy is growing again, driven by expanding exports. 
 
¶6. (C) While both yellow and red try to lay exclusive claim 
to the mantle of democracy, both have ulterior motives in 
doing so.  Both movements reflect deep social concerns 
stemming from widespread perceptions of a lack of social and 
economic justice, but both seek to triumph in competing for 
traditional Thai hierarchical power relationships.  New 
elections would not appear to be a viable solution to 
political divide, and political discord could persist for 
years.  We continue to stress to Thai interlocutors the need 
for all parties to avoid violence and respect democratic 
norms within the framework of the constitution and rule of 
law, as well as our support for long-time friend Thailand to 
work through its current difficulties and emerge as a more 
participatory democracy. 
 
RECEDING MONARCHY 
----------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Underlying the political tension in Bangkok is the 
future of the monarchy.  On the throne for 62 years, 
U.S.-born King Bhumibol is Thailand's most prestigious 
figure, with influence far beyond his constitutional mandate. 
 Many actors, including in the military, are jockeying for 
position to shape the expected transition period in Thailand 
during royal succession after the eventual passing of the 
King.  Few observers believe that the deep political and 
social divides can be bridged until after King Bhumibol 
passes and Thailand's tectonic plates shift.  Crown Prince 
Vajiralongkorn neither commands the respect nor displays the 
charisma of his beloved father, who has greatly expanded the 
prestige and influence of the monarchy during his reign. 
Nearly everyone expects the monarchy to shrink and change in 
function after succession.  How much will change is open to 
question, with many institutions, figures, and political 
forces positioning for influence, not only over redefining 
the institution of monarchy but, equally fundamentally, what 
it means to be Thai. 
 
SOUTHERN THAILAND - SEPARATIST INSURGENCY 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) An ethno-nationalist Malay Muslim insurgency in 
southern Thailand has claimed an estimated 3,500 lives since 
¶2004.  Fundamental issues of justice and ethnic identity 
drive the violence as many Malay Muslims feel that they are 
second-class citizens in Thailand, and ending the insurgency 
will require the government to deal with these issues on a 
national level.  The insurgents use IEDs, assassinations, and 
beheadings to challenge the control of the Thai state in the 
deep South; the government has responded through special 
security laws that give security forces expanded power to 
search and detain people.  The Thai military is now deeply 
involved in counter-insurgency efforts; in contrast, from the 
late 1990s-2004, the military viewed the top national 
security threat to be the flow of illegal narcotics from 
neighboring Burma. 
 
¶9. (C) The insurgents direct their anger at the government in 
Bangkok, not at the United States.  Since a U.S. presence or 
perception of U.S. involvement in the South could redirect 
that anger towards us and link it to the international 
jihadist movement -- a link that is currently absent - we 
ensure that any offers of assistance or training pass the 
"location and label" test.  Put simply, we keep U.S. military 
personnel away from the far South and we make sure that we do 
not label any assistance or training as directly linked to 
the southern situation.  This approach dovetails with the 
 
BANGKOK 00000298  003 OF 005 
 
 
Thai interest in keeping outside influences and actors away 
from the internal conflict. 
 
¶10. (C) General Anupong has dedicated more of his time to 
overseeing RTA counter-insurgency efforts in South than past 
Army Commanders, who often were more focused on politics in 
Bangkok.  Anupong makes almost weekly trips to the South, and 
he and his senior staff have engaged the Embassy and USARPAC 
in an effort to learn counter-insurgency and counter-IED best 
practices. 
 
ENDURING BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP 
------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Despite the political divide, Thailand's unparalleled 
strategic importance to the U.S. should not be understated. 
The U.S.-Thai military relationship, which began during World 
War II when the U.S. trained Thais to covertly conduct 
special operations against the Japanese forces occupying 
Thailand has evolved into a partnership that provides the 
U.S. with unique benefits.  Our military engagement affords 
us unique training venues, the opportunity to conduct 
exercises that are nearly impossible to match elsewhere, a 
willing participant in international peacekeeping operations, 
essential access to facilities amid vital sea and air lanes 
that support contingency and humanitarian missions, and a 
partner that is a key ASEAN nation in which we continue to 
promote democratic ideals. 
 
¶12. (C) Thailand's willingness to allow the United States to 
use Utapao Naval Air Station as the hub for our regional 
assistance program was key to making the 2004 tsunami and the 
2008 Cyclone Nargis relief operations a success.  While those 
high-profile relief operations highlighted publicly the value 
of access to Utapao, the air base is used regularly for 
military flights.  A prime example was the critical support 
Utapao provided during OEF by providing an air bridge in 
support of refueling missions en route to Afghanistan. 
Approximately 1,000 flights transit Utapao every year in 
support of critical U.S. military operations both regionally 
and to strategic areas of the world.  Thailand also provides 
valued port access with U.S. naval vessels making calls, 
primarily at Laem Chabang and Sattahip, over sixty times per 
year for exercises and visits. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Beyond traditional military activities, our 
bilateral military relationship provides benefits in other 
important areas.  One example is the Armed Forces Research 
Institute of Medical Sciences' (AFRIMS) collaboration with 
Thai counterparts on basic research and trial vaccines.  The 
sophistication of the Thai scientific and public health 
community makes collaboration as useful to the USG as it is 
to the Thais.  A number of important breakthroughs, such as 
in the prevention of HIV/AIDS transmission from mothers to 
children, were developed here, and the first partially 
successful phase III, double blind trial for a potential HIV 
vaccine occurred in 2009; a second such trial run by CDC is 
currently ongoing. 
 
COBRA GOLD AND THE MILITARY EXERCISE PROGRAM 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) By means of access to good military base 
infrastructure and large areas to conduct unrestricted 
operations, Thailand gives the U.S. military a platform for 
exercises unique in Asia.  Thai leaders are far more willing 
to host multinational and bilateral exercises than are other 
countries in Asia.  This has allowed us to use exercises in 
Thailand to further key U.S. objectives, such as supporting 
Japan's growing military role in Asia and engaging the 
Indonesian and Singaporean militaries. 
 
¶15. (C) Cobra Gold, the capstone event of our exercise 
program and being held during the visit, is the largest 
annual multi-lateral exercise in the Pacific region and for 
29 years has served to strengthen our relations with 
Thailand, highlight our commitment to Southeast Asia, and 
provide exceptional training opportunities for our troops. 
The event has evolved over the years and now facilitates 
 
BANGKOK 00000298  004 OF 005 
 
 
important objectives such as promoting a greater role in the 
Asian Pacific region for Japan, Singapore, and South Korea 
and re-establishing a partner role with Indonesia.  As an 
example of the tangible benefits of the exercise, USARPAC is 
using this year's Cobra Gold to test a deployable command 
post for crisis situations such as HA/DR incidents.  Cope 
Tiger, a leading air exercise with the Thailand and 
Singapore, and CARAT, a bilateral naval event, are key 
mechanisms for engagement of the Royal Thai Air Force and 
Navy.  The Thai military continues to highlight to us the 
significance of these events for training and for 
relationship building. 
 
PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS AND DARFUR DEPLOYMENT 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶16. (C) Thailand has historically been a strong supporter of 
UN peacekeeping missions and was an early contributing nation 
to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.  In addition, Thai 
generals very effectively led UN forces in East Timor, to 
which Thailand contributed 1,500 troops, and in Aceh where a 
Thai general served as the principal deputy of the Aceh 
Monitoring Mission.  Thailand is preparing for deploying a 
battalion of troops for a difficult UNAMID mission in Darfur 
and has asked for USG assistance.  State recently identified 
$2.4 million to be used to support equipment needed by the 
Thai for the deployment, and we have used various funding 
sources to increase overall Thai peacekeeping capabilities, 
both as a contributing nation and as a trainer of neighboring 
nations. 
 
BORDER CONFLICT WITH CAMBODIA 
----------------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) Bilateral relations with Cambodia remain volatile, 
primarily due to a border dispute centered on 4.6 square 
kilometers of overlapping territorial claims adjacent to the 
11th century Hindu Preah Vihear temple.  Minor skirmishes 
have erupted four times since mid-2008, leading to the deaths 
of seven soldiers.  Cambodian Prime Hun Sen's November 2009 
decision to appoint Thaksin as an economic advisor further 
stoked cross-border tensions.  Furthermore, there have been 
at least six reports of small-scale conflicts resulting from 
cross-border illegal logging activities in recent months. 
 
¶18. (C) The roots of the border dispute lie in the 
Siam-France agreements of 1904-8 and a 1962 International 
Court of Justice ruling that granted Cambodia the temple but 
left the rest of disputed land unresolved.  Tensions spiked 
in 2008 when the Thai government in power at that time 
supported Cambodia's application to UNESCO for a joint 
listing of the temple as a world heritage site, only to face 
opposition in parliament and an adverse court ruling.  Thorny 
internal political considerations and historical rancor 
between Thailand and Cambodia make progress difficult.  We 
urge both sides to resolve their differences peacefully 
through bilateral negotiations, border demarcation, and a 
reduction of troops deployed along the border. 
 
ONGOING REFUGEE CONCERNS: HMONG AND BURMA 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶19. (C) Due to inherent institutional capabilities, the Thai 
military plays a prominent role in the management of the many 
refugees that enter Thailand from neighboring countries. 
Thailand continues to host more than 140,000 Burmese and 
facilitate resettlement of more than 14,000 refugees to the 
U.S. annually, but the recent forced repatriation of two 
groups of Lao Hmong in late December provoked international 
outcry.  The USG and Congress are also focused on 4,000 
ethnic Karen in a Thai army-run camp along the Thai-Burma 
border who came into Thailand last June fleeing an offensive 
and who may be sent back in the near future.  (Note: 140,000 
Karen and Karenni have lived in RTG-sanctioned camps along 
the border since 1990. End Note.)  We underscore to the RTG 
our disappointment with the Hmong deportation decision and 
our continuing concern over access to the Hmong now that they 
have been returned to Laos, as well as our concerns on the 
Thai-Burma border. 
 
BANGKOK 00000298  005 OF 005 
 
 
 
THE INCREASING ROLE OF CHINA 
---------------------------- 
 
¶20. (C) As the shape of Southeast Asia, Asia writ large, and 
the world has changed, so have Thai attitudes.  The Chinese 
have been making a major push to upgrade all aspects of 
relations, including mil-mil.  Thailand is not interested in 
making a choice between the U.S. and China (nor do we see 
closer Chinese-Thai relations as automatically threatening to 
our interests here), but we will need to work harder to 
maintain the preferred status we have enjoyed.  While Thai 
military links with the United States are deeper and far more 
apparent than Sino-Thai links, China's growing influence in 
Thailand is readily evident. 
 
¶21. (C) The Chinese have made a strong effort to court the 
Thai.  The Thai military has a range of Chinese weapons 
systems in its arsenal; the PLA Navy is interested in closer 
links with the Thai navy, and China has worked with Thailand 
to improve air defense equipment provided to Thailand in the 
late 1980's.  In 2007 and 2008, Thai and Chinese Special 
Forces conducted joint exercises, and other mil-to-mil 
exchanges have expanded in recent years, as has the number of 
bilateral military VIP visits. 
 
¶22. (C) During a visit to Thailand by Chinese Minister of 
National Defense Liang Guanglie for the King's birthday 
celebrations in early December 2009, the Thai and Chinese 
militaries agreed to expand bilateral exercises to include 
the two nations' navies, marines, and air forces.  The 
initial exercise will be conducted early this year, with the 
PLA engaging Thai sailors and marines through an amphibious 
landing event and a naval rescue and humanitarian relief 
exercise.  While some entities within the RTG resisted the 
expanded engagement, reportedly the MFA and the Marine 
Commandant, the Thai tell us that the Chinese pushed hard for 
a rapid expansion of bilateral exercises.  The Thai Marines 
suggested to us that the exercise would be held at the 
platoon or company level; it is unclear how many Navy 
personnel may participate.  While there are those in the Thai 
military who have resisted expanding ties with the Chinese, 
Foreign Minister Kasit during an early November meeting with 
EAP Deputy Assistant Secretary Scot Marciel warned that 
Thailand could not continue to say no, and that the U.S. 
military needed to more seriously re-engage with their Thai 
counterparts. 
 
¶23. (C) The expansion of joint exercises follows China 
providing Thailand with $49 million in military assistance 
following the 2006 coup.  Beyond exercises and assistance, 
the number of exchanges by Thai and Chinese officers studying 
at military institutes has increased significantly in recent 
years, particularly since the coup.  The PLA has also 
actively courted Thai military leaders, including Defense 
Minister Prawit Wongsuwan, Chief of Defense Forces General 
Songkitti Jaggabatra, and General Anupong, through multiple 
hosted-visits to China. 
JOHN