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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 000269 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM SMIG TH
SUBJECT: CHINA,S SUSTAINED, SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO COURT 
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THAILAND - PERSPECTIVES AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 186 
     ¶B. 09 BANGKOK 2851 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b, d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Thai contacts from government to academia see 
a decade-long Chinese romance of Southeast Asia, both 
through ASEAN and bilaterally, to have been successful in 
increasing Chinese influence during a period in which many 
believe that U.S. influence and prestige in the region has 
waned.  The Chinese effort in Thailand in particular is 
multifaceted and deeply rooted, from diplomatic to economic, 
military to cultural.  Chinese high-level visits to Thailand 
and reciprocal Thai visits to China by Prime Ministers, 
Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers, and top-ranking 
military brass continued at a rapid pace in 2009, leading to 
a slew of new agreements.  Thais compliment the Obama 
administration's efforts in 2009 to re-engage diplomatically 
in Southeast Asia.  However, even government officials and 
academics sympathetic to the U.S. see the dynamic of China 
rising and the U.S. receding likely to continue, unless the 
U.S takes more vigorous action to follow-up with sustained 
efforts to engage on issues that matter to the Thai and the 
region, not just what is perceived as the U.S.' own agenda. 
This cable is one in a series examining aspects of the 
China-Thai relationship; septels will examine Thai-Sino 
economic relations and cultural ties/exchanges. 
 
¶2. (C) Comment:  Thailand has never seen international 
relations as a zero-sum game and has traditionally sought 
good relations with all sides; the uptick in Chinese 
influence and activity does not automatically mean a 
corresponding decline in U.S. influence.  The upcoming trip 
of Thai Army Commander GEN Anupong to the U.S. on a 
counterpart visit February 7-13 is a good start for the 
bilateral relationship in 2010.  Equally important in 
building on the promise of 2009 will be inviting PM Abhisit 
to Washington, putting substance into the promise of the 
Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), and launching the next session 
of the Strategic Dialogue as agreed by the Secretary and Thai 
FM Kasit last April.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
CHINA RISING, U.S. FADING? 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Indications that the U.S.'s historically close 
relationship with Thailand and the region is being challenged 
by the rise of China have become increasingly evident in 
recent years in a variety of arenas, not just economically 
but diplomatically, culturally, politically, and even in some 
security areas.  A U.S.-educated Thai Army Colonel at the 
National Defense College shocked a group of U.S. one-star 
officers visiting as part of the CAPSTONE program in the fall 
of 2008 by stating bluntly: "The Thai perceive regional power 
dynamics as follows: China is rising; the U.S. is 
distracted/declining; and Thailand will adjust its policies 
accordingly."  In mid-December 2009, the MFA held an in-house 
seminar that covered the future of China and the U.S. in Asia 
and reached similar conclusions, two participants told us 
later that day.  Apart from a general consensus that China 
was reassuming the more prominent role in Asia it had enjoyed 
for millennia prior to the 19th century, there was much 
concern expressed about the future of the U.S. in Southeast 
Asia. 
 
¶4. (C) Participants in the December MFA seminar cited several 
factors behind their doubts about the U.S. staying 
power in the region, according to participating Thai MFA 
officials.  They believed the damage from economic problems 
in the U.S. over the past few years would severely limit the 
ability of the U.S. to influence global economic affairs and 
to dedicate the budget necessary to maintain its military 
advantage in the region.  Other attendees reportedly 
suggested that a fascination in Washington with Indonesia and 
Vietnam would likely lead to continued decreased 
interest/involvement in Thailand bilaterally.  Finally, 
several participants suggested that recent trips by President 
Obama and Secretary Clinton to China had demonstrated a much 
more conciliatory U.S. stance towards China; they interpreted 
 
BANGKOK 00000269  002 OF 004 
 
 
this development as a sign that the balance of power between 
the U.S. and China had shifted in favor of China, rather than 
the possibility that the U.S. stance reflected the 
Administration's more cooperative approach to managing the 
complex relationship with China. 
 
CHINA'S DIPLOMATIC INROADS TO ASEAN... 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) One avenue the PRC has used to court Southeast Asia 
is through sustained, friendly diplomatic engagement over the 
past decade.  China's diplomatic romance of ASEAN started a 
decade ago, Thammasat International Relations 
Professor Praphat Thepchatri stated at a January 14 seminar 
titled "The Obama Administration's Policy Towards Southeast 
Asia, One Year On." (Note: despite not being on the seminar 
agenda, China's role in Southeast Asia was as much under 
discussion by participants as the U.S. role.  End note). 
Suspending its confrontational focus on South China Sea 
territorial disputes, Beijing changed its approach and was 
the first big outside power to sign the Southeast Asia Treaty 
of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) with ASEAN.  It then pursued a 
clear, patient, well-planned strategy of engagement in the 
region through repeated reciprocal visits at all levels. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Praphat and fellow seminar speaker Dr. Wiwat, a 
Cornell and Harvard-educated mainstay of U.S-Thai exchanges 
for decades, contrasted the Chinese charm offensive to what 
they termed the "lost" years of the Bush administration, 
during which time they claimed the U.S. had lost significant 
prestige and moral standing as a world leader in the eyes of 
ASEAN governments and citizens.  Praphat complimented the 
U.S. diplomatic strategy in 2009, including the US-ASEAN 
Leaders' Meeting in Singapore, the U.S. signing of the TAC, 
the launch of the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), and the 
U.S.-announced intention to send an Ambassador to ASEAN in 
Jakarta. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Chinese, however, did not stand still in 2009, 
Praphat noted.  During the 12th ASEAN-China Summit in 
October, China made further inroads by establishing the $10 
billion China-ASEAN Fund on Investment Cooperation and a 
$15 billion Commercial Credit to support infrastructure 
development in ASEAN member states, including the 
construction of roads and railways, for "connectivity" 
between ASEAN and China.  Modest U.S. initiatives lacked such 
similar signature projects, he said. 
 
...AND BILATERALLY 
------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) The fast pace of high-level Chinese bilateral visits 
to Thailand continued in 2009.  Chinese Premier Wen 
Jiabao visited Thailand twice, to attend ASEAN 3 meetings in 
April and October.  Defense Minister Liang Guanglie 
visited in December to enhance Thai-Sino military 
cooperation, pushing (successfully) for new military 
exercises.  PM Abhisit went to Beijing in June 2009 with the 
goal of boosting bilateral trade relations and luring Chinese 
tourists back to Thailand after the 2008 unrest/airport 
closure.  FM Kasit visited China three times in 2009.  The 
Chinese embassy told us recently that there are so many 
visits to Thailand, involving not only central government 
officials but provincial trade delegations, that they do not 
assign control officers for anyone lower than a Vice-Minister. 
 
¶9. (C) During Abhisit's June visit, Thailand and China signed 
eighteen agreements covering Thai exports of rubber, fruit, 
rice, jewelry, and other goods worth an estimated total value 
of $1.05 billion - an example of the Chinese paying attention 
to the Thai top priorities (in this case: exports and trade 
ties), even as China itself benefits from the China-ASEAN 
Free Trade Agreement (see septel for more on Sino-Thai 
economic relations).  Abhisit characterized the 
trip a success that would lead to stronger trade and 
investment cooperation between the two countries (Note: In 
contrast, we have not been able to respond positively to 
Abhisit's repeatedly expressed desire, since he took office 
in December 2008, to visit Washington to promote Thai-U.S. 
 
BANGKOK 00000269  003 OF 004 
 
 
relations. End Note). 
 
¶10. (C) We have also noticed an ever increasing quality to 
the Chinese diplomatic presence in Thailand.  Many Chinese 
diplomats are fully fluent in Thai, led by the Chinese 
Ambassador, who has spent 17 years of his career posted here 
and routinely makes local TV appearances.  Those that do not 
have previous Thai experience, like the DCM, are smart, 
articulate, and increasingly confident in speaking up at 
English-language international relations seminars once the 
preserve of "Western" diplomats. 
 
GREATER CHINESE MILITARY ENGAGEMENT... 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) In recent years the Thai military has increased its 
engagement with China, in the face of sustained Chinese 
interest.  Thailand and China officially initiated annual 
defense talks in 2001; they conducted their first joint 
military exercise in 2005, focusing on humanitarian relief. 
China has conducted intensive military diplomacy with 
Thailand via high-level, expenses-paid junkets and 
educational exchanges for years, currying favor at many 
levels of the military, starting at the very top.  Thai Army 
Commander General Anupong Paojinda, the most powerful Thai 
military officer, frequently travels to China.  In comments 
to close aides after one trip in early 2009, Anupong 
favorably compared the treatment he receives in China to the 
"big brother" approach of his U.S. counterparts, whom he 
viewed as at times more interested in pursuing potential 
concerns over human rights and democracy than in building 
relationships, one of his aides told us later. 
 
¶12. (C) In the wake of the 2006 coup, Beijing pressed its 
advantage while the U.S. suspended $24 million in various 
forms of military assistance and restricted high-level 
engagement.  Stating the coup was an internal affair, China 
quickly provided $49 million in military aid/credits to 
Thailand, increased the number of exchange students at both 
countries' staff colleges, and successfully pushed Thailand 
to conduct annual, small-scale Special Forces joint 
exercises.  The two nations signed a Joint Action Plan in May 
2007 that solidified their cooperation and opened the 
door for a further increase in joint military activities. 
 
¶13. (C) During a December 2009 visit of the Chinese Minister 
of Defense, the two countries agreed to expand bilateral 
exercises starting in 2010 to include an amphibious landing 
event, a naval search and rescue, and a humanitarian relief 
exercise.  The maritime exercise will be conducted with the 
Royal Thai Marine Corps (RTMC) at the platoon/company level 
and take place over the course of one week later in 2010. 
While still in the planning stage, it is expected to involve 
approximately 100 marines from each side, one amphibious ship 
with approximately 5-10 amphibious assault vehicles and/or 
landing craft. 
 
...THOUGH THAI CONCERNS DO EXIST 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Not all Thai leaders are on board with the expansion 
of military ties, however.  The Royal Thai Marine Corps and 
the MFA have resisted the rapid expansion of exercises with 
the Chinese, with the MFA strongly recommending that 
exercises with China focus on humanitarian or disaster relief 
to avoid causing alarm with the U.S.  That said, Foreign 
Minister Kasit advised EAP DAS Marciel in early November 2009 
that Thailand could not continue to say no to China's 
requests for more military engagement, and that the U.S. 
military needed to re-engage more seriously, and to respond 
"at least symbolically" to Thai requests for Excess Defense 
Articles (ref B). 
 
¶15. (C) Dr. Chulacheeb Chinwanno, Vice Rector for 
International Affairs at Thammasat University and a 
specialist on both the U.S. and China, told us in December 
that he doubted that Thailand would adopt Chinese military 
techniques in the next few years because the Thai military 
still prefers training and education in the U.S.  He also 
 
BANGKOK 00000269  004 OF 004 
 
 
noted that the Thai military has been reluctant to make new 
large-scale weapons purchases from China because of concerns 
dating back to the 1980s, when much of the military equipment 
purchased from the Chinese was found to be of poor quality 
and was ultimately reserved for training or left to rust in 
warehouses. 
 
¶16. (C) Moreover, China's sale of conventional weapons to 
Thailand's neighbors has the potential to create tension in 
the relationship, MFA Department of East Asian Affairs 
Officer Surat Suwannikkha told us in December.  Surat said 
that then MFA Permanent Secretary Virasak Futrakul had 
"sternly" raised this issue with the Chinese and underscored 
the security risks that such weapons sales pose for Thailand. 
(Note: Surat would not specify the neighboring country, but 
Virasak had long focused on the Thai-Cambodian border 
skirmishes.  Vice Foreign Minister Panich raised concerns 
about the China-Burma relationship with PM A/S Shapiro in 
mid-January; RTARF J3 LTG Suraphan told A/S Shapiro that the 
two regional militaries deemed a residual conventional threat 
to Thailand by Thai military were Cambodia and Burma.  See 
ref A. End Note). 
 
CHINA COURTS THE ROYAL FAMILY 
----------------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) As part of the Thai-specific charm offensive, the 
Chinese have courted members of the Royal Family by 
supporting lavish VIP trips to China.  We have heard that 
Beijing mounted a serious effort in 2007-8 to get King 
Bhumibol, who has not traveled abroad since a 1995 trip to 
Laos, to visit China before the King's health took a 
serious downturn.  Princess Sirindhorn, the second most 
beloved Thai royal, has made a reported twenty-eight trips 
to China since 1981 - including three in 2009 - in an effort 
to foster closer social and educational ties between 
the two nations.  A Chinese domestic web-based popularity 
contest celebrating the 60th anniversary of the PRC in 2009 
picked Sirindhorn as the second most important of "China's 
top ten international friends." 
 
¶18. (C) The MFA's Surat stressed that the work Princess 
Sirindhorn had undertaken to enhance Thai-China bilateral 
relations is more than symbolic.  Princess Sirindhorn worked 
with the Chinese to establish the Princess Sirindhorn 
Institute, which focuses on joint research in biotechnology, 
alternative energy, and alternative Chinese medicine and 
hosts both Thai and Chinese students.  Princess Sirindhorn, a 
fluent Mandarin speaker, also encourages Thai students to 
study in China and to learn Chinese.  The Chinese have also 
built a special residential compound outside Beijing for 
Sirindhorn.  Those close to Sirindhorn have suggested to us 
that she is likely to leave Thailand and take up permanent 
residence in China after the eventual death of King Bhumibol, 
so as to leave the Thai stage to her brother Crown Prince 
Vajiralongkorn. 
 
¶19. (C) Princess Chulabhorn also travels frequently to China, 
making three trips in 2009 for mostly cultural purposes.  FM 
Kasit's third trip to Beijing in 2009 was to attend 
Chulabhorn's December musical performances, in which she 
played the zither, a Chinese instrument.  Much of the 
attraction to China for the Princesses, as well as many other 
Thai, is cultural in nature; Chualbhorn and Sirinhorn are 
also honorary cultural ambassadors to China. (Septel will 
examine 
Sino-Thai cultural ties and exchanges in greater detail). 
JOHN