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S E C R E T BAMAKO 000099 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2020 
TAGS: MARR ML PREL PTER
SUBJECT: NEW ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR TO MEETS WITH AMBASSADOR 
 
Classified By: Ambassador  Gillian A. Milovanovic, for reasons 1.4 (b) 
(d). 
 
¶1.  (S)  The new Algerian Ambassador to Mali, Nourredine 
Ayadi, paid what turned out to be much more than a courtesy 
call on the Ambassador on February 10.  Ayadi said Algeria's 
and Mali's fate were tied together by history and geography. 
Unfortunately, the two countries have a very different 
approach to dealing with the threat of AQIM, which has 
installed itself in the North of Mali, and has proven itself 
capable of doing a lot of harm not only in the region but 
internationally.  The GOM is not living up to its 
international obligations with respect to countering 
terrorism and has displayed a fair degree of laxity, if not 
to say complicity in dealing with the terrorists. 
 
¶2.  (S)     Algeria will continue to play a role in mediating 
the dispute between various Tuareg groups and the GOM.  The 
ADC has told the GOA that the Algiers Accords are not being 
implemented, and the Government of Mali's response thus far 
has largely been ceremonial.  The ADC has asked for an 
evaluation of the status of implementation of the accords, 
but the Malians have put it off sine die.  The GOM wants to 
move the Kidal Comite de Suivie to Bamako, on the grounds 
that its work has been accomplished and it needs to move to 
the capital for the next phase.  The ADC and GOA think more 
work needs to be done, but the GOA has not taken a position 
about the move.  Algeria offered to the ADC to hold meetings 
in Algiers as they work on Algiers Accords implementation. 
The Algerian Ambassador felt this may have soured Bamako on 
Algerian involvement as the GOM seems to have seen Algiers, 
offer to the ADC as interference and encouragement to one 
side in the Algiers Accords.  The meeting of Tuareg groups in 
Algeria was viewed to be a sop to Mali's enemies by the 
Government of Mali, to judge by press reports. 
 
¶3.  (S)     Ayadi said the P5 of the UN Security Council has 
a duty to uphold UNSCR 1267, which established a sanctions 
regime to cover individuals associated with Al Qaeda and 
subsequent resolutions.  Paying ransom in exchange for 
hostages is a violation of international law. 
 
¶4.  (S)     The Ambassador said the United States has the 
same policy not to make substantive concessions to terrorists 
or hostage takers.  She noted that it is difficult to level 
criticism on countries like Mali and Burkina Faso for 
facilitating negotiations when the countries that pay ransom, 
like Austria and Canada are given a pass.   Everyone needs to 
get the same message. Ayadi agreed.  He said paying ransom 
will only make citizens of the ransom-paying nations targets 
of future hostage taking attempts.  If they stay out of the 
North, the terrorists will only come down to Bamako to snatch 
them. 
 
¶5.  (S)     The Ambassador said there has been lots of talk 
of a heads of state meeting in Bamako.  A number of high 
level U.S. military and civilian government officials have 
made the trip to Algiers to discuss the AQIM problem, and the 
GOA has consistently stated that "Yes, we want cooperation; 
yes, we want Mali to do more; yes, we want to attend the 
Bamako summit."  The Ambassador noted that she has met with 
Malian Government officials, who have said that whenever they 
try to organize the summit one or the other of the 
prospective participants claims to be unable to attend.  She 
asked how, if the summit is important, even from a 
superficial point of view to give political cover, we can 
work together to ensure that it happens.  If it is not 
important to Algiers, what can we do for the Malian 
President?  The Ambassador said ATT vacillates between saying 
he is going to go it alone, if necessary, and expressing the 
view that he has to wait until the summit or until he has the 
clear agreement to cooperate from neighbors like Algeria. 
 
¶6.  (S)     As for cooperation on a joint center for 
operations at Tamanrasset, the Ambassador noted Algeria 
states that cooperation has started and they are willing to 
move forward, but the Malians are dragging their feet.  The 
Malians claim the reverse is true:  they have hosted high 
level visits from Algerian generals and have sent 
equivalent-level representation to Tamanrasset for meetings, 
but nothing concrete ever comes of it, according to them. 
Without inserting the United States in an inappropriate 
manner, the Ambassador asked, what would you propose that we 
do? 
 
¶7.  (S)     Ayadi said that when one's house is on fire, one 
does not wait for the fire truck to do something.  The GOM is 
not operating in good faith.  The summit is not a 
pre-condition to action.  We do not have the impression that 
the GOM thinks of AQIM as the enemy.  He said the release of 
the information he was about to relate had not been cleared 
by Algiers:  the Algerian army had attempted to conduct an 
operation against AQIM with the Malians on Malian soil, but 
AQIM had been tipped off in advance and moved out of range. 
He said that several months ago, Algeria had formally 
requested the extradition of two high level detainees, but 
the GOM responded that they were not in their custody.  If 
Mali were to show the will to engage, we will support them. 
The Ambassador asked if these were the conditions of support: 
 extradition of the two detainees and conducting some 
military action against AQIM. 
 
¶8.  (S)     Ayadi said yes.  We don't need permission to take 
action if the GOA and the GOM want to take action.  The 
Algerian side is ready.  He said we speak from experience. 
The first attack took place in Algeria in 1989, against a 
military outpost far away from Algiers.  Everyone said "it's 
far away, we don't have to worry about it," but two years 
later Algiers was in blood and flames.  People in Mali don't 
realize what they are getting themselves into.  We Algerians 
have paid a very heavy toll to gain mastery over the 
situation and now we don't want to see things come apart 
again because AQIM has established itself in Northern Mali. 
 
¶9.  (S)     The Ambassador said the United States is trying 
to take a systematic approach to training and equipping 
Malian Army units, particularly those units responsible for 
providing security in the North.  We find the Malian soldiers 
to be willing partners with extremely limited resources. 
Success will not be achieved overnight; they are not able to 
do much.  We would like to get to a point where if the Malian 
Army tries to engage they will not face humiliation and 
become demoralized. 
 
¶10.  (S)  Ayadi claimed that the Malian Army had shown 
capability to take action against the Tuareg rebellion but 
refuse to do anything about AQIM.  Niger has fewer resources 
but does more in the fight, and the proof is that AQIM has 
been unable to establish a base in that country.  It looks 
worse than weakness on the part of the Malians, it looks like 
willful complicity.  Ayadi mentioned the Tenere radios, and 
how Mauritania had used its ability to communicate with 
Algeria via radio to cooperate on the hostage crisis.  In 
Mali, by contrast, the Tenere radio has not even been taken 
out of its plastic wrapping.  The Ambassador noted that Mali 
had only recently received a Tenere radio from Algeria, that 
we were working to provide more, and that she understood they 
had been testing secure communications. 
 
¶11.  (S)  Comment:  Ambassador Ayadi,s accusatory and 
dismissive assessment of Mali is consistent with the views of 
his predecessor and with views expressed in Algiers to 
various high level USG representatives.  His laughing off the 
idea of a Bamako Summit and his explanation of Algeria,s 
bottom line requirement of the Malians, that they undertake 
military operations against AQIM before Algeria will consider 
working with or helping them, however, is at variance with 
statements coming from Algiers.  What is consistent is the 
pattern of frequent changes in describing the faults of the 
Malians that are causing Algiers not to act. Our attempts to 
elicit constructive information about how to bring the two 
neighbors together to deal with a common problem, and 
questions about practical follow up to Tamanrassett  and 
Mali,s proposed operation plan, were consistently 
disregarded in favor of pursuing a litany of complaints 
against Bamako.  The dispute between Mali and Algeria over 
two detainees whom Algeria wants extradited and France wants 
liberated in exchange for its hostage has particularly soured 
Malian-Algerian relations at the moment.  As it is easier, 
and feels more virtuous, to list problems than work toward 
solutions, it seems likely that efforts to bring Mali and 
Algeria closer to fight AQIM, though necessary, will continue 
to be a very uphill battle. 
 
MILOVANOVIC