VZCZCXRO2876
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0053/01 0321123
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011123Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1082
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 000053 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN ECON EAID EINT PREL PGOV
SUBJECT: MALI APPROVES A CONTENTIOUS 2010 BUDGET 
 
REF: 09 BAMAKO 771 
 
¶1. Summary: Mali's National Assembly approved the 2010 budget, also 
known as the finance law, on December 18.  The law passed by a wide 
margin in spite of concern in the preceding weeks from opposition 
political parties about the irregular way the GOM was accounting for 
revenue from privatized parastatal companies.  The 2010 budget is 
ten percent larger than the 2009 budget, reflecting, in part, a 
projected increase in revenue from better tax collection.  A 
visiting mission from the International Monetary Fund signaled 
approval of the budget with some caveats. End summary. 
 
¶2. The Malian government projects revenues in 2010 will increase by 
9.6 percent over 2009 to CFA 1,101.603 billion (USD 2.45 billion). 
This is due largely to expected improvements in tax and customs 
collection, including the creation and maintenance of computerized 
tax and customs databases as well as the creation of a new office 
for medium-sized enterprises.  In addition to increased fiscal 
revenue, the privatization of the parastatal telecommunications 
company SOTELMA in 2009 and continued funding commitments from 
international donors will provide a boost to the public coffers. 
Commitments from donors giving direct budget support to the GOM are 
expected to total CFA 354.73 billion (USD 771 million), comprising 
33 percent of the budget. 
 
¶3. According to the IMF Resident Representative in Mali, the 
increase in revenue forecast by the GOM is reasonable when taking 
into account that GDP growth in 2010 was forecast at 4.3 percent and 
inflation at 2.5 percent.  The representative noted, however, that 
there are some risks to these projections.  The increase in revenue 
will depend, in part, on the GOM following through on some 
politically contentious commitments.  This includes a reduction in 
government subsidies for petroleum products, which reached a peak in 
2008 in an attempt to reduce the burden of rising food and fuel 
costs for Malian consumers.  The second commitment was a planned 
reduction in the corporate income tax.  Rather than reduce the tax 
from 35 percent to 25 percent, as the GOM intended, the IMF 
suggested the reduction initially be limited to 5 percent, making 
the corporate tax rate 30 percent. 
 
¶4. The GOM's funding allocations reflect the objectives of the 
country's Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (PRGS), translated 
by the GOM into the Social and Economic Development Program (known 
by its French acronym, PDES).  The PDES is comprised of six axes: 
improving public services; increasing agricultural production and 
food security; supporting the private sector; bringing unemployed 
youth and women into the formal sector; social sector development; 
and societal reform.  Expenditures, which include budget support 
from Mali's international donors and a portion of the revenue from 
the sale of SOTELMA, are expected to increase by 5.6 percent from 
last year to CFA 1,196.1 billion (USD 2.6 billion). 
 
¶5. In what many Malian parliamentarians and international donors 
consider an unorthodox move, in 2010, the GOM will use only CFA 25 
billion (USD 55.6 million) of the CFA 180 billion (USD 400 million) 
it received from the 2009 sale of SOTELMA (reftel).  Although the 
sale was completed in 2009, the GOM will account for the revenue in 
piecemeal fashion.  The funds not used in 2010 will be held in a 
bank account at the Mali branch of the Central Bank of West Africa 
(BCEAO) to be used in 2011 and 2012.  In the 2010 budget, one-fourth 
of the CFA 25 billion is earmarked for infrastructure, agriculture, 
and the social sectors; one-fourth for counterpart funds to 
co-finance public investment with donors; one-fourth for paying down 
domestic debt; and the balance for housing construction, 
decentralization, and support to small enterprises.  In order to 
ensure transparency, the Malian government plans to budget the 
future use of the remaining SOTELMA revenue.  What is worrisome to 
both Malian opposition political parties as well as to some in the 
international donor community, however, is that the GOM has reserved 
the majority of the funds from Mali's largest privatization for use 
in the run-up of the 2012 presidential election.  In addition to 
worries about the manipulation of the revenue for political ends, 
the money is not being used to finance a one-off project to 
stimulate economic development as called for by bilateral and 
multilateral donors.  Rather, it will be sprinkled over 15 different 
program areas that are currently ongoing, rendering the results of 
this investment difficult to measure. 
 
¶6. Mali's 2010 budget falls short of some macroeconomic targets 
agreed upon under the PRGF.  The GOM's target basic deficit for 2010 
is 1.5 percent.  As currently accounted, however, this figure does 
not reflect some of the GOM's policy commitments, such as subsidies 
for agricultural inputs, costs of privatizing the parastatal cotton 
company, CMDT, and a potential investment aimed at revitalizing the 
cotton sector.  On their own, these commitments may reach 1 percent 
of GDP, bringing the 2010 basic deficit to 2.5 percent.  Mali's IMF 
country representative noted that this was significantly higher than 
the 0.6 percent recommended by the IMF in its July Board meeting. 
Because the additional policy commitments are not yet well-defined, 
 
BAMAKO 00000053  002 OF 002 
 
 
they will be addressed in a supplementary budget law later this 
year.  In its letter of intent for the third review under the PRGF, 
the GOM committed to passing the supplementary budget before the 
fourth review.  At that point, the GOM may use more than the 
projected CFA 25 billion from the SOTELMA sale in order to maintain 
the basic deficit at the targeted level.  Note: Absent external 
grants (e.g. direct budget support), concessional loans, and the use 
of SOTELMA privatization receipts, the overall budget deficit is 
projected to be 39 percent in 2010.  End note. 
 
¶7. In the most recent debt sustainability analysis for Mali, 
completed in 2008, the IMF determined Mali was at low risk of debt 
distress.  The interest on the public deficit is budgeted as a 
current expenditure in the budget.  The GOM will limit borrowing 
from the domestic banking system and the regional financial market 
to 1 percent of GDP in order to ensure debt sustainability in line 
with the debt sustainability analysis undertaken the IMF. 
 
¶8. The generally optimistic macroeconomic forecast notwithstanding, 
the health of Mali's economy remains tenuous.  Debt sustainability 
relies on optimistic assumptions about continued gold production 
over the medium term.  A favorable balance of payments depends on 
continued high world gold prices as well as stable production.  In 
addition, Mali remains highly vulnerable to fluctuations in 
commodities markets as evidenced in 2008 with the spike in food and 
fuel prices.  And because of the lack of diversification in the 
economy, a fall in remittances and tourism receipts, comprising 
approximately 3.6 and 2.4 percent of GDP respectively in 2009, would 
have strong adverse effects.