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C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000093 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KISL PHUM AJ IR
SUBJECT: VIEW FROM BAKU - "IRAN CAN'T GO ON LIKE THIS" 
 
REF: A. A) BAKU 91 
     ¶B. B) BAKU 30 
     ¶C. C) 2009 BAKU 972 
     ¶D. AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Rob Garverick, Political/Economic Counselor, 
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Over the last ten days Baku Iran watcher has met with 
over a dozen Iranian contacts to obtain their insights and 
expectations on the upcoming 22 Bahman/February 11 opposition 
demonstrations in Iran.  Contacts polled included Iranian 
bankers, wealthy businessmen, NGO figures, journalists, 
management consultants, and students.  The polled group 
includes several professedly "apolitical" interlocutors and 
two opposition skeptics, as well as several opposition 
supporters and activists. 
 
Massive Tehran Protest Demonstrations Expected 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2.  (C) Most Baku Iran watcher contacts (including several 
Iran-based interviewees) predict massive demonstrations in 
Tehran, and significant protests in Tabriz, Mashad, Isfahan, 
and some smaller cities.  Many asserted that 
pre-demonstration planning, propaganda, and organizational 
activities by opposition supporters (especially students) is 
far more noticeable and fractionalized compared to previous 
demonstrations.  Several commentators claimed that while 
pro-Moussavi and pro-Karroubi websites are still important 
sources of information and encouragement, they are no longer 
the only or even main reference points for determined 
oppositionists.  "Neither Moussavi nor Karroubi can stop this 
(opposition protests) now," one social activist contended. 
 
Opposition Turnout Efforts 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) A businessman pointed out that for the first time the 
reformist fraction in the Majlis, the reformist-affiliated 
Islamic Iran Participation Front, and similar groups have 
issued calls for large turnouts clearly aimed at protesters. 
Two student sources and a journalist related that small group 
of university students and others have traveled from Tehran 
to their hometowns to help promote broader protest turnouts 
and coordination.  While a businessman from Isfahan claimed 
that opposition organizations are increasingly perceptible in 
his city, other interlocutors expressed skepticism that such 
activities will have a measurable impact in the short run.  A 
Tehran University lecturer stressed that opposition 
organization and planning in urban areas is spreading.  He 
conceded a lack of commensurate rural protest, but dismissed 
this as unimportant, since "radical change comes from cities, 
not villages."  Rural populations were also not a factor in 
the overthrow of the Shah, he stated. 
 
 
Teams Put Up Posters, Graffiti 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C) A Tehran student who has participated in all the 
post-presidential election protests claimed that a former 
drop-off in his friends willingness to participate in 
demonstrations was reversed in the Ashura protests, and is 
picking up steam.  "Almost all of them will turnout on 22 
Bahman," he said.  He said that he is part of a four-man 
group that regularly travels on two motorcycles looking for 
places to paint anti-regime graffiti or put up posters: "two 
of us act as lookouts, while the others draw the graffiti." 
He described this as a common model for young people putting 
up slogans.  The student called himself a "pacifist," 
favoring non-violent protest, but claimed that many people 
are talking about bringing clubs and knives with them "to 
defend against the Basij."  A Mashad resident also expressed 
fear of 22 Bahman violence, but noted that popular 
anti-regime clerics there are promoting non-violence. 
 
Father Knows Best? 
------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) The same student related that a few days before 
Ashura he and a friend were caught by police sending protest 
emails over the internet from a closed office.  He said that 
he police said that they didn't want to arrest them, but 
"needed to eat."  After receiving a bribe delivered by his 
sister, 
the police let them go, without any questions about 
my identity or where I live."  The student added that after 
this incident his father complained that "I can't afford your 
revolution." 
 
Khameini "Not As Powerful As You Think" 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) A Tehran-based business consultant who is friendly 
with Supreme Leader Khameini's family, and provides business 
advice to several senior regime figures, told Iran watcher 
bluntly that Khameini is "not as powerful as you guys think." 
 According to this source, Khameini is subject to severe 
bouts of depression, and takes morphine (not opium) 
regularly.  He claimed that Khameini is "unable to function 
half the time," and relies totally on his advisors. 
Khameini's son Mojtaba he dismissed as "a complete idiot" who 
is easily manipulated and has no future after Khameini leaves 
the scene (see septel). 
 
¶7.  (C) Though stressing that he is not an opponent of the 
Islamic system, he warned that the Revolutionary Guard-based 
faction which "stole the election," and is now seeking total 
control is "extremely dangerous to both us and you."  He 
repeatedly characterized this group as "a criminal cult," 
motivated by its fanaticism, ignorance, and the monetary 
self-interest of its members.  He added that the group is 
intent on exporting revolution.  According to source, both 
Ahmedinejad and Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi are affiliates rather 
than "leaders" of this group, and neither will likely end up 
with significant power if the group successfully consolidates 
control over the state and its economy (see reftel). 
 
"Iran Can't Go On Like This" 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) The consultant placed the 22 Bahman protests within 
this context as part of an inner-regime coalition's effort to 
split Khameini from Ahmedinejad, and retake power from the 
"anti-democratic cult."  (Note: other Iranian sources 
expressed doubt that protesters will accept maintenance of 
Khameini in office.  "(Khameini) must go whatever Karroubi 
says, and whether or not he breaks with Ahmedinejad," a 
student asserted.  End Note). 
 
¶9.  (C) The consultant claimed that extra-judicial murders 
undertaken by cult-related elements are being stepped up, and 
placed the recent bombing death of an Iranian physicist and 
the alleged killing of non-cult generals directly in this 
context.  He claimed that Iran's economy is approaching a 
crisis, and predicted that Iran is likely on the road to 
greater violence and unrest.  While not certain of the 
ultimate outcome, he opined that 22 Bahman may well move Iran 
closer to a political endgame.  He explicitly rejected 
suggestions that Iran can continue indefinitely going through 
periods of mass protest followed by crackdowns.  He stressed 
that events are moving forward - instability, fractionalism, 
and factionalism within the country are increasing, and "Iran 
simply cannot go on like this." 
LU