VZCZCXRO6731
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKB #0117/01 0491346
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181346Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2404
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 3793
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1559

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000117 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, INR FOR PSTRONSKI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR RU AM AJ
SUBJECT: KREMLIN FREQUENT FLYER NARYSHKIN BRINGS SOFT POWER 
TO BAKU 
 
REF: 09 BAKU 189 
 
Classified By: A/DCM TERRY DAVIDSON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Sergey Naryshkin, the head of the Russian 
Presidential Administration, completed another high-profile 
visit to Baku - his fifth since President Aliyev's second 
presidential term began in October 2008 - from January 22-24. 
 Naryshkin's visits combine close-hold diplomacy with 
President Aliyev with displays of "soft power" designed to 
preserve the privileged position of Russian language and 
culture in Azerbaijan as an indirect means of influencing 
public opinion and governmental outcomes in Moscow's favor. 
The highlight of this visit was a public forum on 
Russian-Azerbaijani "cooperation in the humanities," attended 
by numerous important Russian cultural figures. While Russian 
linguistic and cultural influence has receded in Azerbaijan, 
Moscow's efforts to reverse the trend are increasing in 
intensity and sophistication.  Russia will continue these 
efforts in the coming year, using the 65th anniversary of the 
end of World War II as a springboard for greater presence. 
However, the hasty and opaque process of planning Naryshkin's 
itinerary, as told to us by MFA and Russian diplomatic 
contacts, demonstrates that the working relationship of the 
governments below the presidential level is weak.  End 
Summary. 
 
Naryshkin - A "Frequent Flyer" to Baku 
--------------------------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) Since President Aliyev's second inauguration in late 
October 2008, Naryshkin has made five 2-3 day visits to Baku, 
arriving October 29 and December 28, 2008; February 26 and 
November 23, 2009; and January 22, 2010.  Three of those 
visits have come immediately before or after one of Aliyev's 
meetings with his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sargsyan 
(October 29, before the Moscow summit; November 23, 
immediately after the Munich meeting and before Aliyev's 
visit to Ulyanovsk, and the most recent visit right before 
Sochi). His last three visits have been with sizable 
delegations of Russian government and business figures. 
Naryshkin's visits always include a private meeting with 
President Aliyev, the results of which are always close-held. 
Bringing Soft Power to Baku 
--------------------------- 
¶3. (C) The public purpose of Naryshkin's visits has been the 
exercise of soft power.  In keeping with the role he first 
adopted while a Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian 
Federation, when, inter alia, his portfolio was foreign trade 
and relations with the CIS, the 150-person delegations he has 
escorted to Baku have been heavy on business leaders, 
including from the energy sector (Note: Energy Minister 
Sergey Shmatko joined Naryshkin for his February 2009 visit 
(Reftel). End Note)  So far, the trade and investment aspect 
of his visits has yielded few tangible results.  In addition 
to the economic side, Naryshkin's visits emphasize the 
linguistic, historical and cultural sides of soft power. In 
February 2009, the centerpiece event of his visit was the 
opening of a satellite campus of the Lomonosov Moscow State 
University (MGU) in Baku, nestled in close to Baku State 
University in newly refurbished quarters.  In November, he 
presided over the opening of a new Russian-language book 
distributorship in Baku that will soon expand to Azerbaijan's 
second city of Ganja and to Sumgayit. 
¶4. (C) For his most recent visit, the public emphasis was on 
the "humanities," meaning the status of Russian language and 
culture in Azerbaijan.  Among the high-profile Russian 
personalities involved were Minister of Culture Alexander 
Avdeev, State Duma International Affairs Committee chairman 
Leonid Slutsky, politician Gennady Burbulis; Special 
Representative of the President for Culture Mikhail Shvydkoi 
(Note: Shvydkoi organized a joint trip by Armenian and 
Azerbaijani parliamentarians and journalists to each others' 
capitals and Nagorno-Karabakh last July.  End Note.), "Ekho 
Moskvy" editor Aleksey Venediktov, famed singer Iosif Kobzon 
and popular author Eduard Topol.  This delegation interacted 
with Azerbaijani counterparts at a two-day forum headlined by 
speeches from Naryshkin and his Azerbaijani counterpart Ramiz 
Mehdiyev and was received warmly and publicly by President 
Aliyev and the First Lady. 
¶5. (C) The agenda of the forum covered the spectrum of 
cultural engagement issues and, read another way, is a to-do 
list for the restoration of Russian language and culture to 
 
BAKU 00000117  002 OF 003 
 
 
the status of the most privileged minority in Azerbaijan.  In 
particular, the Russian delegation advocated for the 
preservation of Russian-language education, the expansion of 
the space for Azerbaijan-based Russian-language media, and 
greater access for Russian television and mass media outlets 
in Azerbaijan.  The latter subject was approached in the 
context of reciprocity - the delegation also floated the idea 
of access to Russia's market for Azerbaijani-language 
programming aimed at the Russia-based diaspora. (Note: Lack 
of reciprocity is one legal justification for excluding 
foreign programming from Azerbaijan; however the decisions 
the GOAJ has taken to remove foreign broadcasters from public 
airwaves - not only Russian, but also the BBC, Radio Liberty, 
Voice of America and Turkish-language soap operas - have 
always had an obvious political component.  End Note.) 
¶6. (C) Naryshkin also spoke to the forum about the need to 
"defend the truth" about the Soviet victory in World War II 
to young people, signaling that this subject will be the 
focus of Russian engagement with countries in the post-Soviet 
space as Russia marks the 65th anniversary of Germany's 
surrender in 2010. (Note: President Medvedev named Naryshkin 
chairman of the Presidential Commission of the Russian 
Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the 
Detriment of Russia's Interests in May 2009.  End Note.) 
¶7. (C) Representing Azerbaijan at the forum were Naryshkin's 
counterpart Ramiz Mehdiyev, who is consistently identified by 
political contacts as being a key Moscow sympathizer in the 
leadership; and the Presidential Administration's foreign 
policy chief Novruz Mammadov, who gave speeches fulsome in 
their praise of Azerbaijani-Russian relations, but also 
calling upon Russia to ensure the return of Nagorno-Karabakh 
and the surrounding districts to Azerbaijani sovereignty. 
 
Curious Timing of the Visit 
--------------------------- 
¶8. (C) Azerbaijani media covered the forum widely and with a 
generally positive spin, although coverage in both state and 
opposition outlets carried the near-obligatory undertone of 
resentment over Russia's perceived favoritism to Armenia. 
Curiously left unmentioned was the awkward timing of the 
event, which took place two days after the 20th anniversary 
of "Black January," the violent occupation of Baku by Soviet 
troops that led to 130 deaths on its opening night (Note: 
Naryshkin paid an official visit to "Martyr's Alley," the 
Baku memorial to the victims.  End Note.)  Just a day before 
Naryshkin's arrival, presidential adviser Ali Hasanov and the 
chief of the Caucasus Muslim Board (CMB), the Shaikhulislam 
Allashakur Pashazade, called for Gorbachev to be tried in The 
Hague for his crimes against Azerbaijan and President Aliyev 
unveiled a new monument at the January 20th Circle, 
graphically depicting the slaughter of Azerbaijanis at the 
hands of Russians.  Comment: We can not exclude that the 
timing of the conference may have been a subtle attempt by 
Baku to remind Russia that it expects its longstanding 
grievances to be addressed if Moscow desires a closer 
relationship.  End Comment. 
 
Relations Dysfunctional Behind the Scenes 
----------------------------------------- 
¶9. (C) The forum appears to have been the result of an 
agreement reached between Presidents Aliyev and Medvedev in 
Ulyanovsk during the former's visit in late November 2009. 
Russian Embassy counselor Oleg Golovanov told us that the 
timeline was very difficult to work under and that the event 
had to be planned entirely through the Presidential 
Administration in Baku, with virtually no assistance from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Speaking generally about the 
Embassy's relations with MFA, Golovanov called the situation 
"terrible."  There are very few people assigned to deal with 
Russian affairs, and those that are never offer substantive 
replies to any issues raised by the Embassy, he said. 
Golovanov, who told Poloff that he had spent six years at 
Russia's mission to the IAEA in Vienna prior to his arrival 
in Baku in late 2008, said that he and other officers are all 
forced to function across portfolios to keep up with the 
Embassy's workload. 
¶10. (C) A conversation with the Ministry's one desk officer 
for Russia, Gunay Ragimli, who until recently worked on the 
Americas desk, confirmed the impression that MFA had little 
to do with the Naryshkin visit; she could not even confirm 
whether Minister of Foreign Affairs Mammadyarov had attended 
Aliyev's meeting with Naryshkin.  However, her account of 
 
BAKU 00000117  003 OF 003 
 
 
working with the Russian Embassy differed from Golovanov's, 
although it still reflected a dysfunctional relationship. 
Ragimli admitted that she had only seen four Russian 
diplomats at the Ministry in nearly a year on the desk: 
Ambassador Vladimir Dorokhin, Deputy Chief of Mission Oleg 
Krokhin; and two junior attaches, Timur Danzanov and Elina 
Zolotareva.  (Note: The Russian Embassy's diplomatic staff 
numbers 25; including the Ambassador, DCM, three military 
attaches, 5 counselors, 5 first secretaries and 10 third 
secretaries and below.  End Note.) 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶11. (C) Naryshkin's visits, combined with President 
Medvedev's personal diplomacy, clearly reflect a courtship of 
Azerbaijan by Moscow, and the perception here is that the 
Kremlin's interest is driven by three interests: 
re-establishing the Russian sphere of influence at the 
expense of the West and Georgia, energy and pipeline 
politics; and a desire to repair its tattered reputation 
after Georgia by engineering a diplomatic solution to the 
Karabakh situation, albeit one that serves Russian national 
interests above all. 
¶12. (C) Despite its continuing status as a reliable second 
language for most adults in Baku and its popularity among 
elites, the influence of Russian in mass media and in public 
- especially outside Baku - is decreasing.  Among 
universities, the Baku branch of MGU, which operates with the 
active sponsorship of the First Lady's family, and the Baku 
Slavic University teach in Russian, but outside of these, the 
quality of Russian observed here is low.  The exclusion of 
Russian-language media from state-controlled airwaves is 
intentional and unlikely to change in the absence of a more 
fundamental shift in relations or, as appears to now be 
possible, Russia offers a sufficiently tempting reciprocity 
offer to permit Azerbaijani programming aimed at its sizable 
diaspora. 
¶13. (C) Aliyev, whose personal and business connections to 
Russia are quite strong, values a positive relationship with 
Moscow for a variety of reasons.  However, for all the effort 
Moscow is dedicating, asserting a privileged position for 
Russian language, culture and points of view here is still a 
challenging task. The historical baggage of imperialism and 
the Karabakh war is extremely heavy. Russia's efforts may pay 
off over time, but as the situation stands now, full success 
for the Kremlin in Azerbaijan probably depends more on 
addressing those key grievances than anything else. End 
Comment. 
 
LU