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C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000107 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020 
TAGS: PGOV KISL PHUM AJ IR
SUBJECT: GRAND AYATOLLAH TO KHAMEINI: FREE PRISONERS, MAKE 
CLEAR BREAK WITH "FANATICS" 
 
REF: 2009 BAKU 759 
 
Classified By: POL/ECON COUNSELOR ROB GARVERICK, REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d 
) 
 
Ardebili Meets Khameini 
------------------------ 
 
¶1.  (C) Iranian source briefed Baku Iran watcher on an 
alleged February 9 meeting in Tehran between Supreme Leader 
Khameini and Grand Ayatollah Musavi-Ardebili.  The source, a 
relative by marriage of Ardebili's, is a longtime Baku Iran 
watche contact who has credibly demonstrated access to a 
wide range of political contacts in Iran.  Sourceclaimed 
that his rundown of the meeting was derived from a a meeting 
transcript distributed by an Ardebili associate. 
 
¶2.  (C) The meeting details are very similar to an account 
printed in the opposition blog, "Rah-e-Sabz," likely derived 
from the same source.  The meeting details also correlate 
closely to a summary provided to Baku Iran watcher on 
February 14 by a Najaf-based Hojateleslam Jawad al-Khoei, who 
contacted Iran watcher on a separate matter.  The 
Hojateleslam (who had no knowledge of the Baku source) said 
that had been apprised of the meeting on February 11 by a 
visiting associate of Ayatollah Ardebili's son, a friend of 
many years (see reftel for more information on al-Khoei). 
 
Alleged Ardebili-Khameini Meeting 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) According to the Baku source, the wheelchair-bound 
Ardebili (a former close associate of Ayatollah Khomeini) 
noted that he is apolitical, and has stayed out of Teheran 
for seventeen years.  He allegedly reminded Khameini that 
"you sit in the seat of the Imam (Khomeini), and should 
remain above conflicts between political factions.  Ardebili 
reportedly scolded Khameini for being out of touch with the 
people as a result of being misled by a coterie of extremists 
who "lack the people's support."  This error, he reportedly 
said,  is seriously undermining the Islamic Revolution and 
Islam, and bringing the long term existence of the Islamic 
Republic into question. 
 
Two Steps to Reconciliation? 
---------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) To remedy the situation, Ardebili supposedly said, 
Khameini should take two steps: order the release of senior 
opposition figures and their relatives, and make clear to the 
people through his actions that he is not allied with the 
fanatic (or any other) faction.  In response, Khameini asked 
incredulously "How can I release them (after what they have 
done)?"  Ardebili reportedly replied "I know many of the 
arrested people, and know that they are honest.  They are not 
trying to overthrow you.  They want reforms, not to change 
the leadership.  They did not cause this crisis.  I do not 
ask you to forgive their actions, I'm just saying they are 
honest.  My wish is that you release them, separate yourself 
from extremists, and listen to the population.  If those to 
whom you have listened (up to now) were truly wise or had the 
support of the people, there would be no crisis, no threat to 
the Revolution, and no damage to Islam ) all of which has 
happened." 
 
¶5.  (C) Ardebili reportedly added, "I have known you more 
than 35 years, and will die soon.  These are my two last 
wishes."  Ardebili reportedly promised that, if Khameini 
takes these two steps, he (Ardebili) will return to Qom and 
go "house-to-house" visiting the religious leadership to 
obtain a statement of support for Khameini.  Khameini then 
allegedly said "Please do that," to which Ardebili replied "I 
will, after I see that you are responding to my wishes." 
Khameini then reportedly stared at him silently, and made no 
further comments on the issue. 
 
Subsequent Release of Prisoners 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) The source added that within hours of this meeting 
reform figures Ali Reza Beheshti, Mohammed Reza Tajik, and 
Mohsen Aminzadeh were released from prison.  The source 
credited these releases to Ardebili's intervention, and 
 
opined that they will lead to a domino effect involving many 
other releases.  He called this meeting "extremely 
significant."  He also noted however, without prompting, that 
Ayatollah Rafsanjani had also talked to Khameini on the 10th, 
after receiving a call from Beheshti's wife, who was then in 
hiding due to fear of arrest.  The source said that that 
Ayatollah Rafsanjani "gave Khameini an ultimatum" not to 
arrest Beheshti's wife, or other opposition elite relatives 
(Note: this account conforms to a report provided by the 
British Embassy in Tehran, of which source was unaware.  End 
Note). 
 
Comment: A Reconciliation by, for, and of the Elite? 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
¶7.  (C) Ardebili's associates (or others with access to them) 
seem to have made a major effort to disseminate details of 
the Ardebili-Khameini meeting.  Though some details are 
undoubtedly spun or left out, the existence of multiple 
sources suggests that the meeting did occur along the lines 
indicated.  What is notable in the accounts received so far 
is the apparent emphasis on "reconciling" primarily with an 
opposition "elite" consisting of revolutionary veterans and 
their relatives.  To that extent, it is reminiscent of the 
emphasis on persecution of "loyal party people" (as opposed 
to non-party members or genuine regime opponents) that was 
stressed in the Soviet Union in the wake of Stalin's regime. 
End Comment. 
LU