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INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000526 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: RRT ERBIL: KURDISTAN ISLAMIC PARTY LEADERS ON 
ELECTION ISSUES AND BARZANI WASHINGTON TRIP 
 
Classified By: RRT Erbil Team Leader Andrew Snow for reasons 1.4 (b) an 
d (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an Erbil Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT) 
cable. 
 
¶2.  (C) Summary.  The Ambassador,s Senior Advisor to 
Northern Iraq (SANI), RRT Team Leader, and RRT staff met 
separately with Salahaddin Bahauddin, leader of the Kurdistan 
Islamic Union (KIU) and Ali Bapir, leader of the Kurdistan 
Islamic Group (KIG).  Both complained bitterly about the 
ruling parties, perceived abuses.  They are suffering from 
campaign violence, and expect voting fraud.  Like many Kurds 
outside the predominant KDP and PUK, they regard President 
Barzani,s recent trip to Washington as a &family trip8 
rather than an official visit on behalf of the KRG. 
Bahauddin also predicted that Masrour-Nechirvan rivalry will 
eventually lead to a serious split within the KDP.  End 
summary. 
 
Barzani Trip to Washington 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) These meetings, on February 18, were part of a series 
of meetings that SANI had in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah after 
President Barzani,s visit to Washington.  SANI underscored 
the importance of President Barzani,s creating personal 
rapport with President Obama.  He also noted Vice President 
Biden,s message that the KRG will do better getting a piece 
of Iraq,s entire oil revenues rather than squabbling over 
the much smaller fields in the three provinces of the Iraqi 
Kurdistan Region.  SANI also went over Secretary Clinton,s 
message, underscored by Commerce Secretary Locke that the 
Kurds must act to improve transparency and fight corruption. 
 
¶4. (C) The KIG,s Bapir was less than enthusiastic about KRG 
President Barzani,s trip, and criticized the President for 
taking both his son Masrour (KRG intel chief) and his nephew 
Nechirvan (former KRG PM, and currently invisible as &deputy 
head8 of the KDP).  In his view,  if President Barzani 
wanted it to be more than just &a family trip8 he should 
have taken Prime Minister (and PUK member) Dr. Barham Salih. 
KIU leader Bahauddin acknowledged the trip as a significant 
sign of USG respect for the Kurds, but was similarly 
critical.  He complained that details of the visit were 
closely guarded by the Barzanis, feeding rumors of a family 
plan being worked secretly with U.S. officials and/or U.S. 
companies.  Bahauddin was also critical of the make-up of the 
delegation saying that it is important to see things from the 
point of view of the opposition and that Barzani should have 
taken with him someone from one of the 20-plus opposition 
parties represented in the Kurdistan Parliament 
 
Critique of Ruling Parties: 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Bapir brought up the subject of PM Salih,s draft KRG 
budget, saying that, during a recent parliamentary debate, 
KIG MPs asked why oil and electrical revenues were not 
included.  They received no reply.  More broadly, he took the 
leaders of both the KDP and the PUK to task, saying that they 
not only control government money, but also dominate  a large 
number of companies (including some with monopolies in 
certain sectors.  Bahauddin lamented both a lack of progress 
in merging the two wings of the Peshmerga ) a process which, 
crucially, will also entail cutting ties between these 
military units and the two predominant Kurdish parties ) and 
what he sees as similarly troubling delay with the 
unification of the two separate boards of audit.  He painted 
a detailed picture of an IKR still far more dominated bu the 
traditional big two parties.  , than many non-Kurds realize, 
Qtraditional big two parties.  , than many non-Kurds realize, 
adding that even President Barzani does not see the whole 
truth. 
 
The Election: 
-------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Bapir is himself running as a candidate.  He said that 
he wants to go to Baghdad and present a different image of 
the Kurds than the KDP and PUK present.  He complained that 
the Kurdistani Alliance makes agreements without discussing 
them with the other Kurdish parties.  One of his goals in his 
party platform is to bring Iraq &back in line with Sharia 
law;8 a plank that he believes will attract Turkoman voters. 
 Bapir observed that it is not good when the various factions 
in Iraq seek guidance from foreigners, adding that Iraqis 
could solve their problems themselves if they stopped 
listening to outsiders. 
 
¶7. (C) Bahauddin, a more polished and sophisticated analyst, 
 
emphasized that his party represents Islamists who have 
adopted democracy.  While not giving numbers, predicted in 
increase in electoral support compared to the 2005 election. 
He added that the KIU is branding itself as permanent 
competition to the Kurdistani Alliance. 
 
Built-in Fraud in IHEC: 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Both Islamic party leaders voiced concern over the 
likelihood of  fraud during the election.  Bahauddin cited 
past examples in outlining how the two ruling parties in the 
IKR have &always8 used electoral fraud to get ahead.  Bapir 
stated that because his party is religious they will not 
cheat; but those who can cheat have the ability to use the 
Assayish.  He asserted that the KDP and PUK even have the 
ability to manipulate IHEC by placing party members in key 
positions.  He said that the head of IHEC used to be head of 
the KDP office, and that the KDP gave this individual a piece 
of land.  He went on to say that this is important because 
that person had a large role in the fraud that happened 
during the July elections.  By his account, when IHEC 
extended the voting an additional hour by making an 
announcement on election day itself, it enabled the KDP and 
PUK to stuff the ballot boxes.  He claimed that 20% of the 
votes counted in July were received in the last hour, when 
the larger parties moved groups of voters from place to place 
having them vote more then once by using pre-printed forms 
that allowed last minute registration. 
 
¶9. (C) One of Bapir,s KIG lieutenants added that the people 
in charge of the voting centers are all either KDP or PUK. 
While the person in charge in each center is supposed to be 
chosen by lottery among the election center workers,  the 
names of all non-KDP/PUK members are removed before the 
drawing.  The KIG has written a memo to IHEC seeking an 
explanation, but have not received an answer. 
 
Security Concerns: 
---------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) In the last several elections there have been 
multiple violent incidents targeting both the KIG and the 
KIU;, however there have been no prosecutions, let alone 
convictions.  During this election there has already been one 
incident involving shots fired at the KIU office in a small 
town in Suleymaniyah Province.   Bahauddin said police 
responded and caught the perpetrators.  He believes  there is 
an organized network behind that attack and the widespread 
destruction of KIU posters.  Bapir expects problems, but said 
that so far in this campaign the KIG has not had any.  He 
claimed that in the July elections it was the Assayish 
themselves who attacked the KIG office, adding that the 
people in the neighborhood around their offices are not 
against the KIG. 
 
Bahauddin Predicts KDP Divisions: 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Bahauddin offered a thoughtful analysis of the 
current state of the KDP, concluding that what happened to 
the PUK*i.e. a major split ) will in time happen to the 
KDP.  In fact he believes the KDP is already on the verge of 
a schism but, unlike the PUK/Goran split, the KDP split will 
occur inside the Barzani family.  He observed that former 
Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani is not happy with his 
current pseudo-position, but is waiting to see how the 
election goes before making any move.  He described a burning 
personal rivalry between Nechirvan and Masrour ) who are 
first cousins and brothers-in-law ) that is much more 
intense than it appears from the outside.  Both would like to 
inherit the Presidency, and each regards the other as the one 
Qinherit the Presidency, and each regards the other as the one 
obstacle potentially blocking that ambition.. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Bahauddin and Bapir,s view of KRG President 
Barzani,s recent visit to Washington as a &family trip8 is 
widely shared in the IKR, especially in Sulaimaniyah.  In 
part it reflects the way Iraqi Kurds have traditionally 
viewed their leadership.  While basic democratic principles 
(especially electoral participation) are widely and 
enthusiastically accepted, the Barzani family has a 
quasi-royal status that transcends any expectation that the 
leadership might be peacefully changed.  Barzani leadership 
of the KDP and preeminence in the KRG is expected to extend 
into the next generation, even by PUK members and members of 
small opposition groups that wield little influence beyond a 
narrow base of adherents.  Bahauddin,s lurid portrait of 
 
looming conflict between Masrour and Nechirvan cannot be 
dismissed, but their rivalry is likely to remain in check as 
long as Masoud remains healthy and firmly in control.  Both 
the Islamic parties and the Goran (Change) Movement have long 
asserted that the extension of voting hours in July 
facilitated large-scale PUK and KDP fraud, and that the 
ruling parties were able to infiltrate their loyalists into 
management of the polling stations.  The continuing violence 
between the ruling parties and security forces, on the one 
hand, and oppositionists on the other, makes it likely that 
KIU and KIG predictions of more electoral violence over 
coming days will be fulfilled. 
HILL