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INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000520 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/I. NSC FOR PHEE AND VROOMAN. 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2030 
TAGS: IR IZ KDEM PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: HUMAM AL-HAMMUDI: ELECTION PROSPECTS AND U.S. ROLE 
IN IRAQ 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR YURI KIM FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) bloc 
leader Humam al-Hammudi was optimistic regarding the election 
and believed the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) and State of 
Law Alliance (SLA) were in very close competition.  He 
welcomed U.S. and UNAMI efforts, especially monitoring, to 
support a fair and transparent election, but pointedly noted 
that, since the signing of the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement 
(SA), the United States no longer has a voice in Iraqi 
political decision making.  He cautioned that opinions 
expressed publicly by some U.S. officials could negatively 
affect the U.S.-Iraqi relationship.  Regarding statements by 
Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri criticizing the 
concept of a national unity government, Hammudi clarified 
that Amiri was not calling for the exclusion of entities from 
the political process, but rather favored a government 
comprised of a political majority with a strong opposition 
rather than a "unity" model. End Summary. 
 
ELECTION CAMPAIGNING IN FULL SWING 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In a February 24 meeting, Hammudi told PolCouns that 
election campaigning is now in full swing and all parties are 
preoccupied with reaching out to voters.  He said he was very 
pleased with the democratic experiment in Iraq, and assessed 
that there would be much wider participation during this 
election than previously, as well as tougher competition 
across the board.  Hammudi stated that he was campaigning all 
over Iraq, lending his support to the INA platform, and was 
finding that ISCI had more support than during the January 
2009 provincial elections.  He believed that election 
promises and speeches were not influencing voters as before, 
as Iraqis saw the realities on the ground and looked to vote 
for those who would truly improve their standard of living. 
 
¶3. (C) Hammudi said it was in the interest of all parties to 
maintain a responsible attitude in campaigning, and assessed 
that the general election atmosphere was positive.  It was 
important to assure the Iraqi people that elections would be 
conducted fairly and emphasized that it was incumbent upon 
"us" (likely referring to the Iraqi political leadership) to 
overcome attempts to undermine the election process and 
security.  Hammudi remarked that his primary concerns moving 
forward into elections were maintaining security and 
countering efforts to cast doubt over the election results. 
He said he had just spoken with UNAMI Deputy SRSG Jerzy 
Skuratowicz and urged him to work with the United States and 
all political blocs to ensure that the election process would 
be transparent and the outcome fair.  He had stressed to 
Skuratowicz that UNAMI must work with the Independent High 
Electoral Commission (IHEC) on a daily basis to make the 
elections transparent.  Hammudi added that he was concerned 
by information coming out of IHEC that 7 million extra ballot 
cards had been printed and 800,000 names had been added to 
voter lists.  (Note: Other political leaders have expressed 
concerns regarding the alleged printing of seven million 
extra ballots.  End Note.)  PolCouns underscored U.S. desire 
to see a fair and transparent election process, noting the 
numerous steps the USG was undertaking in this effort, 
including by dispatching 26 monitoring teams throughout the 
Qincluding by dispatching 26 monitoring teams throughout the 
country and funding a broad array of voter and candidate 
training programs. 
 
ELECTORAL OUTLOOK 
----------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Hammudi said that based on provincial election trends 
and current opinion polls, he believed the INA was ahead in 
all provinces except Basrah, Baghdad, and Karbala, where the 
INA was neck-and-neck with Maliki's SLA.  (Note: Hammudi 
likely was referring to provinces with Shi'a-majority 
populations.  End Note.)  He acknowledged, however, that some 
statistics showed the INA up by 5-7 percentage points while 
others showed the SLA up by 5 percent.  Hammudi speculated 
that the two Shi,a coalitions (INA and SLA) would together 
win 150 seats in the next parliament and as such would be 
able to form a government, but admitted that reaching a 
post-election agreement would be difficult.  According to 
Hammudi, the key question is, "Can we reach a compromise 
solution that will make everyone happy?"  Regarding prospects 
for the next government, Hammudi opined that many would not 
accept Maliki's continuation as PM, as he had lost 
 
credibility by not fulfilling promises.  On the other hand, 
Hammudi noted, it would be hard for either side to support a 
PM candidate who was not well known. 
 
¶5. (C) PolCouns stressed that the United States does not 
support any particular party in the upcoming national 
election, but rather supports a fair and transparent election 
process.  With regard to de-Ba'athification, she reiterated 
that the United States remains opposed to the Ba'ath Party, 
but had been concerned by the lack of transparency in the 
de-Ba'athification process and by reports of further 
de-Ba'athification at both the national and provincial level. 
 She encouraged Hammudi to take a leadership role in helping 
the Iraqi people move past the current de-Ba'athification 
controversy and strengthen Iraq's legal and judicial 
processes. 
 
NO MORE U.S. SEAT AT THE TABLE 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) Hammudi observed that before the Security Agreement 
was signed in late 2008, the U.S. Ambassador in Baghdad had 
rightfully been part of the political decision-making 
structure of Iraq and was accepted as "one of us."  When the 
Ambassador made his views known, they were accepted on par 
with those of the Iraqi leadership.  Now that the SA was in 
place and Iraq was fully sovereign, the United States was not 
an equal member of the decision-making process.  He said that 
given the heightened sensitivities of the current electoral 
environment, statements and actions by U.S. officials that 
might have been acceptable during the pre-SA period would now 
negatively impact the U.S.-Iraqi relationship.  PolCouns 
stressed that the United States had no intention of 
interfering in the Iraqi elections and did not want to be 
used as an election issue.  That said, she reiterated that 
the United States had a fundamental interest in supporting 
fair and transparent political process, inclusive of the 
election on March 7. 
 
CLARIFYING THE RECORD 
--------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) PolCouns questioned Hammudi regarding a statement made 
by Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri on February 24 
criticizing the concept of an "inclusive government." 
Hammudi clarified that Amiri was criticizing the concept of a 
"unity" government, not an inclusive government.  He said 
there are two schools of thought regarding the shape of the 
next government: it could either be a national unity 
government, or a majority coalition government with a strong 
opposition.  The current government was one of the former 
model and had proven itself ineffectual due to the need to 
achieve broad consensus.  He believed that a unity government 
had no measures of success or failure, no delegation of 
responsibilities, and no clear oversight.  However, Hammudi 
acknowledged that based on the Iraqi constitution, even a 
majority government would in essence be a unity government as 
it would require a 2/3 majority to approve the President and 
other top officials.  He added that Amiri supported the idea 
of a majority government with a strong opposition, which, 
according to Hammudi, Iraqiyya head Ayad Allawi also favored. 
 Hammudi further clarified that all parties understood that 
it was in their interest to ensure that no one felt excluded 
from the government formation process.  (Note: In a related 
conversation, MP Abbas al-Bayati told Poloff that Amiri's 
statement was reasonable as he was not demanding an end to 
Qstatement was reasonable as he was not demanding an end to 
quotas across the board and was not trying to marginalize 
Sunnis and Kurds.  Bayati observed that Amiri seemed to be 
calling for a government coalition of only the strongest 
political actors from each group.  End Note.) 
 
¶8. (C) Comment: Fresh from stumping in the south, Hammudi 
appeared relaxed and confident during this meeting.  While 
pleased with the overall election process to date, Hammudi 
was reluctant to wager guesses as to the election outcome and 
did not appear overly optimistic that Iraq's two main Shi'a 
blocs would be able to easily reach a compromise during 
government formation.  He was clear on one point, though: 
The United States should play a strong support role in Iraqi 
politics, but it should not presume to play the same role in 
government formation after March 7, 2010 that it played after 
December 15, 2005.  End Comment. 
HILL