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DE RUEHGB #0517/01 0581620
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FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6858
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RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000517 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2020 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: COALITION PROFILE: TAWAFUQ CONFRONTS DIMINISHED 
ELECTORAL PROSPECTS 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 263 
 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 333 
     ¶C. BAGHDAD 454 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Minister-Counselor Yuri Kim for Reasons 
 1.4 (b, d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The Tawafuq coalition, centered around the 
Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and once the predominant Sunni 
group in parliament, is in a state of continued decline as it 
heads into the March 7 elections.  Down to only 25 seats in 
the Council of Representatives (COR) and with the loss of 
former IIP heavyweights VP Tariq al-Hashimi and DPM Rafi'e 
al-Issawi, Tawafuq is struggling to position itself as the 
most coherent, dependable, and non-Ba'athist option for Sunni 
voters.  Unlike its main competitor for the Sunni vote, the 
Iraqiyya coalition, Tawafuq emerged from the recent 
de-Ba'athification crisis largely unscathed, but it is 
uncertain if it will pick up any significant support as a 
result.  Polling data and the results of the January 2009 
provincial elections suggest Tawafuq may win no more than 20 
seats in an expanded 325 seat COR.  Nevertheless, Tawafuq 
remains the grouping of choice for Sunni Islamists, who look 
with suspicion at more secular parties, and it may fare well 
in the government formation process as the most palatable and 
pliable Sunni partner for Shi'a and Kurdish parties.  End 
Summary. 
 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶2. (C)  Although still the largest Sunni coalition in Iraq's 
current COR, Tawafuq has withered to the point that its 
current membership is drawn almost completely from the IIP. 
Tawafuq lost its two main non-IIP partners, the National 
Dialogue Council and the Iraqi People's Conference, in the 
past year.  The IIP, in turn, has fragmented, with former IIP 
leaders VP Hashimi and DPM Issawi having defected to the 
rival Iraqiyya coalition.  (Note: Hashimi left after being 
ousted as the IIP's Secretary General. End Note.)  The 
coalition now numbers 25 COR members, down from its high of 
45 MPs.  The minor parties in the coalition are the 
Independent National Tribal Gathering, the Iraqi Turkmen 
Justice Party and the National Gathering for the People of 
Iraq, which collectively have one seat in the outgoing COR. 
 
Key Leaders 
----------- 
 
¶3. (C) The most prominent national figure in Tawafuq is COR 
Speaker Iyad al-Samarrai'e IIP head Osama al-Tikriti is the 
second most recognizable member.  Both were elected from 
Baghdad, and both were put forward as potential COR Speakers 
during government formation discussions in 2006.  Should 
Tawafuq form part of the prevailing governing alliance 
following the March 7 elections, Samarrai'e and Tikriti would 
likely vie for the top position awarded to the coalition. 
(Comment: Many observers predict that the main Sunni partner 
in the next government would once again be given the COR 
Speaker position. End Comment.) 
 
Platform/Message 
---------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Neither Tawafuq nor the IIP has spelled out much in 
the way of an issues-based platform to date.  As religious 
parties appear to have fared poorly in the January 2009 
provincial elections compared to their more secular 
competitors, Tawafuq may try to downplay the IIP's Islamist 
identity while being careful not to alienate its core 
supporters.  Tikriti told Emboffs recently that the coalition 
would stress the importance of improving security and the 
provision of public services as main campaign themes.  Given 
the recent uproar over the disqualification of candidates 
from the Iraqiyya coalition, Tawafuq's main rival for the 
Sunni vote, Tawafuq may try to market itself as the most 
coherent, dependable, and non-Ba'athist option for Sunni 
Qcoherent, dependable, and non-Ba'athist option for Sunni 
voters. 
 
Strengths/Weaknesses 
-------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Strengths: As noted above, the IIP managed to avoid 
much negative fallout resulting from the de-Ba'athification 
spectacle played out under the media spotlight (ref A). 
Speaker Samarrai'e the IIP's only remaining marquee figure, 
is one of the most visible politicians in the country and 
still commands a loyal following among Iraqi Sunnis.  Also, 
very devout Sunnis often look upon secular parties with 
suspicion and may view the IIP as the voting option most 
compatible with their religious orientation. 
 
 
¶6. (C) Weaknesses: The public perception of the IIP, and by 
extension Tawafuq, is one of a party in obvious decline.  Its 
Islamist character, even if downplayed, will be an obstacle 
to attracting secular voters.  Moreover, the strongly 
sectarian Tawafuq (despite the presence of nominal non-Sunni 
Arab partners) lies well outside the trend towards less 
religious, nationalist parties.  Finally, the few provincial 
councils with substantial IIP blocs do not have a strong 
track record for providing services, although this may be due 
to factors beyond their control. 
 
Projection 
---------- 
 
¶7. (C) With Tawafuq currently polling in the 6-7 percent 
range among the general population and capturing only 17-19 
percent support in the Sunni community, its prospects for 
holding on to the 25 seats it still has in the COR are not 
bright.  (Note: Reflecting its near-zero level of support 
among Shi'a voters nationally, Tawafuq is not even bothering 
to run candidates in six southern provinces.  Neither is it 
fielding candidates in the three Kurdish provinces, but that 
could also be part of a strategy to curry favor with the 
Kurds by refraining from competing in Kurdish strongholds. 
End Note.)  The IIP's poor showing in the January 2009 
provincial elections also indicates that it will fare worse 
than it did in the December 2005 national vote, when it faced 
much less Sunni competition.  In 2009, the IIP won just 13 
percent of the provincial council seats in Baghdad and the 
four Sunni-majority provinces.  Most strikingly, its share of 
seats in the Anbar provincial council plummeted from 34 to 0. 
 Extrapolating from these two data sets, Tawafuq is unlikely 
to garner more than 15-20 seats of the 325 seats in the next 
COR.  According to contacts, Tawafuq leaders are aware of the 
challenges they face in attracting voters, but believe they 
can win up to 30 parliamentary seats. 
 
Government Formation Outlook 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Despite its limited electoral prospects, Tawafuq may 
fare better than would be expected in the government 
formation process because of potential resistance by Shi'a 
and Kurdish parties to including Iraqiyya -- the coalition 
with the greatest Sunni support -- as the main Sunni partner 
in the next governing alliance.  The main Shi'a coalitions, 
the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) and PM Maliki's State of 
Law Alliance (SLA), likely view Iraqiyya as more "Ba'athist" 
and less dependable and compliant relative to the IIP.  The 
presence of the anti-Kurdish al-Hadba Gathering in Iraqiyya 
could similarly make the IIP a more attractive Sunni partner 
for the Kurds.  In addition, Tawafuq, fearful of being left 
out in the cold due to its reduced electoral muscle, could be 
a more concessionary and compliant ally in government 
formation negotiations.  The extent to which the Iraqiyya 
coalition fractures after the election also will play a large 
role in determining how much clout Tawafuq will have in the 
negotiations. 
 
¶9. (C) Within this context, it appears that Tawafuq is 
courting, or is being courted by, Maliki's SLA with an eye to 
forming a post-election partnership.  One overt sign of this 
has been the PM's support of the IIP's three-month-long 
struggle to block the seating of the governor-elect in Salah 
ad-Din province (ref B).  (Note: The previous governor (IIP) 
was ousted by the provincial council in September 2009. End 
Note.)  Post also has noted low-profile contacts between 
Osama al-Tikriti and the PM for the past couple of months. 
However, the continuing detention and harassment of IIP 
QHowever, the continuing detention and harassment of IIP 
provincial council members in Diyala, which may be directed 
by Maliki (ref C), remains a barrier to Tawafuq-SLA 
cooperation. 
HILL