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O 241906Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6823
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0988

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000502 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2020 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: IN LIMBO, MUTLAQ REQUESTS U.S. HELP 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Minister-Counselor Yuri Kim for Reasons 
 1.4 (b, d) 
 
¶1. (C)  SUMMARY:  With little prospect that political 
colleagues will take action on his behalf, MP Saleh al-Mutlaq 
is seeking U.S. and UNAMI intervention to reinstate him on 
the ballot.  He also urged the United States to "isolate" 
Ahmad Chalabi, who he thought would continue to press his 
malicious activities after the March 7 national elections. 
Mutlaq reiterated that an election boycott was not in the 
interest of his supporters or the Iraqi people in general, 
but warned that he might have no other choice but to declare 
a boycott on principle, even if no one was with him.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
INTERNAL SOLUTION UNLIKELY 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In a late February 23 meeting, a subdued Mutlaq told 
PolCouns that while Iraqi actors from across the political 
spectrum had expressed sympathy for his disqualification, no 
one was prepared to openly or actively advocate for his 
reinstatement.  He said PM Maliki had called him at the 
outset of the de-Ba'athification crisis to disavow any 
involvement in the barring of candidates, and that Ammar 
al-Hakim (ISCI), Humam al-Hamoudi (ISCI), Grand Ayatollah 
Sistani, President Talabani, and KRG President Barzani had 
all expressed support for him.  Mutlaq also said that Federal 
Supreme Court Chief Justice Medhat had told parliamentary 
Speaker Ayad al-Sammarrai'e that the Accountability and 
Justice Commission's activities were illegal.  Yet 
"politicians inside don't have the will to find a solution," 
Mutlaq said.  "It's in their interest not to have me." 
 
¶3. (C) Mutlaq pleaded for U.S. and UNAMI intervention to 
reinstate him on the ballot and ensure that the elections 
would be conducted in a fair manner -- "otherwise we'll both 
end up losers in this process."  He also urged U.S. action to 
stop Chalabi, who he believed was intent on carrying out a 
malevolent agenda, inclusive of politically motivated 
de-Ba'athification beyond the election.  Mutlaq felt there 
was "a real chance" for the Iraqiyya coalition to win the 
elections if the U.S. brokered a solution to his predicament. 
 He thought perhaps the Syrians could engage the Sadrists and 
believed that a delegation of tribes would soon visit Grand 
Ayatollah Sistani to ask for support to reinstate him. 
 
¶4. (C) PolCouns underscored that the United States would not 
act in favor of any particular candidate or party, but that 
we would continue to press strongly for a fair, transparent, 
and inclusive election process.  While we would not intervene 
to impose a political solution, we would support any 
candidate's right to pursue all available legal recourse. 
Mutlaq said he had retained a lawyer and was prepared to 
"face the judges."  He reiterated that no judge would be 
willing to rule in his favor without political consensus to 
provide cover, which was still lacking, he bemoaned. 
 
TO BOYCOTT OR NOT TO BOYCOTT 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C)  PolCouns praised Mutlaq for continuing to encourage 
full voter participation in the election. Mutlaq criticized 
the USG for wavering in its position on de-Ba'athification 
calling for a postponement of the process at first, then 
announcing during VOPTUS Biden's trip that the USG would not 
impose a solution.  This had confused the Iraqi people, he 
claimed, while giving Chalabi and others the impression that 
the USG would abide their misbehavior.  Mutlaq said the 
boycott announcement made by the Iraqi Front for National 
Dialogue (IFND) spokesman was a reaction to the Ambassador's 
QDialogue (IFND) spokesman was a reaction to the Ambassador's 
remarks that the de-Ba'athification crisis had passed.  It 
did not reflect any decision on his party, he stated.  In 
fact, he remained convinced that it was in the best interest 
of his party and the Iraqi people overall to promote full 
participation in the coming election.  "I didn't encourage a 
boycott but had to be silent for three or four days because I 
couldn't go against my party," he explained.  Mutlaq warned 
that "people are depressed, pessimistic...this could lead to 
something else."  But he also admitted that anger among 
Iraqis could drive them to vote "in an aggressive way" in 
order to voice their opinions.  "I have more support now, 
even in the south," he said. 
 
¶6. (C) COMMENT:  Mutlaq's appeal for U.S. intervention likely 
reflects recognition that his political colleagues, even his 
nominal allies, are unlikely to take any further meaningful 
action on his behalf.  He was also sadly cognizant of the 
fact that candidates from his own party are actively 
campaigning and are unlikely to stop no matter what he says. 
While Mutlaq's political influence appears to have quickly 
 
eclipsed, he may yet play a role in the next government 
depending on the electoral showing of his Iraqiyya coalition 
partners.  Leaving aside the immediate issue of Mutlaq's 
fate, his experience and that of others indicates that the 
intensity of Iraqi electoral politics is stifling the 
judicial process and that the United States will need to be 
forceful in ensuring space and support for an independent 
judiciary. END COMMENT. 
HILL