VZCZCXYZ0016
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #0500/01 0551505
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 241505Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6818
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000500 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MOPS PTER IZ
SUBJECT: DETAINEE RELEASES AND TARGETING APPROVAL CHANGES 
ROUND OUT MAYSAN OPERATION FALLOUT 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 405 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 426 
     ¶C. BAGHDAD 378 
     ¶D. TD-314/013127-10 
 
Classified By: DCM, Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (S/NF) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: U.S. forces transferred 
thirteen detainees captured in Maysan in a joint U.S.-Iraqi 
operation in accordance with demands by the PM and terms of 
the Security Agreement.  After an initial transfer of nine of 
the detainees, the Prime Minister ordered high value target 
special operations to cease until the remaining four had been 
transferred.  The GOI released the initial group of nine 
detainees upon transfer from U.S. custody, to the surprise of 
the Maysan Provincial Chief of Police (PCOP) sMG Sa'ad, who 
is currently acting commander of the Maysan Operation Center 
(MOC).  The Iraqi Operational Coordination Group (IOCG), 
which coordinates high value targets, received orders on 
February 21 to "get back to work."  The group works directly 
with U.S. SOF elements in coordinating joint U.S.-Iraqi 
operations against specific targets.  General Abud, former 
commander of the Baghdad Operations Center (BOC) and current 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, has taken the place of 
Military Intelligence (M2) head sMG Ala'a in targeting 
approval. USF-I also received word that despite past U.S. 
efforts to retain sMG Ala'a, he had been ordered to vacate 
his post within 48 hours by Office of the Commander in Chief 
(OCINC) General Farouq (on behalf of the Prime Minister). 
sMG Ala'a raised concerns about the PM's manipulation of the 
M2 along sectarian lines, but requested the U.S. not seek his 
retention so that he could retain his current housing 
privileges in his reassignment. A recent transfer order of 17 
Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) officers has also 
raised concerns about the PM's involvement in the 
intelligence services.  The transfer and release of the 
detainees, while disappointing, must be balanced against the 
need to protect a valuable joint SOF capability to target AQI 
on the eve of elections.  END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
¶2.  (S/NF) In accordance with the PM's express conditions for 
considering a return to normal SOF high value target 
clearance procedures, USF-I transferred to the GOI the last 
four of the Katib Hezbollah (KH) Maysan detainees on February 
19 after transferring nine the previous night.  The detainees 
were arrested in accordance with Operation Steel Curtain (ref 
A).  USF-I received word that the GOI released the initial 
nine prisoners on February 20 to the surprise of USF-I and 
the Provincial Chief of Police (PCOP) sMG Sa'ad.  sMG Sa'ad 
is also serving as the acting Maysan Operations Center (MOC) 
commander during the absence of the commander, sMG Habib of 
the 10th IA, who is out due to medical problems.  (NOTE AND 
COMMENT: In a late breaking development, sMG Sa'ad was 
informed on February 23 that he was being removed from office 
as a result of pressure from the Maysan PC Chairman, who has 
links to KH, according to USF-I.  The Maysan PC Chairman 
(ISCI) has apparently secured approval from the PM for sMG 
Sa'ad's removal.  The PC Chairman has tried to get sMG Sa'ad 
removed before, but the decision was overruled by the PM on 
previous efforts.  Sensing an opportunity in the aftermath of 
Operation Steel Curtain, the PC Chairman gave the PM a choice 
QOperation Steel Curtain, the PC Chairman gave the PM a choice 
to retain either the Governor (a Da'wa party member) or sMG 
Sa'ad, and the PM chose the Governor.  Having both MOC 
commanders out in the weeks before the elections likely will 
pose security/political coordination challenges.  END NOTE 
AND COMMENT.) 
 
¶3.  (S/NF) After the detainee release, the IOCG received 
orders to "go back to work" on February 21.  General Abud, 
former BOC commander and current Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Operations (DCOS OPS), has replaced Military Intelligence 
(M2) director sMG Ala'a as approver for targeting operations. 
 USF-I will familiarize General Abud in order to familiarize 
General Abud with the IOCG process and its relations with 
U.S. SOF elements.  USF-I will also increase coordination 
with the MOD's Joint Operations Center to support 24/7 
operations.  During discussions to get operations back on 
track with the IOCG after the recent PM orders (ref B), the 
GOI reiterated to USF-I that operations against sensitive 
targets must be Iraqi led - meaning that the missions would 
be U.S. command and controlled, logistically supported, etc., 
but that "Iraqi led" meant that the Iraqis would make first 
contact.  General Farouq of OCINC and General Abud also said 
that the balance of forces needed to be better weighted 
 
toward the Iraqi side and that the more important the target, 
the more balanced the force should be.  They acknowledged 
that the U.S. had to have heavy involvement in a support and 
enabler capacity. 
 
¶4.  (S/NF) sMG Ala,a,s reprieve to remain the M2 was short 
lived (ref C).  He informed USF-I contacts on February 20 
that General Farouq passed orders from the PM that he was to 
transfer to another position within 2 days.  Though direct 
USF-I involvement granted sMG Ala,a a reprieve last week, he 
has asked that the U.S. not get involved again due to the 
effect it may have on any future assignment.   It is unclear 
if MG Hatim Jabar Al-Maksusi of the Office of Special 
Investigations (OSI), who was previously named as his 
replacement last week, will in fact assume the position.  sMG 
Ala,a opined that the PM,s goal is to increase the Shi'a 
dominance of the M2, which of its 132 officers, 78% are Shi'a 
(including new officers). Recent reporting has also 
highlighted the PM's attempts to transfer 17 senior Iraqi 
National Intelligence Service (INIS) to other 
non-intelligence Ministries (such as Oil or Youth and 
Sports).  All 17 of the officers were Sunni and had worked 
for Iraqi Intelligence Services (IIS) under the former 
regime.  Other INIS officers with IIS experience who are 
Shi'a were noticeably missing from the PM's list.  Senior 
INIS officials have expressed concern that INIS would lose 
some of its strongest and most experienced officers (ref D). 
 
¶5.  (S/NF) COMMENT: After the events of Operation Steel 
Curtain were publicized in the press, the PM asked for the 
Maysan detainees in our continuing custody be transferred to 
the GOI.  The transfer of the detainees, at least nine of 
which have been confirmed released since transfer, must be 
balanced with the need to preserve, through SOF cooperation, 
the ability to maintain pressure on AQI and Shi'a extremists 
- especially to deny them the initiative in counter-election 
operations.  Once the PM demanded the transfer of the 
detainees in accordance with the Security Agreement and 
threatened to cancel all high value SOF cooperation 
activities, USF-I weighed the loss of the detainees versus 
the loss of SOF cooperation and handed over the KH prisoners. 
 This is disappointing, and it appears that more dialogue 
will be required to get the IOCG and ISF to resume full joint 
operations against CT targets. END COMMENT. 
 
HILL