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C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000499 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IR IZ
SUBJECT: COALITION PROFILE: PM MALIKI'S STATE OF LAW 
ALLIANCE 
 
REF: A. 09 BAGHDAD 2639 
     ¶B. 09 BAGHDAD 1703 
     ¶C. 09 BAGHDAD 3246 
     ¶D. 08 BAGHDAD 969 
     ¶E. BAGHDAD 422 
     ¶F. BAGHDAD 415 
     ¶G. 09 BAGHDAD 2995 
     ¶H. 09 BAGHDAD 2671 
     ¶I. 09 BAGHDAD 2319 
     ¶J. 09 BAGHDAD 2561 
     ¶K. 09 BAGHDAD 2562 
     ¶L. 09 BAGHDAD 3373 
     ¶M. RIYADH 221 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR YURI KIM FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d) 
. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary and Comment: In a significant move toward 
political independence, PM Maliki announced the formation of 
the State of Law Alliance (SLA) in October 2009, distancing 
himself from the Iraqi National Alliance (INA), the dominant 
Shi'a-led coalition.  Despite its strong ties to Iran, SLA is 
perceived to be more independent from Tehran than its rival 
INA.  Still, Maliki has had a hard time selling his 
credentials as a nationalist and his coalition has yet to 
gain signficant Sunni and minority support or participation. 
The coalition may face an anti-incumbent backlash across the 
South for its failure to deliver improved services in 
SLA-dominated governorates.  Another weakness is Maliki's 
failure to improve regional relations and help facilitate 
economic and political integration with the Arab neighbors. 
Despite significant political disparities, the PM's closest 
advisers tell us it is likely that the INA and SLA will join 
forces after the election to ensure a Shi'a-led government, 
and to avoid blame for allowing a "pro-Ba'athist" 
cross-sectarian coalition to come to power.  Unless SLA wins 
a strong plurality, it appears unlikely that Maliki will be 
able to retain the premiership. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
COMPONENT PARTIES 
----------------- 
 
¶2. (C) PM Maliki announced the State of Law Alliance (SLA) on 
October 1, 2009 as a nationalist, non-sectarian political 
list but failed to attract significant Sunni or other 
minority participation (ref A).  SLA comprises 34 parties, of 
which the most prominent are: 
 
--Da'wa Islamiya (Da'wa - PM Maliki) 
--Independents bloc (Minister of Oil Hussein al-Shahristani) 
--Da'wa Tantheem (Tantheem - Hashim Nasr Mahmoud) 
--Islamic Union of Turkomans of Iraq (Abbas al-Bayati) 
--The National List (former INA chairman Hachim al-Hassani) 
--National Emergence Movement (Khalid Sadi Yawar Awad 
al-Dulaimi) 
--National Council for Iraqi Sheikhs (Abd al Hussein abd al 
Atheem Nour) 
--Assembly of Competent People for the Future of Iraq (GOI 
spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh) 
--Alliance of Iraqi Banners (Anbar Sheikh Ali Hatem Abd 
al-Razzaq) 
 
KEY FIGURES IN SLA 
------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) Maliki's attempt to consolidate power during his 
premiership, particularly within the security services, has 
increased tensions with KRG President Masoud Barzani, most 
Sunni political leaders, and even his former partners now 
within the INA.  This will hamper PM Maliki's chances of 
retaining the PM position, unless SLA wins a strong plurality 
of seats in the next parliament.  Even within SLA, there is 
grumbling about Maliki's closed leadership style and 
disinclination to share either power or the spoils of power. 
(Note: PM profile will be reported septel. End Note.) 
Following are key figures in SLA, several of whom are 
considered possible PM candidates: 
 
--Ali al-Adeeb: SLA candidate 1 in Karbala.  Adeeb is Da'wa's 
bloc leader in parliament and acted as whip for the precursor 
pan-Shi'a United Iraqi Coalition (UIC).  In August 2009, 
Maliki pushed Adeeb out of Da'wa's inner circle by denying 
QMaliki pushed Adeeb out of Da'wa's inner circle by denying 
him the position of deputy secretary-general at the party's 
annual conference.  According to MP Qassem Daoud 
(INA/Solidarity), Adeeb has retained close ties to Islamic 
Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) leaders and other INA members 
since the UIC collapsed, and may be a non-threatening 
alternative to Maliki if SLA does well in elections. (Note: 
The Shi'a clergy reportedly objected to Adeeb as a PM 
 
candidate 2005, citing his close ties to Iran. End Note.) 
Adeeb and Maliki have been extremely critical of Ayad Allawi 
and Minister of Interior Jawad al-Bolani's cross-sectarian 
coalitions, frequently conflating "secularism" with Ba'athist 
ideology or anti-Shi'a discrimination to POL M/C and other 
Embassy officials. 
 
--Hussein Shahristani: SLA candidate 3 in Baghdad. A nuclear 
scientist by training and Minister of Oil since May 2006, 
Shahristani is head of the independents group within SLA. 
While he was consistently criticized within the Council of 
Representatives (COR) and the Iraqi press for failing to rein 
in corruption in his ministry and increase oil production, 
Shahristani's frank testimony in parliamentary hearings in 
June and November 2009, and deft handling of the second oil 
bid round in December 2009 dampened the criticism, earned 
praise from political rivals like VP Adel Abd al-Mahdi 
(ISCI), and raised his profile within the coalition (refs 
B-C).  UNAMI contacts believe that Shahristani's influence 
within SLA stems from his close relationship with paramount 
Shi'a cleric Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani:  Shahristani's nephew 
Jawad Shahristani, is Sistani's son-in-law and representative 
in Qom, Iran.  (Note: PM Maliki communicates with Sistani 
through his spokesman, Ali al-Dabbagh, and Deputy COR Speaker 
Khalid Attiya. End Note.) 
 
--Hassan Sunayd: SLA candidate 4 in Dhi Qar.  A well-known 
poet and literary figure in Iraq, Sunayd has been in Da'wa's 
political bureau since the late 1980's.  A member of the 
previous COR's Security and Defense Committee, he is Maliki's 
closest friend, one of his security advisors and liaison to 
the KRG leadership.  Having survived physical torture during 
the Saddam regime, he has used his position as spokesman for 
the SLA to rail against the threat of resurgent Ba'athism and 
was critical of purported U.S. efforts to interfere in the 
de-Ba'athification process. 
 
--Haider al-Abadi: SLA candidate 2 in Baghdad.  Da'wa's 
official spokesperson and one of the few trained economists 
in the COR, Abadi served as head of the Economic Committee in 
the previous parliament.  He strongly supports economic 
reform and anti-corruption efforts but admitted to emboffs on 
February 9 that his committee was not skilled or powerful 
enough to intervene when the GOI promoted regressive economic 
legislation.  Abadi is less powerful than Adeeb within SLA 
but may attain an important ministerial position in the next 
government. 
 
--Tariq Nejm Abdallah:  Independent, but close to Da'wa. 
Abdallah has served as Maliki's Chief of Staff and cabinet 
enforcer since he became premier.  He manages relations with 
Iran for the PM.  Abdallah helped secure his home province of 
Nasiriyah and other southern, predominantly Shi'a provinces 
for Maliki's SLA candidates in the January 2009 provincial 
elections.  Although Abdallah is not running for office, DPM 
Rowsch Shaways and leading NGO activist Mustafa Kadhimy 
(protect) told poloffs recently that Abdallah's name is being 
floated within the two Shi'a coalitions as a second-tier PM 
candidate. 
 
--Ali Hatem al-Razzaq: Founder of the predominantly Sunni, 
Anbar-based Alliance of Iraqi Banners party, Hatem is the 
most significant Sunni actor Maliki has attracted to SLA.  He 
is the de-facto head of the Dulaim, one of the most prominent 
tribal confederations in Iraq, and splits his time between 
Anbar and Amman, Jordan. 
 
PLATFORM: LONG ON SECURITY, SHORT ON SPECIFICS 
QPLATFORM: LONG ON SECURITY, SHORT ON SPECIFICS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶4. (C) LAW AND ORDER VS. SERVICES:  Maliki's list did well in 
the 2009 provincial elections by taking credit for increased 
stability after security operations in Basra and Diyala in 
2008 quashed Jaish al-Mahdi and other militia activity (ref 
D).  Abbas al-Bayati (SLA/Islamic Union of Turkomens) has 
told a number of Iraqi and Arab media outlets that the 
coalition's key priorities are providing housing to the 
disadvantaged and developing agriculture.  However, Haider 
al-Abadi told emboffs February 9 that SLA candidates fear an 
anti-incumbent backlash in several Da'wa dominant provinces, 
due to a lack of improvement in essential services.  Safia 
Suhail (SLA/Independent) complained to poloffs recently that 
SLA's overall campaign was overly focused on "personalities 
and security" rather than specific issues. Citing poor 
teacher training and school infrastructure, Izzat Shabander 
(MP and current candidate for SLA in Baghdad) told poloffs 
February 18 that educational reform and improvement was his 
priority issue and would be critical to Baghdad voters. 
 
¶5. (C) SECULAR GOVERNMENT:  Independents on SLA's list have 
told us they appreciate Maliki's nationalist perspective and 
relative distance from Iran in comparison to INA's 
leadership.  Shabander said that the independents bloc (with 
the exception of Deputy COR Speaker and Shi'a cleric Khalid 
Attiya) was pushing for secularism in government.  He 
observed that Maliki respects the idea of separation of 
Mosque and State, but noted that the PM has not vocally 
supported this view. (Comment: It is unlikely the PM will 
actively support secularism and risk further criticism that 
he is compromising Shi'a values and unity. End Comment.) 
 
¶6. (C) DE-BA'ATHIFICATION:  The parliamentary Accountability 
and Justice Commission's (AJC - ref E) effort to de-Ba'athify 
the national election candidate list was extremely popular in 
the Shi'a heartland.  Both major Shi'a coalitions have 
campaigned on their "anti-Ba'athist" bona fides, which has 
effectively diverted attention from core issues like water 
resources and electricity (ref F). Maliki, Chalabi and ISCI's 
Jalal ad Din al-Saghir closely collaborated in 2005-6 on 
de-Ba'athification of thousands of Iraqis and found little 
resistance to their actions. 
 
¶7. (U) CHANGE AS A THEME:  Per PRT campaign reports, the most 
prevalent SLA campaign poster in Baghdad and in southern Iraq 
features PM Maliki smiling over a slogan calling for "Change 
and Building Iraq." 
 
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES HEADING INTO ELECTIONS 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶8. (C) SECURITY AND SOVEREIGNTY:  Maliki's popularity rose in 
Baghdad and in southern Iraq after 2008 security operations 
greatly reduced militia actively.  He also benefited from the 
June 30, 2009 withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq's cities, 
by taking credit for "restoring sovereignty" and overseeing 
the rebuilding of Iraqi Security Forces. 
 
¶9. (C) NATIONALISM:  Maliki's close advisor and Da'wa MP Sami 
al-Askari remarked to POL M/C that this is the first time 
since the fall of Saddam  that both the Shi'a and Kurds are 
competing on two lists, which he believed was a step in the 
right direction for Iraqi democracy.  One of SLA's greatest 
strengths -- its effort to posit itself as a nationalist 
coalition willing to break from the pan-Shi'a list -- is also 
its greatest challenge heading into the election.  Perceived 
as less sectarian and more independent from Iran than INA, 
Maliki and his partners hold greater appeal to more secular 
Shi'a voters.  However, Abadi and PM Advisor Sadiq Rikabi 
confided to poloffs in November that SLA's leadership is 
worried about being blamed for creating a rift in the Shi'a 
community, which ISCI and others, including Iran, can exploit 
in the face of "Ba'athists building new coalitions." (ref G) 
 
¶10. (C) Former Transitional National Assembly (TNA) Chairman 
Hachim al-Hassani and Anbari Sheikh Ali Hatem are the only 
nationally-prominent Sunnis in SLA.  Despite early efforts to 
reach out to Sunnis and pitch himself as a nationalist, 
Maliki failed to secure the participation of two more 
prominent Sunni tribal leaders who had expressed early 
interest in joining SLA: Ahmed Rishawi (Abu Risha), head of 
the Anbar Awakening Movement, and Abdullah Yawar al-Shammari, 
head of the al-Shammari tribe and a political power in 
Ninewah.  Yawar at one point told the Special Advisor for 
Northern Iraq that he could secure Ninewah for SLA if Maliki 
would agree to certain conditions (ref H).  Both ultimately 
Qwould agree to certain conditions (ref H).  Both ultimately 
opted to join predominantly Sunni cross-sectarian coalitions: 
Rishawi went with Interior Minister Bolani's Coalition of 
Iraq's Unity (CIU), while Yawar brought his party into Ayad 
Allawi's Iraqiyya list. 
 
¶11. (C) Maliki seemingly has failed to take into account the 
concerns of some of his few Sunni allies:  SLA Baghdad 
candidate and Sunni tribal leader Sheikh Wasfi al-Asi told 
the Commanding General's political advisor that he was 
disappointed with the coalition's reluctance to accept the 
candidates he proposed around the country, and lamented that 
he received no support for his campaign. 
 
¶12. (C) TARGETED ARRESTS:  Maliki's ability to attract Sunni 
support was indisputably harmed by what Sunni leaders in the 
provinces of Diyala and Salah ad-Din viewed as the PM's 
direct intervention in provincial affairs to benefit Shi'a 
groups (Diyala) or favored Sunni politicians (Salah ad-Din) 
(ref L). 
 
¶13. (C) REGIONAL RELATIONS:  Maliki has not endeared himself 
with the neighbors.  The PM's rush to accuse Syria of 
harboring the terrorists responsible for the August 19, 2009 
 
Baghdad bombings (ref I) and subsequent high-profile attacks 
in Iraq marked a new low in Iraq's relations with its Arab 
neighbors.  Some Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, have 
been critical of Maliki's "failure" to rein in Iraq's close 
relationship with Iran and have not hesitated to promote 
Sunni political groups within Iraq through media and 
financial support to balance interference from Tehran (refs 
J-K, M).  SLA leaders, other than Minister of Oil 
Shahristani, have not made the effort to engage neighboring 
Arab states in the way that Iraqiyya head Ayad Allawi and 
ISCI Chairman Ammar al-Hakim have.  SLA figures maintain 
close ties to Iran but have managed to mitigate those ties 
more effectively in the public eye in comparison to INA. 
 
PROJECTIONS 
----------- 
 
¶14. (C) Given the opposition of INA and KRG President Barzani 
to a second term for Maliki, the SLA will have to win a 
convincing plurality (i.e., more than just a few more seats 
than INA) if he is to have a good chance of remaining PM. 
Based on current indicators, it is likely that SLA will win 
18-22% of parliamentary seats, which would put it at 60-66 
seats out of 325 in the next COR - or about roughly the same 
as currently projected for INA. 
HILL