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INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000382 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2020 
TAGS: PTER PGOV ASEC PREL EAID KJUS KCRM KCOR KDEM
IZ 
SUBJECT: PRT ANBAR: DESPITE EFFORTS, VOTER PARTICIPATION 
HARD TO PREDICT 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 00289 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 00178 
     ¶C. BAGHDAD 00372 
 
Classified By: Classified by PRT Anbar Team Leader Paul Fitzgerald for 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (U) This is an Anbar Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) 
reporting message. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary.  Anbari government leaders, tribal sheikhs 
and religious leaders are encouraging Anbaris to vote in the 
March 7 national elections.  Yet PRT-gathered anecdotal 
evidence and polling data suggests significant challenges 
remain.  Anbar voters are discouraged by recent violence, the 
exclusion of candidates by the Accountability and Justice 
Commission (AJC), and the widespread belief that Iran 
controls the Government of Iraq (GOI).  Nevertheless, many 
Anbaris are determined not to boycott the vote as they did in 
2005, viewing it as a strategic mistake.  END SUMMARY. 
 
GOVERNMENT LEADERS SHOW ENTHUSIASM AND CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM 
============================================= =========== 
 
¶3. (C) Prior to the AJC exclusion of candidates, provincial 
government officials predicted a 60% voter turnout, mirroring 
the January 2009 provincial election.  After the AJC 
announcement, Acting Provincial Governor Fo'ad Jitab 
al-Karbouli stated that the disqualification list discouraged 
potential voters and disrupted coalition building-efforts. 
Like many Anbaris, Karbouli felt the exclusion of candidates 
proved there has been no national reconciliation, and that 
people were not being given a free choice.  In a January 20 
meeting with PRToffs, Karbouli said that in recent meetings 
with local clerics and sheikhs he is stressing the importance 
of "get out the vote" messages.  "We all know that the only 
way forward is that we must vote.  If voters do not go to the 
polls, we only open up the (GoI) to increased Iranian 
influence and control," he remarked. 
 
¶4. (C) At the local level, Fallujah city government officials 
echoed a similar determination.  Regarding Anbar Sheikh Ahmed 
abu Risha's recent talk of a boycott (ref A), City Council 
head Sheikh Hamid Rashid al-Alwani told PRToffs on February 4 
that the city council and all local sheikhs will turn out the 
vote and are prepared to counter publicly any calls for a 
boycott.  This determination has taken the form of a friendly 
rivalry between tribal sheikhs in the Fallujah area to ensure 
voter participation in the elections. 
 
BUT SKEPTICISM ABOUNDS 
====================== 
 
¶5. (C) In Saqlawiyah and Ameriyah, two towns outside of 
Fallujah, voter enthusiasm is significantly curbed by 
security concerns.  The Chairman of the Saqlawiyah City 
Council told PRToffs that he thinks fewer than 40% of 
eligible voters will go to the polls because Saqlawiyah has 
endured many IED attacks, and the public does not believe 
that the Iraqi Police are able to stop them. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Leaders in eastern Anbar have called for the absence 
of U.S. Forces on election day, believing that their presence 
will draw attacks against polling centers and depress voter 
turnout.  Many local leaders also fear that political parties 
will simply buy votes. One Fallujah city council member 
warned that the market rate for a vote was USD $50 to $100. 
 
¶7. (SBU) In Rutbah and Karmah, city officials are expecting 
low turnout.  They claim that many Iraqis in these areas do 
not want democracy and fear that those who do support the 
democratic process will be targeted by those who oppose it. 
Still others simply do not believe voting will make any 
difference.  These areas are still run by CPA-appointed 
municipal governments, and some western Anbaris cite this as 
Qmunicipal governments, and some western Anbaris cite this as 
a reason for their disenchantment with the concept of 
democracy.  "If you want democracy, go to America," said one 
man from Rutbah. 
 
SHEIKHS WARY OF DEMOCRACY 
========================= 
 
¶8. (C) Anbar's paramount sheikhs continue to support the vote 
(ref B) but are growing increasingly wary. Prominent local 
sheikhs, including Sheikh Ahmed abu Risha - the most 
politically influential Anbar sheikh - have characterized the 
AJC list as an Iranian-directed assault on their political 
prospects.  Sheikh Khamis Abd al-Kareem al-Fahadawi, the 
leader of one of the most influential tribes in Ramadi, 
 
BAGHDAD 00000382  002 OF 003 
 
 
remarked that the constitution's de-Ba'athification 
provisions are being used as a weapon against Sunnis, and are 
further punishment against those who have lost family members 
to the fight against Al-Qaeda. 
 
¶9. (S) The sheikhs strongly believe that the recent meetings 
with GOI leaders by the Iranian Ambassador to Iraq and the 
Iranian Foreign Minister, along with the Iranian incursion 
into the southern Fakka oil field and the lack of an Iraqi 
military response, are proof that Iran is controlling the 
central government (ref B).  Sheikh Hamed Rashid al-Alwani 
remarked that "Iraq is not ready for democracy.  We need a 
few years to root these people out first."  In a February 9 
meeting with the Ambassador (ref C), all of the attending 
sheikhs voiced a desire for USF-I to slow down their 
withdrawal from Iraq and for the USG to directly intervene in 
GOI affairs, expressing fears that Iran is taking over the 
country.  However, they do see the necessity of voting, and 
admitted that boycotting the 2005 election was a strategic 
blunder that they are determined not to repeat.  They view 
voting as the only realistic option to counter Iranian 
influence. 
 
THE RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT PUSHES FOR THE VOTE 
============================================= == 
 
¶10. (S) The governing body of Sunni Islam in Anbar, the Anbar 
Sunni Endowment, has been a strong advocate for voting in 
Anbar.  Endowment head Sheikh Abdullah Jalal and his deputy, 
Sheikh Riyadh Dhiyab Zoobaa, have written and disseminated 
several sermons stressing the importance of every man and 
woman in Anbar voting in the election.  In late January, the 
Endowment issued a fatwa (religious ruling) that 
participation in the election is to be regarded as a 
religious duty.  Sheikh Abdullah announced this fatwa on 
television and gave a recorded copy to Deputy Prime Minister 
Issawi for national distribution.  Independent USF-I and PRT 
sources have verified that Ramadi and Fallujah mosques have 
repeated this message. 
 
¶11. (C) Despite the Endowment's support for the election 
process, its leaders greatly distrust the Independent High 
Elections Commission (IHEC), which they feel is not 
impartial, and deplore the AJC's decision to exclude Sunni 
candidates.  Sheikh Abdullah has stated privately to PRToffs 
that this is an attempt by the GOI to mute the voice of 
Iraqis and cripple their ability to rebuild their country: 
"The prevention of professionals who belonged to the former 
regime from running for office or working in government is 
not helpful.  We need trained people to rebuild our cities." 
As with other Anbaris, Sheikh Abdullah believes this is being 
done at the behest of the Iranians, who he considers to be 
the real power in Baghdad. 
 
THE ANBAR STREET ) DIVIDED AND UNSURE 
===================================== 
 
¶12. (SBU) In order to collect its own data, the PRT developed 
five standard election questions, printed them on a card, and 
distributed the cards to all PRT members and local staff to 
use when engaging local residents.  In the PRT's numerous 
engagements with non-elites since January 25, these five 
questions have been asked: 
- Do you plan to vote, and if so, why? 
- What are your feelings about security for the election?  - 
What is the most important issue in this election? 
- Do you think your vote will make a difference? 
- What is your reaction to the AJC,s exclusion of 
candidates? 
 
¶13. (SBU) From January 25 to February 7, the PRT questioned 
127 Ramadi and Fallujah residents, both women and men, 
ranging from 18 to 45 years old.  Slightly less than half the 
Qranging from 18 to 45 years old.  Slightly less than half the 
respondents had some college education, and an additional 
third were high school graduates.  Some 38% indicated that 
they intended to vote and that they were hoping that the new 
parliament would be more balanced and better represent Sunni 
interests.  Over 65% of these already-committed voters 
indicated that supporting the new political and democratic 
process was the most important issue, transcending the 
political platforms of the parties themselves, even if their 
vote did not ultimately have a significant impact on the 
outcome. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Twenty-eight percent stated that they would not 
vote because they felt that the same coalitions would hold 
power and nothing would change.  They cited the AJC's 
exclusion of prominent Sunni candidates as evidence that 
those in power in Baghdad were determined to hold on to power 
 
BAGHDAD 00000382  003 OF 003 
 
 
and deny Anbaris their voice.  Eighty percent of all 
respondents felt strongly that this committee was designed to 
exclude Sunni leadership from power.  More than half of the 
respondents indicated that they did not care if someone was 
previously a Ba'athist and they supported the inclusion of 
every candidate, regardless of background. 
 
¶15. (SBU) The remaining 40% of the respondents said they 
still hadn't decided whether or not to vote.  One-third of 
the respondents cited the current security situation as their 
primary concern, including most of those who had not yet 
decided to vote.  In spite of previous reporting from 
government leadership that the presence of the Iraqi Army 
would have a destabilizing effect on Anbar, 58% of 
respondents indicated that they felt safer with the presence 
of the Iraqi Army, often remarking that, because they are 
from outside Anbar, they are likely to be fairer and more 
vigilant.  In a January 24 conversation with a group of young 
Ramadis, most insisted that they would go to the polls and 
encourage their family to vote.  However, a majority followed 
that statement with the pronouncement that "it won't make a 
difference anyway.  Nothing will change, but we have to vote." 
 
¶16. (C) COMMENT:  In spite of the recent AJC disqualification 
of candidates, Anbari religious, tribal, and government 
institutions continue to support the election for different 
reasons.  In eastern Anbar, where the bulk of Anbaris live, 
local government and religious institutions appear to be 
working together to get Anbaris to the polls, and, to varying 
degrees, believe that there is some chance for incremental 
change.  The primary motivation for tribal institutions to 
support the polls appears to be a tacit acceptance that it is 
the only way they can counter what they view as the greatest 
threat: Iranian influence.  When talking with other 
"non-elite" Anbaris, however, the picture becomes much less 
clear, with some insisting that they will vote out of 
principle and others insisting they won,t because of 
security.  One thing that they all agree on is that they feel 
there is little hope for real change in the Iraqi Government. 
 END COMMENT. 
FORD