VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #0365/01 0421536
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111536Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6570
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000365 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KTER IZ
SUBJECT: PRT KARBALA: ATTACKS DURING ARBA'IN LEAVE 56 DEAD 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 0224 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 0296 
 
Classified By: PRT Karbala Team Leader John Kincannon for reasons 1.4 ( 
b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (U) This is a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Karbala 
reporting cable. 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY:  Fears of violence in Karbala during Arba'in 
(reftel A) were realized after four deadly attacks left 56 
dead and more than two hundred wounded among the several 
million visitors to the event, culminating on February 4. 
All four attacks used vehicle-borne improvised explosive 
devices (VBIED) and occurred on roads leading into the city 
from al-Hillah.  Local officials blamed the attacks on 
"Ba'athists" and al-Qaida.  Karbalans remain concerned about 
the chances for increased violence ahead of next month,s 
elections.  END SUMMARY. 
 
FOUR DEADLY ATTACKS 
------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) Iraqi security force (ISF) reports confirmed two VBIED 
attacks on February 3 along a main route leading into 
Karbala.  The attacks killed 25 and wounded more than one 
hundred.  The second two attacks February 5, initially 
reported as mortar fire, used two VBIEDs about one half mile 
apart and left 31 dead and 118 wounded.  ISF sources 
confirmed that all four attacks occurred in an area under the 
responsibility of a single Iraqi Army commander, who USF-I 
interlocutors characterized as generally effective.  Local 
officials blamed the attacks on al-Qaida and "Ba'athists." 
(NOTE:  Local press reported that Karbala Governor Amal 
al-Din (Da'wa) attributed the second two attacks to "mortar 
fire."  One local PRT employee speculated that this might be 
an effort by the ISF to divert blame away from a more 
preventable VBIED attack to one much less easy to combat. END 
NOTE.)  Another PRT local employee reported that the Governor 
planned to blame any attacks on the "Ba'athist threat," even 
if there was evidence that the perpetrators were Shi'a 
militia. 
 
EXTENSIVE SECURITY PLAN IMPLEMENTED 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Iraqi media reported an extensive plan for the 
February 4 Arba'in commemoration by security officials, 
incorporating Karbala and the surrounding provinces.  The 
plan included deployment of more than 30,000 forces, 
increased checkpoints, 1,500 females employed to conduct 
searches, use of undercover personnel, installation of 
surveillance cameras, and Iraqi and U.S. Air Force air 
support.  Security operations began ten days in advance of 
Arba'in, which caused grumbling among security personnel over 
denied leaves during the event, according to a PRT local 
employee with relatives in the security forces. 
 
¶5. (C) Media reports announced the personal participation of 
Prime Minister al-Maliki and the Minister of Interior, Jawad 
al-Bolani in developing the security plans for the event. 
(COMMENT:  While Maliki hails from Karbala province and is a 
somewhat regular visitor for a variety of political and 
personal reasons, this was a rare visit during one of 
Karbala's religious events for Bolani, perhaps an indication 
of the level of seriousness given to the planning or his own 
electioneering on behalf of his Coalition of Iraq,s Unity. 
END COMMENT.) 
 
¶6. The Karbala Police Chief, Ali Jassim al-Greri, criticized 
the media during a press conference on January 28 for 
creating an uproar over the use of handheld explosive 
detecting devices, stating "this is just noise to negatively 
affect the security preparations for Arba'iniyah.  We have 
tested these devices and the results were very good."  (NOTE: 
 The director of the UK manufacturer of the devices was 
recently arrested for fraud, resulting in significant Iraqi 
Qrecently arrested for fraud, resulting in significant Iraqi 
media attention on the devices used at many checkpoints 
around the country.  The timing of the controversy was 
especially harmful to perceptions of security on the eve of 
this major religious event.  END NOTE) 
 
COMMENT:  CONFIDENCE SHIFTS 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Initial confidence in the Arba'in security plans was 
strong, with PRT local employees reporting larger crowds in 
attendance than previous years and significant increases in 
foreign visitors, especially Iranians and Kuwaitis.  Local 
officials launched a regular and detailed media plan to 
inform the public about the security measures taken.  The 
attacks during Arba,in, while disturbing, fall within the 
amount of violence associated with major Shi,a 
commemorations post-2003.  While an Arba'iniyyah unmarred by 
violence would have been a huge plus for Maliki and the ISF, 
the fact that matters were not worse is probably a political 
"wash."  The attacks have raised concerns for more violence 
ahead of next month's elections.  Blaming the Ba,athists for 
the attacks will add to already negative feelings about Iraqi 
judicial decisions to include certain "Ba'athist" electoral 
candidates (reftel B). 
HILL