VZCZCXYZ0015
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #0364/01 0421524
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111524Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 0052
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6567
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/USDOE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000364 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR 
THE HAGUE FOR BIEK 
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN, CP> 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (BROWN, DENYER AND CRISTOFARO) 
NSC FOR LUTES 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2020 
TAGS: PARM PREL OPCW CWC IZ
SUBJECT: CW DESTRUCTION PLAN IN IRAQ: NO MONEY AND SHIFTING 
PLAYERS 
 
REF: A. 09 HAGUE 738 
     ¶B. HAGUE 39 
     ¶C. HAGUE 79 
     ¶D. MIKULAK-BANAA LETTER OF 4 FEBRUARY 2010 
 
Classified By: PM MinCouns Cameron Munter for reasons 1.4(b) & (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  During a February 7 meeting with PMOff and 
a United States Forces - Iraq (USF-I) J-3 representative, Dr. 
Mohammed Al Sharaa, Director General of the Iraqi National 
Monitoring Directorate (INMD), claimed the GOI did not 
forward prior chemical munitions find reports to the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) 
because these munitions finds had not been filled with 
chemical agents. In addition, Dr. Al Sharaa, although 
admitting the importance of designating key actors to 
coordinate Iraq's chemical weapons (CW) destruction plans, 
stated the GOI would not send the technical experts who 
participated in the January CW destruction plan discussions 
in The Hague to the February 22-26 follow-up discussions, 
citing lack of funding. Finally, Dr. Al Sharaa revealed the 
formation of a GOI inter-ministerial technical expert 
committee that will review the proposed CW destruction plan 
and decide whether encapsulation of the Muthanna bunker is a 
valid option. The Embassy will continue to engage with the 
GOI on these issue, stressing the importance of participant 
continuity in destruction planning and the future funding of 
CW destruction operations. End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
GOI CONFUSED OVER WHAT CHEMICAL MUNITIONS FINDS 
NEED TO BE REPORTED TO OPCW 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On February 7, PMOff and LTC Steve Creighton, USF-I 
J-3 CBRNE Fusion Cell Lead, met with representatives from the 
INMD and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to discuss chemical 
munitions finds reporting to the OPCW, the proposed CW 
destruction plan and the upcoming OPCW Executive Council 
meeting at The Hague.  During this meeting, PMOff provided 
the GOI reports of chemical munitions finds discovered by 
USF-I between February and August 2009. Although these 
reports were previously provided by the U.S. to Dr. Al Sharaa 
and sBG Ali, MoD Chemical Defense Corps, the GOI failed to 
forward them to the OPCW, as required under the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC) (ref. A). When pressed by the USG 
for the reasons behind its failure to transmit these reports, 
Dr. Al Sharaa responded that the GOI would only transmit 
munitions finds that had been filled with chemical agents. 
For example, he claimed that the GOI would not need to report 
munitions that had been rendered unserviceable by UNSCOM. 
Further, he stated that in order to determine which munitions 
finds the GOI needed to report to the OPCW, the GOI would 
need to analyze them in a laboratory. (Note and Comment: The 
U.S. does not intrusively test recovered rounds for 
confirmation of agent type or fill.  Rather, the U.S. 
declares rounds that have been identified as having been 
manufactured as chemical rounds.  With this disagreement on 
the reporting requirements under the CWC, it will be 
important for GOI representatives, while they are at The 
Hague in February, to go through these reports with the OPCW 
Technical Secretariat (TS), clarifying the CWC's requirements 
QTechnical Secretariat (TS), clarifying the CWC's requirements 
for these and all future chemical munitions finds. End Note 
and Comment.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
FEBRUARY HAGUE TRIP: PREVIOUS TECHNICAL EXPERT 
PARTICIPANTS WILL NOT ATTEND 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶3.  (C) In response to PMOff's question regarding Iraqi 
technical representation at the February OPCW Executive 
Council meetings, Dr. Al Sharaa, although claiming to agree 
that key Iraqi actors are necessary to coordinate Iraq's CW 
destruction plan, admitted the GOI would send different 
participants to the OPCW to continue the dialogue regarding 
CW destruction plans in Iraq. (Note: In January, the GOI sent 
Iraqi technical experts Mohanad Al-Helli, Director, Chemical 
Activity Department, INMD, and Khalid Al-Janabi, Engineer, to 
The Hague for discussions with the USG and the OPCW TS on 
 
possible options on destroying CW remnants in Iraq (ref. B). 
End Note.)  PMOff stressed the importance of continuity in 
the destruction plan discussions and the technical expertise 
of both Mohanad and Khalid (ref. C & D).  Dr. Al Sharaa 
responded by claiming the GOI did not have the money to fund 
the travel for these two individuals and that he (Dr. Al 
Sharaa) would be attending the February technical meetings 
with Jwan Khioka, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), sBG 
Mohammed Ali, MoD, and Dr. Essam, INMD. (Comment and Note: 
Although Dr. Al Sharaa claims he recognizes the importance of 
these meetings and the need for key GOI actors to coordinate 
Iraq's destruction plan, his failure to send Mohanad, who 
works directly for Dr. Al Sharaa, speaks volumes.  Rather 
than sending Dr. Essam from INMD to attend the upcoming 
meetings, Dr. Al Sharaa could just as easily have sent 
Mohanad, the head of his Chemical Activity Department, and an 
individual with both the knowledge and expertise to 
participate in these important CW destruction planning 
discussions.  In addition to issues within INMD, there appear 
to be issues with the MoD as well. Minister of Defense Abd 
Al-Qadr Al-Mufriji has given permission for sBG Ali to travel 
to The Hague for the February meetings; however, it is 
unclear whether he will ultimately be allowed to participate 
in the meetings.  Previously, Minister Al-Mufriji rescinded 
his permission for sBG Ali to depart Iraq without any 
explanation for this decision, thereby denying the 
participants an opportunity to consider the Iraqi military's 
views on CW destruction plans in Iraq. (ref. D).  End Comment 
and Note.) 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
GOI TECHNICAL EXPERT COMMITTEE FORMED TO 
REVIEW THE CHEMICAL WEAPON DESTRUCTION PLAN 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) In order to review the CW destruction plan proposed 
in January, the GOI has formed an inter-ministerial technical 
expert committee that will determine whether encapsulation of 
the Muthanna bunker would be sufficient, Dr. Al Sharaa 
revealed.  Although the GOI had not selected him to serve on 
this committee, Dr. Al Sharaa expressed concern that 
encapsulation would be insufficient and the contents of the 
bunker could have a negative environmental effect on 
neighboring areas. At one point during this discussion, Dr. 
Al Sharaa claimed there are unexploded ordinances (UXO) in 
the bunker. (Note and Comment: Dr. Al Sharaa showed U.S. 
representatives several aerial photos of the Muthanna bunker, 
which clearly showed a hole in the top of the bunker and 
chemical munitions scattered on the bunker floor. Dr. Al 
Sharaa would not allow us to take these photos, claiming they 
were classified. It is unclear whether this demonstration was 
meant to suggest the scattered munitions were UXO, as he 
claimed. However, based upon previous USG assessments, there 
are no UXO in the Muthanna bunker (ref. B). End Note and 
Comment.) 
 
¶5.  (SBU) After expressing his concerns that encapsulation 
would not be sufficient, Dr. Al Sharaa then seemed to shift 
gears, claiming a previously-proposed U.S. plan for 
destruction was too expensive. He stated he preferred the 
Qdestruction was too expensive. He stated he preferred the 
plan that had been proposed by the German government (ref. 
A), which was not as detailed or as expensive as the U.S. 
plan. LTC Creighton suggested that another alternative the 
GOI might consider could be a hybrid of the German and U.S. 
plan, further suggesting that the GOI break the destruction 
plan into tasks and request international assistance with 
each specific task. Further complicating the issue, Dr. Al 
Sharaa informed the U.S. reps that the GOI does not have the 
money to fund CW destruction, claiming the GOI budget has 
already been passed and the earliest the GOI would have money 
for destruction costs would be in FY 2011. 
 
¶6.  (C) Comment: Based upon the failure of the GOI to grasp 
the importance of sending the same technical expert team to 
The Hague for further CW destruction plan discussions with 
the OPCW TS and the U.S. and the statements made by Dr. Al 
Sharaa that the GOI is unable to fund any CW destruction in 
the immediate future, there may be concerns that the GOI does 
not consider compliance with the CWC a priority.  What is 
apparent is that any CW destruction plan would require 
 
complete funding by the international community, as the GOI 
has not made the task of either encapsulating the bunker or 
breaking the seal and inventorying and destroying the 
contents of the bunker a fiscal priority. If Iraqi CW 
destruction implementation is envisioned for any time in the 
near future, significant buy-in from the international 
community is required. However, without a clear CW 
destruction plan and executable tasks that can be 
communicated by the GOI, complete international funding is 
uncertain.  The Embassy will continue to engage the GOI, 
stressing the importance of CW destruction funding and the 
importance of consistent Iraqi participation at international 
forums. End Comment. 
HILL