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DE RUEHTH #0093 0431125
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O R 121125Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1526
INFO RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS
RUEKJCS/HQ USEUCOM LO WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000093 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/12 
TAGS: PREL MASS ECON GR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND MOD DISCUSS FIGHTER PROCUREMENT 
 
REF: 09 ATHENS 1605 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  The Ambassador called Defense Minister Venizelos 
February 11 following press reports that the Minister indicated 
Greece had already decided to meet its next generation fighter 
needs with the Eurofighter.  The Minister reassured the Ambassador 
that press reports were inaccurate, and that Greece's fighter 
procurement, which would not be decided until the end of 2010, 
would proceed in a transparent, open framework.  The Ambassador 
urged the Minister to deliver on his pledge of transparency, and 
for the Greek decision to be based on price, value, and Greece's 
security needs, not politics.  American firms would be strong 
competitors in such a framework.  Venizelos agreed, but complained 
again about longstanding problems regarding the ASPIS II defensive 
systems suite on 60 Peace Xenia III F-16's, and asked for the 
Ambassador's help.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Greek press, rampant with speculation in advance of PM 
Papandreou's May 9-10 trip to Paris that France and Germany would 
support EU assistance aimed at abating Greece's economic crisis, 
reported February 11 that the price of this assistance was Greek 
procurement of European weapons systems, such as the Eurofighter 
and the French-built FREMM class frigate.  Building on a Venizelos 
statement that Greece's decision to procure its next generation 
fighter aircraft would be made by the end of 2010, media outlets 
reported that the GoG had likely decided already to go with the 
Eurofighter, given German pressure. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (C) During his call, Venizelos assured Ambassador Speckhard 
that press reports were inaccurate concerning the Eurofighter. 
While the Greek government is seeking to decide on which next 
generation fighter to purchase by December 2010, it was premature 
to comment on individual aircraft, he said.  The Minister stated 
that the procurement process would be transparent and open, and 
that he knew of the interest of U.S. firms in competing for the 
tender.  He stressed to the Ambassador that Greece was a strong, 
credible partner, and the process would be above-board. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (C) The Ambassador urged the Minister to deliver on his pledge 
of transparency, and for the Greek decision to be based on price, 
value, and Greece's security needs, not politics.  U.S. firms more 
than hold their own in a competitive and transparent marketplace, 
he added, and reminded Venizelos of the additional value U.S. 
products represented during this time of economic difficulty in 
Greece. 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C) MOD Venizelos raised a longstanding concern, first broached 
with the Ambassador in their initial meeting on November 4 
(reftel), that none of Greece's 60 Peace Xenia III F-16's have 
their ASPIS II defensive system suites installed.  Venizelos 
believes that the U.S. producer of ASPIS II, Raytheon, is at fault. 
He asked for the Ambassador's assistance in resolving the impasse. 
(ODC NOTE:  Raytheon and the General Directorate for Defense 
Investment and Armaments (GDDIA) have been in negotiations over 
ASPIS II for more than one year to resolve differences to no avail. 
At issue is the Greek belief that Raytheon did not meet the 
requirements and specifications of the contract, to include 
timelines, while our understanding is that Raytheon believes it has 
addressed all issues in good faith and fixed any shortfalls with 
the system, and that Greece is pushing for more than what the 
original contract stipulated.) 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C) COMMENT:  The transaction between Raytheon and the Greek 
government was a direct commercial sale, not FMS.  While official 
U.S. options are limited, this major, Minister-level snag in the 
Peace Xenia III F-16 program combined with the political pressure 
from Greece's European partners to buy the Eurofighter may not help 
the case of U.S. firms over the course of the year as Greece 
formulates its procurement decision. .  However, since the Peace 
Xenia IV aircraft have the APSIS II included in the FMS 
procurement, this could be merely an excuse if Greece succumbs to 
pressure to buy the more expensive Eurofighter.  END COMMENT. 
Speckhard