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DE RUEHTH #0077/01 0341643
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O R 031643Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1471
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 000077 
 
SIPDIS 
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA 
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG 
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA 
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/03 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR GR MK TU CY IR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR TO DROUTSAS: SHOW WASHINGTON YOUR STUFF 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (S) SUMMARY.  In a January 30 meeting with Alternate Foreign 
Minister Dimitri Droutsas just prior to his first trip to the U.S., 
Ambassador Speckhard focused him on resolving challenges close to 
home and advised him to show Washington he was not just a diplomat 
but a political decision maker with whom we could work.  He told 
Droutsas frankly that bold moves to tackle longstanding regional 
problems could strengthen the case for a meeting between PM 
Papandreou and President Obama, given the long queue of leaders 
seeking to travel to Washington.  On Macedonia, he counseled 
Droutsas to prepare to discuss specifics with Washington 
counterparts; on Cyprus, he urged him to identify how Greece can 
help promote a solution in the interest of all and to be more 
positive in public; on Turkey, he discussed PM Papandreou's recent 
letter to Turkish PM Erdogan, and Greek views on the future of the 
relationship, including willingness to take the continental shelf 
dispute to the ICJ.  Droutsas emphasized that he hoped Washington 
had taken note of the positive direction of Greek-Turkish 
relations, and Papandreou's personal efforts thus far.  He was 
disappointed in Talat's recent proposal which he characterized as a 
step backwards in the Cyprus process.  Describing Papandreou's 
approach toward both Turkey and Macedonia, he explained that he is 
trying to lay the groundwork and build the personal ties necessary 
to change relationships that have become entrenched in bitter 
disputes.  Turkey is Greece's top foreign policy priority at 
present, and while Greece's message to Macedonia prior to the 
December EU Council meeting was "we're ready if you are," Greece 
did not sense a real effort by Macedonia to find a solution.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
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SHOW WASHINGTON YOU'RE READY TO WORK TOGETHER 
 
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¶2.  (S) The Ambassador met with Alt/FM Droutsas in advance of his 
February 2 meetings in Washington with the Secretary and Deputy 
Secretary.  While delivering a strong message that we welcomed PM 
Papandreou's interest in strengthening our partnership and playing 
a greater role in meeting international challenges, he counseled 
that the most important contribution Greece could make would be to 
resolve some of the challenges close to home.  Show Washington you 
are a political decision maker able to lead, and somebody with whom 
we can work together practically to solve problems, the Ambassador 
said, not just a diplomat who can explain positions.  The 
Ambassador stated that there are many supporters at State and the 
White House recommending a PM visit to Washington, but given the 
long queue of leaders wanting to come there were some others asking 
"why Greece, why now."  Bold moves in tackling longstanding 
regional problems would make the case for a visit even stronger. 
Droutsas, describing Papandreou's approach toward both Turkey and 
Macedonia, explained that the PM is trying to build the personal 
ties and lay the groundwork necessary to overcome the bitter 
disputes that have become entrenched over the past two decades. 
Even though these issues may seem inconsequential to  Washington in 
the face of greater world challenges, Droutsas noted, the PM has 
been working hard to make progress and deserves a great deal of 
credit for only four months in office. 
 
 
 
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Macedonia Name 
 
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ATHENS 00000077  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶4.  (S) The Ambassador told Droutsas that Washington was interested 
in substance, and that the Deputy Secretary was prepared to talk 
specifics about what Greece was willing to accept.  The U.S. had 
been listening, the Ambassador said, and believed the main elements 
of the deal were a geographic qualifier, a general acceptance of 
erga omnes in the international context, and leaving identity 
outside the agreement (and not to be recalled at some point in the 
EU accession process). 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Droutsas complimented his previous meetings with Macedonian 
FM Milososki as friendly and warm, and said that he had invited 
Milososki to Athens following their most recent talks.  Droutsas 
pledged his full support to the UN process, and highlighted his 
invitation to UN negotiator Nimetz to visit Athens.  Looking back 
at the December 2009 EU Council meeting that punted the decision on 
naming a date for Macedonian EU accession talks, Droutsas shared 
his impression that PM Gruevski had believed mistakenly that 
last-minute pressure within the EU from select states would cause 
Greece to fold.  Greece's message to Macedonia prior to the meeting 
had been "we are ready if you are," but Athens had seen no real 
effort by Skopje to work on details.  Droutsas stated that if he 
had one message to pass to Skopje, it would be to avoid public 
statements that harm the bilateral atmosphere, and create a hostile 
press climate in Greece that limits the government's course of 
action. 
 
 
 
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Cyprus 
 
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¶6.  (S) The Ambassador told Droutsas to expect Washington to press 
him on Cyprus and encouraged him not to respond by blaming 
everything on Turkey, and offer what Greece could do to promote a 
solution in the interest of everyone.  The Ambassador encouraged 
Greece to be more positive in public in order to help generate the 
necessary public support for the difficult negotiations.  Droutsas 
believed that the last proposal by Turkish Cypriot leader Talat was 
seriously disruptive to the process and had been a setback.  With 
these types of "antics" it would be hard to get the progress 
needed, he said.  He agreed that the public dynamics were not 
helpful, in particular that some Greek Cypriots have started to 
accept the idea of a permanent partition as preferable to what they 
thought would be a poor agreement.  President Christofias had 
Greece's full support, Droutsas underscored, and deserved much 
credit for keeping the process moving in the face of such 
difficulties.  Droutsas conveyed the Greek impression that the 
talks were not going near as well as reported.  He said that he had 
told this to UN SYG Ban prior to Ban's recent trip to Cyprus, while 
also assuring him that Greece fully supported the UN process and 
welcomed the Secretary General's involvement and would support any 
initiative the SYG undertook. 
 
 
 
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Turkey 
 
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¶7.  (C) Greek-Turkish relations are at the top of PM Papandreou's 
priority list, Droutsas told the Ambassador.  He pointed to 
intensive engagement that began with the PM's October 8, 2009 trip 
to Istanbul - 4 days after his election - where he met with PM 
Erdogan, and continued with the exchange of detailed letters by 
 
ATHENS 00000077  003 OF 003 
 
 
both Prime Ministers on bilateral relations, and commitments for 
future high-level travel to capitals.  Droutsas pointed to his 
3.5-hour dinner with Turkish FM Davutoglu in London on the margins 
of the London Conference as a sign of their warm relationship and 
seriousness of purpose, and said that he had reiterated PM 
Papandreou's invitation to PM Erdogan to visit Athens, which he 
anticipates will happen by the end of June.  He also informed the 
Ambassador that Davutoglu invited him to Ankara, which he intends 
to follow up on in the future. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (C) The challenge, Droutsas noted, was how to proceed in 
practical terms, now that the political willingness appears to be 
in place.  Greece hopes to replicate some successful processes from 
the 1999-2004 Papandreou-Cem rapprochement to take joint steps on 
issues of mutual concern such as climate change, the Middle East, 
and Iran, while continuing high-level consultations on more 
sensitive areas of the relationship.  Greece supports exploratory 
bilateral talks aimed at delimiting the continental shelf in the 
Aegean.  These talks should proceed with a set timetable, and if a 
satisfactory agreement cannot be reached by a specific date, they 
should agree to take jointly the issue of continental shelf 
delineation to the International Court of Justice for resolution. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (C) Droutsas was pleased that thus far, coverage by the Greek 
media of Papandreou's initiatives has been relatively positive.  He 
attributed this to the methodical, step-by-step approach by 
Papandreou to the problem, and judged that changing public opinion 
was a key ingredient in the future success of any initiatives 
between Greece and Turkey. 
 
 
 
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Foreign Policy Priorities 
 
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¶10.  (C) Droutsas was clear:  the PM had placed changing 
Greek-Turkish relations at the top of the foreign policy priority 
list.  He assured that this did not mean that Greece was not 
working hard to resolve the Macedonia name issue - one had only to 
note the number of Prime Ministerial and Ministerial-level 
engagements to see the effort - but he hoped Washington would 
recognize the bold steps the PM was taking on Turkey and realize 
the significance of this initiative.  The PM was going to great 
lengths to fundamentally and permanently improve the relationship. 
They were picking up where Papandreou and Cem had left off in 2004 
and had been energetic in pushing the process forward in only a few 
months in office.  With the opposition New Democracy party now 
reorganized following its October defeat and its leader Samaras 
likely to look toward foreign policy as an area to criticize the 
government, they were expecting more challenges ahead.  Managing 
Greek domestic politics while moving the foreign policy ball 
forward was understandably a key component of success.  This will 
be a delicate process with some political risk, and Droutsas asked 
for Washington's support and understanding. 
Speckhard