VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTH #0133/01 0560946
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 250946Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1624
INFO IRAN COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000133 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/25 
TAGS: PARM KNNP MNUC IAEA IR SY GR
SUBJECT: GREECE: VIEWS ON IRAN TRR AND RECENT EU FAC; SYRIA DEMARCHE 
PASSED 
 
REF: STATE 16530; STATE 15979 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Deborah A. McCarthy, Deputy Chief of Mission; REASON: 
1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  MFA interlocutors welcomed points explaining our 
position on the Tehran Research Reactor, and appreciated our 
interest in addressing the humanitarian issues facing Iran.  They 
stated that due to a great divergence of views among members, the 
EU had not yet decided if it will apply unilateral measures against 
Iran, and is watching to see what the UN Security Council does 
first.  They expressed great concern that Greece could suffer 
economically in the case of oil sanctions due to its dependency on 
Iranian oil, and significant shipping interests corollary to that - 
particularly if China did not support the sanctions.  In a separate 
engagement on Syria, MFA took on board our concerns about Syrian 
nuclear activities and the need to for Syria to cooperate fully 
with the IAEA, stating our paper would be reviewed carefully.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
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IRAN: EU STILL SPLIT, GREECE CONCERNED ABOUT BOTTOM LINE 
 
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¶2.  (C) Pol-Mil Chief delivered reftel B points jointly February 23 
to the MFA's International Organizations Directorate (D1) 
Disarmament Sub-Section Head Loukas Tsokos, who has primary 
responsibility for IAEA policy, and Common Security and Defense 
Policy Directorate's (A11) European Correspondent Alexandros 
Ioannidis, who coordinates Foreign Affairs Council preparation and 
accompanies the Minister to Brussels monthly.  Points were shared 
February 24 with the Middle East Directorate's (A6) Iran, Iraq, and 
Gulf States Counselor Grigoris Karahalios, as well.  All welcomed 
the explanation of our position on the Tehran Research Reactor and 
the accompanying non-papers, and appreciated our interest in 
addressing the humanitarian issues facing Iran. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (C) Tsokos stated that Greece shared our views with regard to 
the humanitarian concerns in Iran, and was increasingly concerned 
at Iran's intransigence toward the international community. 
Ioannidis provided a glimpse into the restricted EU FAC session on 
Iran.  He stated that while most EU members agreed that Iran had 
gone too far and the EU needed to do something, there was a wide 
divergence on the "what" and the "how" of potential EU action, and 
thus the FAC concluded nothing concrete.  All eyes were on New 
York, with a general view that the EU needed to support the UNSC 
before implementing any additional EU measures.  Karahalios added 
that the Council's COMEM working group on the Middle East and Gulf 
was set to continue discussion February 25 on possible measures the 
EU could take in the trade, finance, transport, and energy sectors. 
 
 
 
 
¶3.  (C) All three were adamant on the potential damage to Greece's 
economic bottom line should sanctions be applied, and especially if 
China did not fully participate.  Ioannidis reiterated the 
longstanding Greek concern that Greece receives approximately 30 
percent of its oil imports from Iran, much of that carried by Greek 
ships.  Karahalios said that while Greece had explored diversifying 
and importing more from other producers, Middle East and Gulf 
producers replied that production levels were booked, which would 
leave a thirty percent gap in Greek oil imports in the case of 
sanctions unless alternate sources could be found.  All expressed 
the firm view that if China did not participate in sanctions, 
Chinese industry would simply consume any excess Iranian oil supply 
created by sanctions, and that Chinese ships would quickly replace 
Greek ships in the transport sector. 
 
 
 
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IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO GREECE: WE DON'T TRUST THEM 
 
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¶4.  (C) Karahalios stated that the Iranian Ambassador to Greece had 
come to the MFA the preceding week, and told them that Iran was 
ready to do an exchange of LEU for reactor fuel, but that Iran did 
not trust the U.S. and others not to keep the LEU and refuse to 
honor their side of the deal.  Karahalios expressed the view that 
Iran would eventually accept an exchange, if negotiations could 
continue.  PolMil Chief pointed Karahalios to the fact that we have 
offered Iran substantial assurances, and that the international 
community also needs a strong sign of Iran's good faith in order to 
give us the confidence we need following Iran's lengthy history of 
non-compliance. 
 
 
 
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SYRIA: POINTS DELIVERED 
 
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¶5.  (C) Separately on Feburary 24, we delivered to Tsokos U.S. 
concerns about Syrian nuclear activities and the need for Syria to 
cooperate fully with the IAEA.  He took our concerns on board and 
stated that our paper would be reviewed carefully. 
SPECKHARD