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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 000186 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  OSCE HEAD TAKES ADVANTAGE OF 
"POSITIVE MISUNDERSTANDINGS" 
 
ASTANA 00000186  001.3 OF 004 
 
 
¶1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public 
Internet. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Ambassador Alexandre Keltchewsky, Head of 
the OSCE Center in Astana, told the Charge d'Affaires during 
a luncheon on February 1 that the OSCE and Kazakhstan have 
politely differed over words and perceptions, a tendency that 
he called  "positive misunderstandings." The dissonance has 
allowed the OSCE to take the government at its word, and 
raise issues it might not otherwise have been able to discuss 
publicly.  But, Kazakhstan sometimes uses the differences to 
slip past the hard work on its third dimension shortcomings. 
Keltchewsky cautioned that this was something member states 
needed to watch and counter.  Regarding the possibility of an 
OSCE Summit in 2010, Keltchewsky recommended a "wait and see" 
approach.  "Kazakhstan has something to sell," he said.  "We 
should bargain to make sure we get the best possible price 
for it."  END SUMMARY. 
 
KAZAKHSTAN'S STRONG PUSH FOR AN OSCE SUMMIT 
 
¶3.  (SBU) During a two-hour lunch at the residence of the 
Deputy Chief of Mission, the Head of the Center for the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 
Astana, Ambassador Alexandre Keltchewsky, commented on 
Kazakhstan's priorities as Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE in 
¶2010.  He said Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev's top 
priority is to convene a Summit of OSCE members, possibly in 
Vienna or Madrid.  Keltchewsky said that Spain has been very 
active in the OSCE and has expressed a willingness to host 
the Summit.  "Of course," he opined, "we have to be in favor 
of a Summit.  What else can we say?  But it must have 
substance and produce results."  Keltchewsky was reluctant to 
attach conditions to a Summit, but said that Kazakhstan must 
meet certain "pre-requisites" to justify the participation of 
heads of state.  He added, "The question is where, and when, 
to hold the Summit," noting that it could conceivably take 
place in 2011, although he acknowledged that would "deeply 
offend" the Kazakhstani government. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Keltchewsky said that the idea of an informal 
Ministerial was suggested by OSCE Secretary General Mark 
Perren de Brishambo in Astana in October 2009.  Keltchewsky 
said that Saudabayev pressed hard for a firm commitment to a 
Summit in 2010, and Brishambo proposed holding an informal 
meeting with OSCE Foreign Ministers in the middle of 2010 as 
a compromise.  According to Keltchewsky, Saudabayev was 
visibly unhappy with this arrangement, but agreed to it in 
the end.  "Getting a Summit is (Saudabayev's) only task," 
said Keltchewsky.  "He is under orders from the top." 
Keltchewsky said he was not opposed to a Summit in principle, 
but recommended a "wait and see" approach. "Kazakhstan has 
something to sell," he said.  "We should not be victims here. 
 We should not allow Kazakhstan to play us.  We should 
bargain to make sure we get the best possible price for it." 
He said that a "jubilee Summit" to mark the 35th anniversary 
of the Helsinki Accords, the 20th anniversary of the Paris 
Declaration, and the 65th anniversary of the end of World War 
II was not sufficient justification to gather OSCE heads of 
state. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Keltchewsky admitted that previous gatherings -- 
such as the Istanbul Summit in 1999 -- have produced few 
tangible results, but he attributed that to international 
politics.  "The states are playing a game," he said.  "They 
agree to misunderstand their agreements."  He suggested that 
a Summit in 2010 could be similar, in that member states 
could speak positively about areas of common ground, while 
avoiding areas of disagreement. 
 
 
ASTANA 00000186  002.3 OF 004 
 
 
EAST AND WEST STILL DIVIDED 
 
¶6.  (SBU) In describing the relationship between East and 
West since the end of the Cold War, Keltchewsky said that in 
his opinion "there has been no -- or very little -- progress 
in the dialogue on security matters."  Citing Russian 
President Medvedev's proposed European security charter, 
Keltchewsky said that Russia "completely misunderstands the 
Western position on security issues."  He said Medvedev's 
proposal relies entirely on United Nations resolutions that 
are not legally binding, and focuses exclusively on "hard 
security" issues to prevent armed conflict, which Keltchewsky 
said were not as relevant today. 
 
LOST IN TRANSLATION 
 
¶7.  (SBU) According to Keltchewsky, the main priorities for 
the OSCE now are economic cooperation, the Human Dimension, 
and the rule of law -- not confict prevention.  He insisted 
that progress and reform in these areas could increase 
confidence among member states, even more than military 
cooperation.  "These are the issues we should discuss at a 
Summit," he said.  He suggested that there is a persistent 
cultural divide between East and West, and noted that the 
Russian translation of "Human Dimension" ("gumanitarnoe 
izmereniye") does not capture the true meaning of the term, 
and can lead to misunderstanding on the issues.  Rather than 
an emphasis on the inalienable human rights of the 
individual, for example, the Russian translation stresses the 
rights of a group of individuals who have been granted 
protection by the state.  "That is totally different from the 
Western concept," he insisted.  When asked if Kazakhstan's 
leadership understood the nuances, Keltchewsky said that 
Deputy Foreign Minister Konstantin Zhigalov did, "but he can 
only share 50% of it with the top.  He has to swallow the 
rest, because he knows they won't want to hear it." 
 
"POSITIVE MISUNDERSTANDINGS" OPEN A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Turning to Kazakhstan, Keltchewsky said that the 
country is still best characterized as a newly independent 
state, not as an emerging democracy in a state of transition. 
 "Kazakhstan is the result of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, not an independence movement," he stated. 
Nevertheless, he said that the OSCE Center has had some 
success in Kazakhstan and has benefitted from a series of 
"positive misunderstandings" that have enabled the Center to 
work in areas, such as the Human Dimension, that the 
government might otherwise not have allowed.  For example, he 
told the Charge that a government-supported institute, the 
Institute of Parliaments, approached the Center asking for 
advice and support for a conference on the OSCE.  Keltchewsky 
understood that the institute simply wanted to promote 
Kazakhstan's role as Chairman-in-Office, but he agreed to 
provide support nevertheless, and was able to shift the 
agenda to focus on the Human Dimension, and invite several 
leaders from civil society. 
 
PRESIDENT FOR LIFE 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Commenting on the general state of democracy in 
Kazakhstan, Keltchewsky said that the situation is "even 
worse" now than it was one year ago.  He called President 
Nazarbayev a "good khoziyan" (boss, or master), gave 
Nazarbayev credit for his adroit handling of the large ethnic 
minority populations in Kazakhstan, and complimented 
Nazarbayev's proposed National Unity Doctrine.  He also 
suggested that Nazarbayev does not have 100% control over all 
of the factions vying for power in Kazakhstan, noting that 
the National Security Committee (KNB) and Ministry of 
 
ASTANA 00000186  003.3 OF 004 
 
 
Internal Affairs enjoy some degree of autonomy. Q(GQp Kazakhstan now that they 
are 
Chairman-in-Office," he insisted. 
GREENQ-Q~U~WQreens are good camouflage," not a legitimate opposition 
party.  He speculated that the Green PaQQA0e 
also claimed that the "St. Petersburg mafia -- including 
(Russian Prime Minister Vladimir) Putin -- is much more 
liberal than the other mafias in Russia," because of their 
exposure to the West, and their degrees in modern economics 
and law.  (NOTE:  Keltchewsky is a French career diplomat 
whose family emigrated from St. Petersburg; he served as 
France's Consul General in St. Petersburg from 1998-2002. 
END NOTE). 
 
DEMOCRACY AND ETHNICITY 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Keltchewsky told the Charge that he believes there 
is greater potential for political reform among the ethnic 
Russian population of Kazakhstan than among the ethnic Kazakh 
population.  He pointed out, for example, that most of the 
leaders of Kazakhstan's civil society organizations are 
ethnic Russians.  The Charge politely disagreed, noting that 
there are many outstanding think tank and NGO representatives 
of every ethnicity in Kazakhstan. Further, there is no ethnic 
Russian political movement, or community leader, and that it 
is likely that ethnic Russians with initiative, ambition, and 
skills gravitated to civil society because most of the 
leadership positions in government have been occupied by 
ethnic Kazakhs. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Talk then turned to the 2009 census, the results 
of which were released on February 10.  According to the 
census, 63% of Kazakhstan's 16.2 million are ethnic Kazakhs, 
an increase of 26% since the 1999 census.  (NOTE:  According 
to the census, ethnic Russians comprise 23% of the 
population, Uzbeks 3%, Ukrainians 2%, Uigurs 1.4%, Tatars 
1.2%, Germans 1.1%, and other ethnic groups 4.5%.  END NOTE). 
 Keltchewsky said the percentage of ethnic Kazakhs was "a 
political figure," suggesting the data were manipulated for 
political purposes.  He also said that if the figures are 
correct, then nearly half of the ethnic German population has 
left Kazakhstan, "likely the most active and talented half." 
 
THE OSCE AND AFGHANISTAN 
 
¶13.  (SBU) When asked what the OSCE could realistically 
accomplish in Afghanistan, Keltchewsky admitted that the 
 
ASTANA 00000186  004.3 OF 004 
 
 
organization did not have an ambitous agenda.  "Kazakhstan is 
interested in Afghanistan," he said, "only because the United 
States is interested."  He noted that Kazakhstan has 
announced a program of bilateral economic and educational 
assistance, and suggested that Kazakhstan could contribute to 
efforts to stem drug trafficking, but opined that Kazakhstan 
"is in no position to contribute to the stabilization of the 
country." 
 
¶14.  (SBU) COMMENT:  A conversation with Ambassador 
Keltchewsky is never predictable, prosaic, or short.  He has 
a fascinating personal history, and valuable experience, in 
the region, but his comments frequently reflect his own 
personal, somewhat elitist views than those of the 
organization he represents.  His vision is understandably 
formed by his vantage point, a fact that is worth keeping in 
mind as Kazakhstan and the OSCE member states continue to 
shape the ambitous agenda the Chairman-in-Office has set for 
¶2010.  END COMMENT. 
SPRATLEN