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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANTANANARIVO 000097 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/E - JLIDDLE 
TREASURY FOR FBOYE 
PARIS FOR WBAIN 
LONDON FOR PLORD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2019 
TAGS: PGOV MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: REACTIONS TO ICG DURING AF/E VISIT 
 
Classified By: POL/ECON CHIEF DOVIE HOLLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  While the International Contact Group on 
Madagascar was meeting in Addis Feb 18 (septel) and the 
African Union's Peace and Security Council was deciding to 
give Madagascar's leaders until March 16 to implement the 
power-sharing accords signed in Maputo and Addis, AF/E Deputy 
Director David Reimer and Emboffs met with representatives 
from the opposition, other embassies, the business community, 
and civil society on the ground in Madagascar. Almost all the 
interlocutors were in favor of targeted sanctions against the 
de facto regime.  Opposition members expressed their 
willingness to return to the negotiating table and 
flexibility towards the make-up of a unity cabinet.  They 
universally believe that the French are shoring up TGV and 
that he'll be forced to negotiate if the GOF more clearly 
withdraws its support.  As of Monday, TGV has not yet 
publicly responded to the ICG and AU communiques, although 
the HAT spokesperson indicated that they would continue to 
pursue their plan for legislative elections.  While there was 
some progress on the human rights front with respect to 
certain political prisoners Feb 16, most likely occurring in 
response to last week's human rights review of Madagascar by 
the UN, threats and intimidation are occurring against new 
targets.  End summary. 
 
Attitudes towards Sanctions 
--------------------------- 
¶2. (C) Rajoelina gave a press conference Feb 17 -- on the eve 
of the ICG in Addis -- and stated that he was not afraid of 
sanctions against him, but begged the international community 
"not to hurt the Malagasy people". Interlocutors from other 
political movements derided his martyr routine in meetings 
with visiting AF/E Deputy Director Reimer and Emboffs, 
arguing that Rajoelina was not behaving like a chief of state 
and was obviously unable to govern this country.  Rajoelina 
further said that he had sent his prime minister to Addis to 
explain the HAT's compromise proposal and that his movement 
was open to considering the proposals of the ICG and the AU 
Peace and Security Council.  Although he insisted on his plan 
to organize constituent assembly elections in May, he 
asserted that they want elections to be recognized by the 
national and international communities. 
 
¶3. (C) At a dinner for Deputy Director Reimer, several 
Ambassadors expressed support for moving forward with 
targeted sanctions, although others expressed reservations 
about the potential effectiveness of such maneuvers.  The 
German Ambassador said that, as a member of the EU, France 
would be forced to go along with measures against the HAT, 
while others had difficulty envisioning France freezing 
Malagasy assets or blocking their travel.  The Moroccan 
Ambassador said that although HAT members have some assets in 
France, they also have assets in Mauritius and elsewhere, but 
didn't specify those other locations.  (Note: The press has 
reported that those benefiting from the traffic in rosewood 
have created offshore accounts, into which the importers, 
mainly Chinese, directly deposit their proceeds.  End note.) 
The World Bank Director is opposed to applying sanctions, 
even targeted sanctions, because they will cause even further 
economic decline.  He argued that even targeted sanctions 
would send an extremely negative signal to the private sector 
that we are in this crisis for the long haul, encouraging 
businesses to close or stay away.  He said that if the crisis 
continues, Madagascar will see many more enterprises folding, 
including Madarail and Air Madagascar.  As fifty percent of 
the fuel is delivered from the port to the capital and 
significant quantities of rice are moved by train, the 
closure of Madarail would enormously impact distribution and 
prices. 
 
¶4. (C) Zafy's movement leader (and "Co-President" of 
Madagascar) Emmanuel Rakotovahiny told Emboffs that "easy 
money is killing us now!", referring to the corruption that 
is institutionalized in the de facto regime.  Targeted 
sanctions could help bring some accountability to politicians 
who now act with impunity.  Presidential hopeful Pierrot 
Rajaonarivelo also told Emboffs that he supported targeted 
sanctions and recommended that the international community 
impose a dialogue.  Ravalomanana's movement is unequivocally 
in favor of sanctions, while the business community is 
 
ANTANANARI 00000097  002 OF 004 
 
 
divided.  In a discussion with Reimer, the American Chamber 
of Commerce Board explained that the main business chambers 
have, on the surface, remained apolitical because they are 
split down the middle.  Although many are losing because of 
the economic deterioration, others have gained following the 
change of government.  (Note: This is true for U.S. 
investors, as well.  Brinks, who was blocked routinely by 
Ravalomanana due to his enmity towards its local partner, 
Sipromad, is now functioning normally.  U.S. flour miller 
Seaboard, which pulled out because it couldn't compete with 
Ravalomanana's subsidized mill, told the ambassador last week 
that they are considering re-entering the market.  End note.) 
 During a civil society roundtable with Reimer Feb 18, 
participants all expressed support for targeted sanctions and 
questioned why such measures had not been already adopted, 
rather than aid and AGOA cuts which had hurt the poor who 
lack social safety nets.  Reimer explained that the decision 
to suspend AGOA was based on a legal imperative. 
 
Reactions to ICG:  The Opposition is Willing to Negotiate 
---------------- 
¶5. (C) Leader of the Ravalomanana movement (and the other 
"Co-President" under the Addis agreement), Fetison 
Andrianirina, expressed gratitude for the support of the U.S. 
at the ICG, but was disappointed that the ICG communique 
coming out of the Feb 18 meeting in Addis did not immediately 
call for targeted sanctions against the HAT.  Ravalomanana 
issued an open letter Feb 18 to the members of the AU Peace 
and Security Council encouraging them, at their Feb 19 
session, to carefully target sanctions against the illegal 
regime, but not to cause further hardship to the Malagasy 
people.  Fetison was also disappointed that the AU decided to 
give the HAT until March 16 to implement the Maputo accords 
before applying targeted sanctions, as he is pessimistic 
about the HAT yielding in the interim.  As proposed by the 
AU, these new sanctions would become effective on the 
one-year anniversary of the coup. 
 
¶6. (C) Despite some frustration with the prospect of 
returning to negotiations after having already negotiated a 
consensual solution in Maputo and Addis, all sides appear 
willing to talk further.  Zafy's Co-President Rakotovahiny 
told AF/E Deputy Director and Charge Feb 18 that his movement 
was willing to discuss new proposals, as long as they were 
within the framework of the Maputo charter.  While he said 
that Zafy would not be willing to accept HAT prime minister 
Vital, with whom Zafy has refused to even meet, as the 
"consensus prime minister", he did say Zafy would be flexible 
with respect to the naming of ministers and proposed that 
each movement provide a few names for each post and let the 
consensus PM -- whoever s/he is -- decide.  He argued that 
the international community should be more directly involved 
in the cabinet division negotiations this time to ensure that 
they did not stall as before, as the situation is "far from 
stable".  (Note:  Zafy's reported desire for more 
international involvement is ironic, as Zafy was the most 
incensed among the four movement leaders when the UN's 
Tiebile Drame returned to Antananarivo after Addis in 
November to widwife the unity government.  End note.)  Mamy 
Rakotoarivelo, Ravalomanana's designate for transition 
congress president, told Emboffs Feb 18 that his movement 
agreed with the compromise proposal that AU Chairman Ping had 
submitted to them.  He asserted that they are ready to make 
further concessions if Ping demands it.  According to 
Rakotoarivelo, the Ravalomanana movement is flexible 
regarding the unity cabinet make-up.  He said that it didn't 
matter which ministries they got, as long as each movement 
got one ministry of national sovereignty.  Their first 
priority is an amnesty law, that would erase a conviction 
against Ravalomanana.  Ravalomanana movement leader Fetison 
agreed separately that he was willing to negotiate and again 
offered himself up as the sacrificial lamb if ceding his part 
of the co-presidency would advance negotiations. 
 
¶7. (C) As of Monday, Rajoelina still has not publicly 
responded yet to the ICG and AU communiques of Feb 18 and 19. 
 However, HAT spokesperson Annick Rajaona insisted on Feb 21 
that their idea of organizing elections was incontrovertible, 
and the press speculated that Rajoelina would not accept a 
return to Maputo as that would discredit him.  Rumors were 
circulating on Feb 22 that Rajoelina would replace his 
 
ANTANANARI 00000097  003 OF 004 
 
 
foreign minister, following the resignation of Ny Hasina 
Andriamanjato 10 days ago, with Maxime Zafera, Ratsiraka's 
former Ambassador to Switzerland and currently a senior 
advisor to HAT PM Vital (whom he accompanied to Addis last 
week).  Appointing new members to his unilateral cabinet 
would be an early sign that Rajoelina is not planning to 
implement power sharing. 
 
All Blame the French 
-------------------- 
¶8. (C) Mamy Rakotoarivelo, Ravalomanana's designate for 
transition congress president, asserted to Emboffs Feb 18 
that Rajoelina has continued his quest to govern solely, 
without respecting the Maputo accords, because of France's 
ambiguous position.  He espoused the popular belief that 
France does not want Ravalomanana to return, so therefore, 
does not condemn Rajoelina's actions.  Rakotoarivelo argued 
that if France adopted a firm position against TGV, who "is 
possibly reasonable", he would not be able to continue his 
unilateralism.  Rakotoarivelo decried France's continued 
military cooperation, albeit in fact insignificant, as 
symbolically detrimental.  Zafy's movement leader 
Rakotovahiny asserted that French FonMin Kouchner recently 
visited the Congo, current SADC President, to lobby Kabila to 
support TGV at the AU.  Many share the sentiment that any 
popularity Rajoelina may have had in the capital city has 
greatly diminished, and that he is being shored up by the 
French.  Rakotovahiny describe the 44 members of the HAT as 
mere opportunists who did not hold allegiance to TGV, or to 
the previous administrations with which they were affiliated. 
 Members of the AmCham Board noted that the French are 
"throwing money around to whoever has a project", so the HAT 
believes it can carry on without other donor support. 
 
HAT on Human Rights: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back 
------------------- 
¶9. (C) On February 16, likely spurred by the UN Human Rights 
Commission's Universal Periodic Review of Madagascar, the 
Malagasy authorities released two political prisoners 
(journalists on a pro-Ravalomanana radio station) from 
detention pending trial and lifted the arrest warrant against 
Ravalomanana's appointed Co-President, Fetison Andrianirina. 
While this was heralded as progress, the authorities 
continued to take measures to repress the freedom of speech 
and assembly of others.  Fetison told Reimer and Charge Feb 
19 that the government was pressuring the Malagasy Chamber of 
Commerce to cancel its contract with Ravalomanana's company 
TIKO for the Magro lot where peaceful, almost daily 
opposition rallies continue to be held.  Furthermore, the 
authorities told the Protestant association, FJKM -- closely 
allied with Ravalomanana -- that it must obtain approval 
before holding prayer meetings/political rallies on its 
private property in the center of Antananarivo.  According to 
Fetison, 12 law enforcement personnel attempted to arrest the 
leader of this movement the night of Feb 18, but he fled his 
house before they could arrest him.  The "Ecclesiastical 
Movement", mainly made up of FJKM pastors, held a prayer 
meeting/political rally in conjunction with the Ravalomanana 
movement on Feb 20.  They were denied permission to hold it 
at the main stadium downtown, but were authorized to use a 
stadium in the suburbs. 
 
Comment: The Military Must be Reassured 
-------- ------------------------------ 
¶10. (C) Rajoelina will likely not be able to weather the 
imposition of sanctions.  The HAT is imploding already and 
the economic situation continues to deteriorate rapidly.  The 
state's predatorial actions towards businesses are generating 
growing support for a resumption of law and order, even among 
some business owners who helped finance the coup.  The loss 
of AGOA has already provoked around 15,000 lost jobs and will 
cause another 30 to 40,000 in the next two months.  Support 
for TGV is waning; however, current military leaders (and TGV 
himself) are frightened by a possible return of Ravalomanana 
to power and the revenge they anticipate he would seek 
against them.  Coastal hardliners loosely aligned with TGV, 
including Marson Evariste, have stated that they'd rather 
have sanctions applied than Ravalomanana back.  The French 
are also opposed to Ravalomanana's return, fearing the likely 
chaos that would ensue following a disintegration of the HAT 
into competing factions.  Ravalomanana movement leader 
 
ANTANANARI 00000097  004 OF 004 
 
 
Fetison Andrianirina also shares this concern and told 
Emboffs that TGV should be maintained through the transition 
to hold his followers together. What the HAT without him is, 
is a good question.  If the military leaders could be 
reassured of their safety and their positions, they would 
likely withdraw their support from TGV, forcing him, or his 
successor, into renewed negotiations.  Fetison told us he has 
encouraged Ravalomanana to publicly announce that he won't 
run in the next presidential election, but to no avail, and 
has requested USG support for convincing his stubborn boss. 
 
Comment continued:  Will anyone go to the streets? 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
¶11. (C) None of the opposition figures met by Emboffs over 
the last week were willing to predict when, or even whether, 
there might be a truly popular response against the 
mis-governance of the HAT and Rajoelina, even after further 
sanctions or further deterioration of the economic situation. 
 One leader said, "it could be three days, three months, or 
three years from now,"  as the Malagasy people are remarkably 
tolerant, and equally unpredictable.  All invoked at one time 
or another the menace of "social explosion" or "civil war," 
but when asked to define who against what, or how, none could 
elaborate.  Rental crowds from one side or another contine to 
be a possibility (as in the past), but what either side could 
gain from renewed violent confrontation or violence 
attributable to them is unclear.  End comment. 
STROMAYER