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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANTANANARIVO 000077 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/E JAMES LIDDLE 
PARIS FOR WALLACE BAIN 
LONDON FOR PETER LORD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2018 
TAGS: PGOV MA
SUBJECT: (MORE) CONFUSION IN MADAGASCAR AS ICG APPROACHES 
 
REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 44 
     ¶B. ANTANANARIVO 68 
 
Classified By: POL/ECON CHIEF DOVIE HOLLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D. 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: As the International Contact Group on 
Madagascar (ICG-M) prepares to discuss Madagascar's ongoing 
crisis on February 18 in Addis Ababa, Antananarivo is buzzing 
with political intrigue, although facts remain scarce.  All 
four political movements have submitted their replies to AU 
Chairperson Jean Ping's January request concerning a return 
to the accords signed in Maputo and Addis Ababa in 2009. 
Zafy and Ratsiraka are generally amenable to the plan, and 
Ravalomanana has added a few caveats, while Rajoelina's 
fractious team produced their own "compromise" that 
reportedly was rejected immediately by Ping.  Rajoelina sent 
envoys to Addis on Thursday to negotiate with AU on possible 
firther comppppromises.  Vice Prime Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Ny Hasina Andriamanjato resigned on Feb 10, in 
protest over Rajoelina's intransigence, precipitating rumors 
of an impending cabinet reshuffle, or further principled 
resignations.  In the background, a diverse group of church 
leaders are growing more vocal in their opposition to the 
political stalemate, Ravalomanana's in-country representation 
is growing impatient and frustrated, rumors are circulating 
that former PM Roindefo Monja may be plotting a new coup, and 
the EU parliament has joined the fray with a firm 
denunciation of the de facto GOM and the current impasse. 
The only constant appears to be that all eyes are, once 
again, on Addis Ababa and the ICG, although there is little 
consensus on what they hope is achieved there. END SUMMARY. 
 
RAJOELINA LOSES FOREIGN MINISTER, FALLOUT UNCLEAR 
--------------------------------- --------------- 
¶2. (C) The departure of Ny Hasina Andriamanjato is 
significant; in a political culture generally unfamiliar with 
the concept of a principled resignation, his decision sends a 
message to the government and its recalcitrant supporters, 
although it is not clear that they will hear it. 
Andriamanjato has been one of Rajpoelina's closest and most 
mature allies since 2008, serving him first at the mayor's 
office in Antananarivo, and then following him through his 
rise to power in early 2009 to become Minister of Foreign 
Affairs after the March 17 coup.  He also remained a 
privileged embassy contact afterwards, regularly calling ont 
he ambassador at the CMR.  There were other factors at play: 
in a January 2009 discussion with Emboff, he cited "divine 
inspiration" in his decision to join Rajoelina, and never 
wavered in his belief that Ravalomanana would eventually 
fall.  Several months after the coup, however, he was among 
the first to understand the consequences of continued 
isolation, and came to represent the small "moderate" faction 
of the administration.  When attempts at engagement (through 
the ICG, the mediation team, and the various summits in 
Maputo and Addis Ababa) failed to produce international 
legitimacy or recognition, he slowly lost ground to 
hard-liners in the High Transition Authority.  Earlier this 
week, he staked his position on Rajoelina's choice to accept 
the Maputo/Addis accords.  The only surprise is that he 
actually followed through, when he handed his resignation to 
both Rajoelina and de facto PM Camille Vital on February 10. 
He called the ambassador on February 11 to explain his 
decision before it became public:  he said that he still 
wants to help Rajoelina, but hopes his resignation will help 
bring him around to supporting Maputo.  In the interim, 
hard-liner Norbert Lala Ratsirahonana has taken temporary 
responsibility for foreign affairs; this is unlikely to calm 
the opposition, and may presage a more assertive, and more 
ideological, voice from the MFA.  Rumors of an imminent 
cabinet shuffle are now circulating as well, although it is 
unclear how that would fit into the current schema as 
everyone waits for the ICG response next week.  Futher 
resignations are also a possibility. 
 
BELEAGUERED CO-PRESIDENT WANTS OUT 
---------------------------------- 
¶3. (C) Fetison Andrianirina, appointed co-president by 
Ravalomanana under the November 2009 Addis accord, told the 
Ambassador on February 10 that he is tired of living without 
his family, frustrated with his inability to make change, and 
wants out of his position.  He has been constantly blocked by 
Rajoelina, who issued a warrant for his arrest, forcing him 
to live in hiding.  He is also growing weary of mistreatment 
by his own boss, Ravalomanana, who is trying to keep him on 
too short of a leash, fails to listen to Fetison's advice, 
and is unwilling to set aside his personal ambitions to find 
a solution to the crisis.  Special Intervention Force (FIS, 
 
ANTANANARI 00000077  002 OF 004 
 
 
military unit reporting to Rajoelina) leaders COL Charles 
Andrianasoavina and COL Rene Lylison told Fetison that they 
were willing to back the Maputo and Addis accords as long as 
they could be assured that Ravalomanana, from whom they fear 
retribution, would not run in the next presidential election, 
which they allpresume he would win.  As this sentiment is 
shared by many, particularly in the military, Fetison 
attempted to encourage Ravalomanana to remain out of politics 
for a few years, but to no avail. 
 
¶4. (C) Fetison appears sincere in his concern for Madagascar 
and attempted to bring all sides together in an open 
discussion February 4.  Although around 280 participants 
attended, mainly from the "silent majority" but also from the 
Zafy and Ratsiraka movements, the HAT boycotted and 
Ravalomanana told his own movement not to support the effort. 
 He also said that the French Ambassador had approached 
Ravalomanana supporter  Mamy Rakotoarivelo (who was appointed 
head of the still unformed transition congress) to encourage 
his camp to compromise by accepting TGV's Prime Minister 
Camille Vital staying on as the "consensus" PM, and replacing 
Fetison with a new co-president, preferably a woman.  Fetison 
noted that Vital was on good terms with the military leaders 
"of the day", but would likely not be accepted by 
Ravalomanana. 
 
PASTORS SPURRED INTO ACTION 
--------------------------- 
¶5. (C) Six Protestant pastors involved in a budding 
"Ecclesiastical Movement" explained to the Ambassador on 
February 10 that they had been spurred into political action 
by the lack of democracy and rule of law, growing insecurity, 
human rights abuses, poverty, and attacks against churches. 
Another contact reported separately to Emboff that churches 
that were known to have received financial or other support 
from Ravalomanana, an ardent Protestant, were being targeted 
by the de facto GOM.  At least three of the pastors in the 
movement are subject to arrest warrants, and the leaders of 
the movement are spied on and followed. 
 
¶6. (C) They have already held two services in Antsahamanitra 
(FJKM property in Tana) to call for a return to democracy, 
and claim that most Malagasy just want a return to rule of 
law, so they have a high level of support.  Although not all 
Protestants are in agreement with politicization of the 
church, they claim that hundreds of Protestant and some 
Anglican and Lutheran pastors support their movement 
(although the Catholics are notably absent).  The new 
Anglican head of the FFKM, a local  association of the 
Protestant, Anglican, Lutheran, and Catholic churches, is 
taking a cautious approach in order to avoid deeper divisions 
within the association.  The Anglicans have, however, planned 
a prayer service for the nation on February 12 and plan to 
call for everyone to return to reason, according to the 
pastors. 
 
¶7. (C) The Ecclesiastical Movement is planning to hold a 
large prayer service, followed by a procession through town, 
and will request permission from the authorities to use the 
main stadium in the capital (Mahamasina).  They have 
provisionally scheduled the event for February 20, but will 
base their action on the result of the February 18 ICG 
meeting in Addis Ababa, so may postpone if the 
AU/international community response is not yet clear.  They 
expressed concern that Rajoelina was inflexible and confident 
due to French backing, and urged the U.S. to act as a 
diplomatic counterweight.  The Ambassador explained that the 
entire international community, including the French, was now 
pressuring Rajoelina to compromise. 
 
FOUR MOVEMENTS RESPOND TO PING 
------------------------------ 
¶8. (C) In January, AU Chairperson Jean Ping travelled to 
Antananarivo to propose a compromise solution to the current 
political impasses (ref A); he gave the four movements 15 
days to respond, in writing, at which time the ICG would 
reconvene to discuss their options.  The movements have 
responded, and a meeting of the ICG has been scheduled for 
February 18 at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. 
Fortunately, no party has completely rejected a renewed 
effort to implement the structures outlined in the Maputo and 
Addis accords, but particularly Rajoelina's position stops 
short of a clear endorsement to pick up where they left off 
in November.  Rajoelina's proposal reflects the facts that 
the French support the maintenance of PM Vital and dismissal 
of Mangalaza, and that he is limited in his maneuvering by 
hardliners in his increasingly fractured movement. 
 
ANTANANARI 00000077  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
- ZAFY and RATSIRAKA have generally endorsed Ping's proposal. 
 Athough Zafy expressed hesitation at the idea that Rajoelina 
would remain head of state (ref B), he has not rejected the 
possibility, and has imposed no new conditions.  Ratsiraka 
requested that the presidential election be held prior to the 
legislative elections, rather than simultaneously as Ping 
suggested, and also expressed hesitation to Rajoelina keeping 
his current position. 
 
- RAVALOMANANA stated that he accepts the compromise 
proposal, but introduced several "observations" for 
consideration.  These include a change in the wording 
concerning the co-presidents to increase their authority, 
empowerment of the cabinet to decide who replaces the 
president in case of absence, the granting to his movement of 
the ministerial posts submitted to Prime Minister Mangalaza 
in November (foreign affairs, agriculture, commerce, 
transport, higher education, and decentralization), and the 
holding of presidential and legislative elections separately. 
 Tellingly, he also suggested a change in how a vacancy in 
the presidency would be filled, proposing consensus among the 
four movements in the place of allowing the Rajoelina 
movement to do it unilaterally. 
 
- RAJOELINA's proposal keeps some elements of Maputo, but 
rejects others, diminishing the power of the other three 
movements.  He proposed that the unity government would be 
formed by his unilaterally-appointed PM Vital, based on names 
provided by the other three movements.  Vital, who would 
become the "consensus" PM, would decide which names would be 
matched with which portfolios.  Elections for a 
legislature/constituent assembly would occur in May; a new 
cabinet would then be formed based on party rankings in those 
elections.  The legislature would organize a national 
conference to rewrite the constitution and then the new 
government would organize presidential elections in November. 
 The other three movements will likely reject the proposal 
because it weakens their power under the Maputo and Addis 
accords; it fails to mention Zafy's national reconciliation 
council, excludes Ravalomanana's congress, unilaterally 
replaces consensus PM Mangalaza, and indicates a strong 
preference to eliminate the co-presidents.  But it concludes 
by inviting the AU and/or ICG to arbitrate a solution.  Ping 
reportedly rejected the Rajoelina proposal upon receipt, so 
Rajoelina dispatched his Chief of Staff Zazah to Addis on 
Thursday to negotiate a possible revised version. 
 
EU PARLIAMENT DENOUNCES COUP, HR VIOLATIONS 
----------------------------- ------------- 
¶9. (C) The EU parliament passed an extremely critical 
resolution on February 11 against the HAT, denouncing the 
coup d'etat, Rajoelina's unilateral actions, his failure to 
implement the Maputo and Addis accords, human rights 
violations (harassment, arbitrary arrests and torture, press 
intimidation, and pillage of churches), the HAT's 
monopolization of power, the authorization of unprocessed 
wood exports endangering the country's biodiversity, 
systematic repression of the opposition, and detention of 
opponents without charges.  The resolution further condemned 
Rajoelina's decision to boycott the Maputo III negotiations, 
called for a return to talks and the immediate implementation 
of the Maputo and Addis agreements, mandated targeted 
sanctions against members of the HAT if they failed to 
implement those agreements, and demanded an account by the 
European Commission on the status of the Article 96 
consultations regarding the future of 600 million Euros of 
aid under the Cotonou Agreement.  The main pro-HAT newspaper 
vehemently protested some of the characterizations of 
Madagascar and the HAT, particularly the European 
parliament's "concern about the disappearance of several 
hundred people" and its call for the establishment of a 
disarmament process and the disbanding of militia.  Post is 
unaware of "disappearances" conducted by the HAT and agrees 
that the language may be somewhat exaggerated, but overall, 
the resolution is a welcome contribution that is helping 
place additional pressure on the HAT to reconsider its 
intransigent ways. 
 
COUP PLOTS, ASSASSINATIONS, AND SUNDRY RUMORS ABOUND 
--------------------------- ------------------------ 
¶10. (C) On February 11, Emboff met with two individuals, both 
well-connected to the current government, who claimed to have 
direct knowledge of an imminent plan for Roindefo Monja to 
launch a coup against Rajoelina's government, allegedly 
within the following 48 hours.  Such plans are not beyond the 
imagination of the disgruntled former PM, and he has been 
 
ANTANANARI 00000077  004 OF 004 
 
 
incrementally raising his profile over the past two months 
(including in a recent meeting with Ambassador Marquardt, 
which he publicized within minutes of leaving the Chancery). 
However, Post cannot corroborate the claim, and the sources' 
attempts to link it with current unrest within an 
Antananarivo gendarme unit were spurious, at best.  They also 
echoed months-old rumors of a plot to assassinate Rajoelina, 
although they added former consensus PM Eugene Mangalaza to 
the list of possible targets, stating that combined attempts 
on their lives would spur a coastal/highland conflict that 
would allow hard-line members of the HAT to seize power, and 
provide the military with an excuse for direct intervention. 
These individuals were unable to provide any evidence, or 
other sources, to back up their claims, but they reflect 
widespread (if overstated) sentiment that the current impasse 
may come to violence, after almost a year of political 
infighting. 
 
¶11. (C) COMMENT: Rumors such as those in para 10 are not new, 
and their source has no more credibility than any of the 
disaffected activists that exist on all sides of the 
conflict.  With the ICG meeting around the corner, however, 
and Rajoelina's government looking weaker than ever in the 
wake of Andriamanjato's resignation, there is increasing 
concern among our contacts that something has to give - 
although we've been here before.  The only constant among 
them all is their current attention on the international 
community, with each side convinced that the ICG's meeting 
next week will be decisive, one way or another.  Despite 
increasing consensus among members of the ICG, however, there 
is no middle ground that will please all of these voices. END 
COMMENT. 
MARQUARDT