INFO  LOG-00   AID-00   AMAD-00  CIAE-00  INL-00   DODE-00  PERC-00  
      DS-00    DHSE-00  EUR-00   VCI-00   H-00     TEDE-00  INR-00   
      IO-00    LAB-01   MOFM-00  MOF-00   CDC-00   VCIE-00  NSAE-00  
      ISN-00   NIMA-00  MCC-00   GIWI-00  ISNE-00  DOHS-00  FMPC-00  
      SP-00    IRM-00   SSO-00   SS-00    NCTC-00  R-00     SCRS-00  
      DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-00   G-00     SAS-00   FA-00    SWCI-00  
      PESU-00    /001W
    
O 020741Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3273
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T ANTANANARIVO 000056 
 
 
ADDIS PASS AF/AS JOHNNIE CARSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR:  TGV'S CHOICES:  ACCEPT PING PROPOSAL 
OR LEAVE OFFICE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Niels Marquardt for reasons 1.5 d and e. 
 
¶1.  (S)  Summary:  Finally exasperated with Rajoelina's 
incompetence, a group from within his inner circle and the 
military will give him a stark:  accept the Ping/AU 
"compromise" proposal, or stand aside to allow a consensual 
council to run Madagascar until elections.  Rajoelina returns 
today from Paris and will be presented with this choice later 
this week.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Presidential Chief of Staff Zazah Ramandimbarasoa 
(strictly protect) came to see me discreetly at the residence 
this morning.  He had just returned from Addis where, with 
Foreign Minister Ny Hasina Andriamanjato, they had met with 
Ramtane Lamamra of the AU, the French and EU Ambassadors, and 
UN Under Secretary Lynn Pascoe and UN Political Affairs 
Director Haile Menkerios.  He said they all had the same 
tough message:  agree to consensus as proposed by Jean Ping, 
or sanctions and isolation will follow.  The situation, he 
said, is very difficult. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Zazah said he and others in the inner circle are 
preparing a letter to Jean Ping for TGV to sign when he 
returns from his private visit to Paris (perhaps later 
today).  The draft lettter essentially accepts the compromise 
proposal Ping left here on January 22.  Zazah explained that 
some face-saving provisions, particularly involving the 
departure from the co-presidency of Ravalomanana nominee 
Fetison Rakoto Andrianirina, would have to be managed, as 
Fetison and Rajoelina can no longer work together, he said. 
I told him that Fetison had told me he would not insist on 
holding his position if leaving would permit a resolution of 
the crisis, but that the issue needed to be worked in a 
consensual way involving all the parties -- not forced 
unilaterally on Ravalomanana and Fetison.  He also raised the 
issue of the consensus prime minister, suggesting -- but not 
insisting -- that Camille Vital might stay on in place of 
Eugene Mangalaza.  I questioned whether Ravalomanana would 
accept Vital, who makes no effort to hide his dislike for the 
former President (whom he blames for ending his military 
career), but suggested that they continue to work on this as 
a package.  The U.S., I said, will accept whatever compromise 
the Malagasy themselves can agree upon. 
 
¶4.  (S)  Zazah then went into a long monologue about 
Rajoelina's incompetence, lack of decision-making ability, 
immaturity, instability, and general unfitness for his 
position.  He regretted the rampant lawlessness, non-respect 
of human rights, and the despoilation of Madagadscar's 
natural resources for short-term gain under HAT rule.  "The 
track record on governance is terrible", he said.  He allowed 
that he is not optimistic that Rajoelina will accept to sign 
the draft letter, in which case he and others have developed 
a Plan B.  Plan B is for Rajoelina to "step aside" in favor 
of a council or directorate composed of respected technocrats 
from across the political spectrum and perhaps some military 
officers.  The council will then lead the country forward 
consensually to elections.  He said Rajoelina will not want 
to accept this -- "his ego is too big" -- but the backing of 
the military for this plan -- which Zazah says he enjoys -- 
will help TGV realize that he has no choice.  I insisted 
three times that another coup is not what Madagascar needs, 
and each time Zazah assured me that this will not be a coup, 
that the transition will amount to a consensual act, albeit 
one about which Rajoelina will have no choice.  I asked who 
else is involved and he offered me an impressive list of TGV 
insiders and respected Generals who he said are behind Plan 
¶B.  Military support is the key, he said. 
 
¶5.  (C)  We then discussed ongoing efforts to create the 
consensus necessary for implementing the Ping proposal.  I 
again deplored the arrest warrant against Co-President 
Fetison and explained my effort over the weekend to broker a 
meeting between Fetison and Camille Vital (which never took 
place).  Zazah said Vital is among those on board with his 
plan and that he expects to be present later today when 
Fetison and Vital do finally meet.  (He then called Vital in 
my presence to confirm this meeting.)  I suggested that all 
the movements, including the moderates in the HAT, accept the 
invitation Fetison has sent out to the entire spectrum of 
political opinion and civil society for an "inclusive 
meeting" this Thursday and Friday at the Carlton Hotel.  I 
said that the HAT has proven incapable of rallying any 
consensus, but could contribute to one by responding 
positively to the Fetison initiative.  Zazah seemed to agree 
and said he would discuss this later today with Vital and 
Fetison.  He agreed that time was extremely short before the 
Ping deadline expires and that there is no time to wait for 
other initiatives if sanctions and isolation are to be 
avoided. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Regarding the threat of sanctions, I asked Zazah 
whether he thought that TGV was taking this seriously.  Zazah 
said that the Paris visit, during which TGV spoke directly to 
Elysee Sec-Gen Claude Gueant, finally had removed the last 
doubt and hope from TGV's mind on this issue.  Everyone, 
Zazah said, is now saying exactly the same thing, and there 
is no alternative left to accepting the Ping proposal (or 
Plan B).  He said the French must now be thinking beyond TGV, 
looking for an acceptable alternative to come to power 
through elections.  "That's how they are -- not loyal, and 
not sentimental," he opined.  Zazah said he discounts rumors 
that Total is behind TGV:  "they too are looking for 
alternatives."  He mentioned individual French politicians, 
including the French Senator for the Indian Ocean, as people 
who have been falsely assuring TGV that he can stand pat, but 
said that their promises are no longer credible to TGV. 
Zazah said he would also "talk to the French", but noted that 
Ambassador Chataigner is still in Paris.  He said their 
charge d'affaires here is too closely linked to TGV Advisor 
(and dual national) Patrick Leloup; Leloup is a petty crook, 
Zazah said (and we agree), who has been giving TGV bad advice 
while going around shaking down businesses and looting the 
country. He therefore will not be speaking to the French 
charge. 
 
¶7.  (S)  Comment:  This move toward a "council" is not 
entirely a surprise, although its origin so deep within TGV's 
inner circle -- rather than within the military -- was not 
expected.  At the same time, the gap between talk and action 
remains wide in Madagascar, and may remain so in this case 
too.  For our parts, we will continue to push all parties 
together toward consensus as the AU deadline approaches.  End 
Comment. 
 
 
MARQUARDT