VZCZCXRO3782
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAN #0114/01 0570520
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 260520Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3373
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0238
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANTANANARIVO 000114 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E JAMES LIDDLE 
PARIS FOR WALLACE BAIN 
LONDON FOR PETER LORD 
NSC FOR MGAVIN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MA AU
SUBJECT: AU MOVES TOWARD SANCTIONS, FOLLOWING ICG-M CONDEMNATION 
 
REF: A) ANTANANARIVO 44 
B) ANTANANARIVO 97 
C) ADDIS ABABA 12 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On February 19, the African Union's Peace and 
Security Council (PSC) decided on targeted sanctions against 
Madagascar's coup leaders, giving them a final deadline of March 16 
to implement the 2009 Maputo/Addis accords in good faith.  Although 
France and China blocked such precise language in the final 
communique during the International Contact Group on Madagascar 
(ICG-M) the previous day, most of the international community was in 
agreement that these accords represent the only way forward, and 
that de facto president Andry "TGV" Rajoelina's political movement 
is the key impediment to their implementation.  There was 
disagreement in the ICG-M over the extent to which Rajoelina was 
"showing progress" in his engagement with the international 
community, but most found recent statements from the de facto GOM to 
be unhelpful, provocative, and contrary to finding a solution.  In 
the five weeks since the ICG-M had last met in January, there has 
been no progress in forming a unity government, or in addressing the 
growing economic and social problems in Madagascar.  Senior mediator 
Joaquim Chissano agreed to try to organize a final round of talks 
among the four Malagasy political leaders in Addis, possibly 
starting March 1, to reach agreement on implementation of the 
Maputo/Addis framework.  This credible threat of AU sanctions 
provides a new and necessary tool to back Chissano's efforts, but we 
and most other observers here expect TGV to continue to flout the AU 
and international community, rather than comply.  END SUMMARY. 
 
ICG-M: DIVISIONS PERSIST, BUT MAJORITY RULES 
------------------------ ------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) In his January visit to Madagascar, AU Commission 
Chairperson  Jean Ping presented a proposal, based on the 2009 
Maputo/Addis agreements, for forming a unity government and 
organizing credible elections as soon as possible; each of the four 
movements was to respond within 15 days (ref A).  Former presidents 
Ratsiraka, Zafy, and Ravalomanana responded favorably and on time, 
while Rajoelina submitted an unacceptable response, several days 
late.  Ping promptly rejected it, stating that it "failed to meet 
the expectations of the international community", leading Rajoelina 
to submit a second response, dated February 16.  In the interim, 
both senior mediator  Chissano and AU Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra 
met with delegations from the HAT in Maputo to discuss the 
proposals, and to coordinate the efforts of the AU and SADC. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The second Rajoelina response also failed to respond 
favorably to Ping's proposal.  The first (dated Feb 5) had kept COL 
Camille Vital as PM, questioned the need for the Presidential 
Council, proposed that Vital and Rajoelina determine the cabinet 
composition, eliminated all other transition institutions except the 
High Council of the Transition (CST, equivalent to the Senate, and, 
under the Maputo/Addis accords, was to be headed by a Rajoelina 
appointee), and announced plans to hold elections in May.  The 
second (dated Feb 16) grudgingly accepts the Presidential Council - 
but empowers Rajoelina to select his co-presidents from lists 
proposed by Zafy and Ravalomanana.  It insists on retaining Vital as 
PM, and grants him the authority to select ministers from lists 
proposed by the three opposition movements.  As in the first 
response, it provides for the formation of a CST, but considers the 
other transition institutions (all to be headed by other political 
movements) as "unjustified, given the short duration of the 
transition period".  Details on a revised electoral code and the 
formation of the electoral commission (CENI) are left blurry and 
essentially in the hands of Vital.  Finally, it makes all of these 
provisions contingent on a commitment that elections for a 
Constituent Assembly (which was not foreseen in the Maputo/Addis 
agreements) will be held in May 2010. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The French delegation, led by MFA A/S for Africa equivalent 
Stephane Gompertz, took an optimistic view: Rajoelina's continued 
engagement, and the relative "softening" of his position between the 
two versions above, was to be encouraged.  The AU Commission 
leadership, senior mediator Chissano, and almost every other 
delegation present, however, saw the two responses simply as varying 
degrees of a bad faith effort to appease the ICG while surrendering 
nothing to the opposition.  The delegations from Nigeria, 
Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Malawi came out 
forcefully in favor of ending this nearly year-long debacle, and 
provided an effective balance against French objections that 
 
ANTANANARI 00000114  002 OF 003 
 
 
ultimately required little assistance from the United States and 
other European delegations.  Deputy Assistant Secretary Karl Wycoff 
confirmed the USG's intention to follow the AU's lead on sanctions, 
reiterated US concern about the degrading human rights situation in 
Madagascar, and raised the need for a specific endpoint should 
further mediation fail to yield results.  Chissano responded 
specifically to Rajoelina's letters, methodically rebutting each 
element listed in para 3 before stating that the Feb 16 letter 
"completely disregarded Ping's [January] compromise".  He also added 
some useful context: Vital had called him the previous night to 
inform him that "it's up to the ICG to decide if they want to 
sanction, but we [the de facto government] will find a way around 
them if you do". 
 
¶5. (SBU) In its final communique, the ICG-M recognized that 
Rajoelina's response was "not fully consistent with the proposals 
for compromise solutions", and empowered Ping and Chissano to resume 
their work to implement the Maputo/Addis agreements.  In the event 
of continued impasse, it called on members to take measures, 
possibly "including further sanctions", against those who are 
impeding progress.  The ICG-M continues to agree that elections are 
the ultimate means to restoring democracy, but recognizes that a 
functioning and inclusive transition government is a vital step to 
getting there.  This amounted to a firm condemnation of Rajoelina's 
continued intransigence, did not oblige any members to impose 
sanctions if they didn't wish to, and left the ball squarely in the 
AU's court to determine the path forward.  Chissano closed the ICG-M 
on February 18 by stating his intent to convene a final meeting in 
Addis of Madagascar's four political leaders, possibly starting 
March 1, to reach agreement on outstanding issues regarding 
implementation of the Maputo/Addis framework.  (Curiously, word of 
this plan has not become public in Antananarivo.) 
 
AU PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL: SERIOUS AT LAST 
------------------------------ --------------- 
¶6. (SBU) The AU PSC met on February 19, with the ICG-M decision in 
hand, and the day-old military takeover in Niger still ringing in 
their ears.  Ping presented a lengthy report on the situation in 
Madagascar, recounting the AU's involvement and actions to date, and 
summarizing the movements' responses (see paras 2 and 3) to his 
January proposal.  He regretted the continued failure to implement 
the Maputo/Addis agreements, and stated that although responsibility 
for this failure is shared, "the Rajoelina camp is alone in not 
supporting the proposals that [Ping] presented on January 22...and 
has continued to take unilateral measures which cannot but result in 
additional difficulties." 
 
¶7. (SBU) Ping called for the AU to "definitively turn the page" on 
coups d'etat and other forms of unconstitutional change of 
government, and supported sanctions against the de facto GOM and 
"all individuals and entities...[which contribute] to the 
unconstitutional status quo."  In its communique, released later 
that day, the PSC affirmed its support of this view, demanded that 
the de facto GOM accept the Maputo and Addis agreements, and decided 
to impose sanctions if "the authorities borne out of the 
unconstitutional change do not comply" by March 16.  These sanctions 
would consist of three parts; following is a transcription of the 
specific language presented in the communique.  The sanctions would 
include: 
 
[Begin transcription] 
 
(i) a travel ban against all members of the institutions set up by 
the de facto authorities borne out of the unconstitutional change 
and all other individual members of the Rajoelina camp whose actions 
impede the AU and Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) 
efforts to restore constitutional order. In this respect, Council 
decides that these measures shall be without prejudice to exemptions 
that it may decide to grant, on a case-by-case 
basis, at its own initiative or upon request, on humanitarian 
grounds or for requirements linked to the negotiations for a way out 
of the crisis [...]; 
 
(ii) the freezing of funds, other financial assets and economic 
resources of all individuals and entities contributing, in one way 
or another, to the maintenance of the unconstitutional status quo 
and impeding the AU and SADC efforts to restore constitutional 
order. In this respect, Council decides that these measures shall be 
without prejudice to exemptions that it may grant, at its own 
 
ANTANANARI 00000114  003 OF 003 
 
 
initiative or upon request, to facilitate basic needs and expenses 
[...]; 
 
(iii) the diplomatic isolation of the de facto authorities borne out 
of unconstitutional change, through concerted action by Member 
States to challenge the participation of the representatives of 
these de facto authorities in the activities of non-African 
international organizations, including the United Nations and its 
agencies and other 
concerned bodies. 
 
[End transcription] 
 
¶8. (SBU) The PSC communique calls on partners (including the UN, the 
EU, and the UNSC P5) to support this decision, and refrain from any 
action which could undermine these efforts.  It also instructs the 
AU Commission, in collaboration with SADC, to "establish the list of 
individuals and entities [to be sanctioned]", to be delivered to AU 
member states and partners "if necessary".  This list is currently 
rumored to include 77 individuals, from the de facto presidency, the 
cabinet, and the 41-member "High Transitional Authority". 
 
FINALLY, A RESOLUTION WITH TEETH 
-------------------------------- 
¶9. (SBU) COMMENT: The February 18 meeting of the ICG, and the 
subsequent meeting of the PSC, benefitted from three key 
developments since the January 6 ICG-M (ref C).  First, it has 
become increasingly obvious that a rush to elections is not a 
panacea, and that the structure and composition of the transition 
government is of vital importance in finding a credible resolution 
to this crisis.  French attempts to define recent developments as 
"progress" no longer hold much water, and few (if any) in the ICG 
were swayed by such arguments. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Second, the dynamic between the AU and SADC has improved 
significantly since then.  Chissano found himself sidelined and 
somewhat ignored in January, whereas this time he was seated next to 
Ping and Lamamra on the dais, with a strong and equal voice in 
leading the discussion.  This allows the AU (Ping) to comfortably 
retain political control over the process, while enabling SADC 
(Chissano) to engage in the direct mediation, without stepping on 
each other's toes. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Third, in addition to its focus on stopping 
unconstitutional changes of government in Africa, the AU discussed 
Madagascar in its recent 14th Ordinary Session of the Assembly, and 
"expressed deep concern over the continuing political crisis" in the 
country.  The Assembly decision to affirm support for the 
Maputo/Addis agreements, and for AU and SADC efforts to seek their 
implementation, gave the ICG and the AU Commission yet another 
reference point and basis for determining their next steps. 
 
¶12. (SBU) These ICG-M and AU PSC decisions give Chissano a useful 
and necessary tool for a final attempt at mediation, backed up now 
by a credible threat of sanctions.  Unfortunately, Rajoelina remains 
in a precarious position atop a fractious political alliance and 
under continuous threat from hardliners strongly opposed to further 
concessions.  The new threat of sanctions is therefore unlikely, in 
our view and that of most observers here, to change his position 
regarding Maputo/Addis (ref B).  Rajoelina has not made any public 
statements since the ICG-M, although media reports indicate that he 
still plans on elections in May.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶13. (U) This cable was cleared by Joel Maybury (USAU), but was not 
reviewed by Deputy Assistant Secretary Wycoff (AF). 
 
MARQUARDT