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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000112 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/E JAMES LIDDLE 
PARIS FOR WALLACE BAIN 
LONDON FOR PETER LORD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2020 
TAGS: PGOV MA
SUBJECT: CONTROVERSIAL MILITARY FIGURE NAMED NEW FOREIGN 
MINISTER 
 
REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 77 
     ¶B. ANTANANARIVO 97 
     ¶C. ANTANANARIVO 112 
 
Classified By: POL/ECON CHIEF DOVIE HOLLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D. 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Vice-Admiral Hyppolite Ramaroson was named 
Vice Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs on February 24, and 
sworn in today.  He takes over an important ministry at a 
crucial moment, with AU sanctions looming if the de facto GOM 
fails to implement the 2009 Maputo/Addis accords (ref c) by 
March 16.  The appointment of yet another senior military 
figure to the cabinet (which already contains three officers, 
two of which were active duty at the time of their 
appointment) has further reinforced the impression that de 
facto President Andry "TGV" Rajoelina is worried about feeble 
military support, although personal animosity towards 
Ramaroson within the armed forces will do little to improve 
stability.  This unilateral appointment sends a strong and 
negative signal that Rajoelina is intent on ignoring the AU 
ultimatum and has no intention of forming a true unity 
government, and makes Rajoelina look weaker than ever atop 
his fractious ruling coalition.  Ramaroson's appointment will 
not bridge differences within the armed forces, nor will it 
comfort moderates or opposition politicians who might have 
hoped that the threat of sanctions would soften Rajoelina's 
position.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) Following several days of rumors, de facto President 
Andry "TGV" Rajoelina announced on February 24 that 
Vice-Admiral Hyppolite Ramaroson would become Vice Prime 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, replacing Ny Hasina 
Andriamanjato, who had resigned on February 10 (ref A). 
After his appointment, Ramarason stated in the media that 
"(his) principal mission is to explain to the international 
community what really happened in Madagascar", resorting to a 
common tactic among de facto GOM officials.  Unwilling to 
assume responsibility for the coup perpetrated in March 2009 
(or even to recognize it as such), he will attempt to 
"correct" the international community's perception of the 
facts. This strategy was already deployed to no avail in 
January and February, when several GOM officials were sent on 
mission abroad to do just that.  It is unlikely that 
Ramaroson will be any more effective than his predecessor, 
Andriamanjato, or other experienced HAT advisors such as 
Norbert Lala Ratsirahonana. 
 
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
------------------ 
¶3. (SBU) Ironically, Vice-Admiral Ramaroson was named 
president of a military directorate by former President Marc 
Ravalomanana on March 17, 2009, but, almost certainly under 
extreme pressure from the putschists, he handed power over to 
Rajoelina later that same day.  He has since generally 
remained out of the spotlight, although he acconmpanied 
Rajoelina to Article 96 consultations in Brussels in 
mid-2009, where he tried to convince the EU that Rajoelina's 
assumption of power had been constitutional and uncoerced. 
His name was also floated in December 2009 as a possible 
Prime Minister to replace Eugene Mangalaza, but COL Camille 
Vital was selected instead. (NOTE: Ramaroson is a common last 
name, and he is not related to the notorious Alain Ramaroson, 
a businessman turned politician who currently heads the HAT 
defense committee, or any other high-profile Ramarosons 
currently in government.) 
 
¶4. (C) Ramaroson served as Chief of Staff of the Ministry of 
Defense in 2004, under Minister of Defense GEN Behajaina 
Petera.  Prior to that, starting in 2002, he worked in the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock as Secretary of State 
for Fisheries. From 1997 to 2002, Ramaroson served as Chief 
of International Relations and Maritime and Coastal Security 
advisor at the Ministry of the Armed Forces (later renamed to 
Ministry of Defense, and then back to Armed Forces in 2009). 
His boss was General Marcel Ranjeva, who then served as 
Foreign Minister, until last year.  Ranjeva told the 
Ambassador today that Ramarason's appointment was a mistake 
reflecting Rajoelina's poor grasp of the situation.  While 
Ranjeva said Ramarason had been responsible for foreign 
relations within the MOD, he also said that "he knows nothing 
of diplomacy, and now is no time for OJT." 
 
¶5. (C) His academic career began at College Saint Michel in 
Amparibe, followed by Institution Sainte Famille Mahamasina, 
both in Madagascar.  He studied at the Antsirabe Military 
Academy from 1971 to 1974, then in France at the C.S. Naval 
 
ANTANANARI 00000112  002 OF 002 
 
 
School of Lanveoc-Poulmic in Brest, France, from 1974 to 
¶1976.  He returned to France in 1993-1994, to study at the 
Interservice Defence College/Ecole Superieure de Guerre in 
Paris. 
 
¶6. (C) Ramaroson has also studied on USG programs at the 
College of Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii, the United 
Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, and the 
United States Naval Justice School.  He has participated in 
NATO exercises in France, Spain, and Ireland, and also worked 
on a peace-keeping force in Seychelles.  He speaks Malagasy, 
French, and English. 
 
AN UNLIKELY APPOINTMENT 
----------------------- 
¶7. (C) Despite his impressive resume and standing as 
Madagascar's seniormost active-duty military officer, the de 
facto Minister of Defense (GEN Noel Rakotonandrasana) and the 
Army Chief of Staff (GEN Andre Ndriarijoana) consider 
Ramaroson very corrupt, and DAO has linked him to past abuses 
of power and bribery concerning USG assistance programs. 
Immediately after Ramarason was handed power in March 2009, 
both Rakotonandrasana and Ndriarijoana expressed to 
Ambassador Marquardt their shock and dismay over his 
appointment, stating angrily that they could not accept him. 
This reaction precipitated their intervention later that day 
in, most likely, coercing Ramarason to transfer power to 
Rajoelina.  It is unlikely that their feelings about him have 
changed, creating a cabinet rife with animosities.  (We do 
not yet have a fix on Ramarason's relationship, if any, with 
the far-more-junior HAT Prime Minister, Col. Vital.) 
 
¶8. (C) Rajoelina's motives for appointing Ramaroson remain 
unclear, although there are several lines of reasoning that 
may have played a role.  As Ramarason was Ravalomanana's 
appointed successor in March 2009, it is possible that 
Rajoelina may consider his appointment a gesture of openness 
to the opposition and to the international community. 
Likewise, it may be a misguided attempt to appease the 
200-plus generals sidelined and leap-frogged by the upstart 
CAPSAT Colonels in March who now run the military.  He may 
consider this a way of neutralizing or appeasing 
pro-Ravalomanana officers who could upset the current tenuous 
peace within the military.  Neither of these explanations 
demonstrate an accurate reading of the situation within the 
Malagasy military or the position of the international 
community, but may reflect the sometimes bizarre views of 
Rajoelina and his advisors.  Presidential Chief of Staff 
Zazah, whom we consider responsible and moderate,told the 
Ambassador early on Febuary 24 that he had recommended former 
Ambassador Maxime Zafera for the position; Ramarason's 
appointment thus shows again the limited influence of the few 
moderates around Rajoelina. 
 
THE AU DEADLINE: 19 DAYS TILL SANCTIONS 
--------------------------------------- 
¶9. (C) COMMENT: With four military officers now holding 
senior positions in the de facto GOM (Foreign Minister 
Ramaroson, Prime Minister Vital, Minister of the Environment 
Calixte, and Minister of Defense Rakotonandrasana), it is 
clear that Rajoelina is either concerned about a military 
take-over, or that he is under the thumb of hard-liners and 
unable to heed moderates even were he so inclined.  Indeed, 
some observers are talking about the ongoing creation of a 
"stealth" military directorate.  However, this appointment 
will do little to address fractures within the military, 
given the personal animosity between Ramaroson and current 
military leadership, and is instead more likely to worsen 
them.  If Rajoelina ignores the March 16 AU deadline for the 
implementation of the 2009 Maputo/Addis accords, members of 
his government will face sanctions.  Given the unilateral 
nature of this appointment, it appears that Rajoelina has 
either decided to take that route, or has lost control over 
the composition of his government.  Finally, the approach of 
sanctions, if not checked, will increase pressure on some 
officers within the military to "assume their 
responsibilities" by taking matters into their own hands. 
End comment. 
MARQUARDT