VZCZCXRO3218
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAN #0111/01 0561433
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 251433Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3369
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000111 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E-JLIDDLE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL FR MA
SUBJECT: LOCAL FRENCH VIEWS ON MALAGASY CRISIS 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Although the French government may be outwardly 
in synch with the rest of the international community, discussions 
with local French representatives indicate that do not plan to "lay 
down the law," in a clear, non-ambiguous way, to Andry "TGV" 
Rajoelina and the HAT.  They continue to support the idea of early 
elections, even if imperfect, as the French are extremely 
pessimistic about the ability of sanctions, the Maputo/Addis 
Accords, and/or further negotiations led by Chissano to solve the 
political crisis.  The French government has reduced its military 
aid to Madagascar, but does not plan to make further cuts to 
bilateral aid programs, even if EU funds are cut following the 
closure of discussions under the Cotonou Accord, now expected in 
March.  End summary. 
 
No Sanctions, Elections Instead 
------------  ----------------- 
¶2.  (SBU) The French Ambassador, accompanied by three colleagues, 
hosted the U.S. Ambassador and three colleagues at a working lunch 
to discuss Madagascar's political crisis Feb 23.  The French 
Ambassador questioned the utility of sanctions targeting the HAT, 
arguing that they wouldn't help solve the crisis, but may rather 
produce a counter-productive nationalist surge that reinforced TGV. 
 He argued that 85 percent of the Malagasy population who are 
apolitical should not be punished by further economic deterioration 
due to the failures of a few politicians.  He reiterated their 
belief that rapid elections, and the avoidance of a Cote d'Ivoire 
scenario, were the best, practical option for ending the crisis, and 
stated categorically that "there will be elections."  The HAT has 
already begun revising the electoral lists.  Although a rapid 
election could not be perfect, no election could be, even if the 
Malagasy had six years to prepare, the head of French Cooperation 
argued.  The French Ambassador added that elections had been skewed 
under Ravalomanana and could easily be skewed again. 
 
Maputo Will Not Work 
-------------------- 
¶3. (SBU) The French Ambassador argued that TGV's compromise offer to 
the AU and the ICG already pushed him as far as he could go due to 
constraints within the fragmented HAT movement.  He asserted that 
TGV would not participate in negotiations with the other three 
movement leaders that SADC mediator Chissano was to organize, as TGV 
fears meeting with those three more than he fears sanctions.  He 
(like us) has heard nothing of Chissano's effort to organize a next 
round of talks in Addis starting next week.  Thus, given the AU 
communique of Feb 19, he concludes that AU sanctions are now 
inevitable.  He further argued that Ravalomanana was just as 
intransigent and would not make a deal to save his business 
interests here as he thinks he can have it all - money and power - 
by letting the situation further deteriorate and coming back later 
with increased popularity. 
 
French Support for TGV 
---------------------- 
¶4. (SBU) The French Ambassador adamantly rejected the notion that 
France is propping up TGV, and seemed unaware or disbelieving of the 
extent to which that view is held here.  His DCM appeared outraged 
when the U.S. Ambassador asked whether or not TGV may resign.  She 
indicated that he has no such intention and questioned why one would 
think he should.  (Answer:  sheer incompetence.)  She reiterated her 
belief that TGV was the product of a popular uprising, while the 
French Ambassador argued that the opposition lacks the popularity or 
ability to rally crowds to its cause.  The French Ambassador noted, 
and U.S. Emboffs agreed, that an agreement by all four leaders, 
Rajoelina, Ravalomanana, Zafy, and Ratsiraka, not to run for 
president in the next election would be an ideal solution.  The 
mediators had proposed this idea, but it was rejected by 
Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka, and then Rajoelina, who had initially 
accepted it last April, recalled the French DCM. 
 
French Aid and Cotonou 
---------------------- 
¶5. (SBU) France cut budget support for Madagascar in December 2008 
and does not intend to turn it back on in the current context.  If 
the AU proceeds to sanctions, a negative response can be expected by 
the EU on frozen aid under the Cotonou Accord, said the French 
Ambassador.  However, he explained that even a "negative response" 
would have positive implications as it would allow the EU to move 
forward with humanitarian assistance which is currently in limbo. 
Whatever the EU decides, France's bilateral aid will be unaffected, 
he added. 
 
Military Aid Quietly Reduced 
---------------------------- 
¶6. (SBU) The French DATT explained that, in fact, France had 
discontinued all regional and operational support for the Malagasy 
military since the coup and only maintained 16 French personnel 
embedded in the Malagasy military.  France has not made public 
announcements about such reductions here, however, and seems 
 
ANTANANARI 00000111  002 OF 002 
 
 
unperturbed by the contribution their silence is making to negative 
public opinion here and elsewhere.  He claimed that it was necessary 
to maintain the 16 personnel as they have been instrumental in 
avoiding violent clashes and maintaining stability for the past 
year. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Comment:  We agree with the French mainly in our current 
pessimism about the way forward.  Where we disagree, strongly, is 
both about the utility of rushing to ill-prepared elections, which 
they favor, and about the propriety and effectiveness of deep French 
involvement in trying to solve this crisis for the Malagasy.  We 
disagree with them that rapid, unilateral elections will solve 
anything, and doubt strongly that the opposition will accept the 
bones thrown their way.  Furthermore, it is our perception that, the 
harder the French try to foster a solution (e.g. by making public 
their view that HAT Prime Minister Vital is an excellent choice), 
the worse matters become.  Meanwhile, the Chinese are positioning 
themselves for future investment here by acquiring land and mining 
permits, having indicated at the Feb 18 ICG meeting in Addis that 
they will never apply sanctions on the HAT.  France has made it 
clear that it does not intend to cut its lifeline, and the Chinese 
will no doubt continue to avoid taking any political stand that 
could negatively impact their economic interests.  Thus, truly 
isolating the leaders of the HAT to force them to comply with the 
agreements that they signed looks unlikely.  End comment. 
 
MARQUARDT