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Viewing cable 10ANTANANARIVO105, MADAGASCAR: CHILD LABOR AND FORCED LABOR FOR DOL
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
10ANTANANARIVO105 | 2010-02-25 04:21 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Antananarivo |
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHAN #0105/01 0560421
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 250421Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3352
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0109
UNCLAS ANTANANARIVO 000105
SIPDIS
STATE FOR DRL/ILCSR FOR SARAH MORGAN
G/TIP FOR LUIS CDEBACA
AF/E FOR JAMES LIDDLE
DOL/ILAB FOR LEYLA STROTKAMP, RACHEL RIGBY, TINA MCCARTER
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ELAB EIND ETRD PHUM SOCI KTIP MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: CHILD LABOR AND FORCED LABOR FOR DOL
CONGRESSIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
REF: 09 STATE 131995
¶1. SUMMARY: Madagascar's ongoing political crisis, which began in
December 2008, has severely diminished the government's ability to
address a wide range of social problems, including child labor and
forced labor. The most recent reliable data specific to this
subject remains the 2007 national survey on child labor from
ILO/IPEC, but anecdotal evidence suggests that any recent gains were
likely erased by the crisis of 2009. Trade and investment have
shrunk, unemployment has risen, and the government has had to adapt
to substantial cuts in direct budget assistance from the IMF and EU
members in December 2008, followed by reduced development assistance
after the March 2009 military-backed coup. Predictably, the crisis
has disproportionately affected Madagascar's most vulnerable
populations, although reliable statistics on the subject remain
unavailable. This cable responds to reftel tasking concerning the
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) of 2005,
and the Trade and Development Act (TDA) of 2000. Responses in
paragraphs 2 (TVPRA) and 3 (TDA) are keyed to questions as presented
in reftel. END SUMMARY.
¶2. TASKING 1/TVPRA: Information on the use of forced labor and/or
exploitive child labor in the production of goods.
In consultation with local NGO contacts, post has identified the
following 11 specific goods as being produced with
exploitive/hazardous child labor. This list is not exhaustive;
given the extent of child labor in Madagascar, Post focused on
specific goods of which we had personal knowledge, or for which we
could rely on the personal experience of trusted NGO contacts.
There are, most likely, many more goods produced, to some extent,
with child labor.
1/A) GOOD: Wine
B) TYPE OF EXPLOITATION FOUND IN THE PRODUCTION OF THE GOOD:
Exploitive/hazardous child labor
C) SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND YEARS: PACT (2009)
D) NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION: Children as young as 11 to 13 years old
are responsible for harvesting grapes used in wines produced in the
region of Haute Matsiatra (mainly in Ambalavao). Children are only
involved on small farms, and do not play a role once the grapes have
been sold to actual wine producers.
E) PREVALENCE: Statistics are unavailable.
F) HOST GOVERNMENT/AUTHORITIES, INDUSTRY, OR NGO EFFORTS
SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO COMBAT FORCED LABOR OF ADULTS OR CHILDREN
IN THE PRODUCTION OF GOODS: The GOM, with PACT Madagascar, through
its program KILONGA, have targeted the Association of Winegrowers
with information and education campaigns, resulting in a commitment
on their part to make an effort to stop recruiting children.
Despite this commitment, they recognize that while industrial farms
do not directly recruit children, children continue to work in
family vineyards, which are the wine industry's main source of
grapes.
2/A) GOOD: Tea
B) TYPE OF EXPLOITATION FOUND IN THE PRODUCTION OF THE GOOD:
Exploitive/hazardous child labor
C) SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND YEARS: PACT (2009), Internet sources
D) NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION: Children aged 11 to 13 are involved in the
harvesting and the transport of tea leaves from the plantations.
Malagasy tea plantations are located in the village of Sahambavy
(Fianarantsoa, Haute-Matsiatra region), with a surface area of about
330 hectares, of which 94 hectares are managed by local farmers.
Children are often asked to carry up to 50 kilos of tea leaves on
their backs, and are also employed to spray fertilizer.
E) PREVALENCE: It is difficult to provide statistics, but up to 500
seasonal staffers are hired during the peak season of October to
April for harvesting. Eighty percent of the tea produced in this
region is reportedly destined for export, mainly to Kenya. Working
children are paid fifteen ariary (USD 0.007) per kilo of tea
leaves.
F) HOST GOVERNMENT/AUTHORITIES, INDUSTRY, OR NGO EFFORTS
SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO COMBAT FORCED LABOR OF ADULTS OR CHILDREN
IN THE PRODUCTION OF GOODS: PACT is conducting an education and
information campaign through their Kilonga project, in order to
promote the reinsertion of working children into the school system.
3/A) GOOD: Cocoa
B) TYPE OF EXPLOITATION FOUND IN THE PRODUCTION OF THE GOOD:
Exploitive/hazardous child labor
C) SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND YEARS: PACT (2009)
D) NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION: Young boys aged from 10 to 12 in Ambanja
(Diana region) work to harvest cocoa by climbing up cocoa trees.
Young girls join them later to sell the products in the local
markets, sometimes for export. Production peaks in June-July and in
October-November.
E) PREVALENCE: More than 90 percent of the national cocoa supply is
produced in Ambanja and the Sambirano region, primarily by family
farms for export. Internet sources indicate that the country
produces up to 4,000 tons of cocoa per year from its 1,700ha of
plantations, for export mainly to European countries including
Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Belgium, and to South Africa.
F) HOST GOVERNMENT/AUTHORITIES, INDUSTRY, OR NGO EFFORTS
SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO COMBAT FORCED LABOR OF ADULTS OR CHILDREN
IN THE PRODUCTION OF GOODS: PACT is conducting an education and
information campaign through their Kilonga project, in order to
promote the reinsertion of working children into the school system.
4/A) GOOD: Oysters
B) TYPE OF EXPLOITATION FOUND IN THE PRODUCTION OF THE GOOD:
Exploitive/hazardous child labor
C) SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND YEARS: PACT (2009)
D) NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION: Children are directly engaged in
collecting oysters, for consumption in local restaurants or sale in
markets.
E) PREVALENCE: Statistics are unavailable.
F) HOST GOVERNMENT/AUTHORITIES, INDUSTRY, OR NGO EFFORTS
SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO COMBAT FORCED LABOR OF ADULTS OR CHILDREN
IN THE PRODUCTION OF GOODS: Post is not aware of any specific
efforts to combat this practice.
5/A) GOOD: Essential oils
B) TYPE OF EXPLOITATION FOUND IN THE PRODUCTION OF THE GOOD:
Exploitive/hazardous child labor
C) SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND YEARS: PACT (2009)
D) NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION: Children aged as young as 11 to 13 are
paid MGA 37 (USD 0.017) per kilo of medicinal plant leaves harvested
and transported for the production of essential oils in the region
of Haute Matsiatra. Most essential oils are destined for the export
market.
E) PREVALENCE: No exact statistics are available, but PACT's general
assessment notes that child labor mostly occurs in family farms or
plantations.
F) HOST GOVERNMENT/AUTHORITIES, INDUSTRY, OR NGO EFFORTS
SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO COMBAT FORCED LABOR OF ADULTS OR CHILDREN
IN THE PRODUCTION OF GOODS: PACT is conducting an education and
information campaign through their Kilonga project, in order to
promote the reinsertion of working children into the school system.
6/A) GOOD: Cotton
B) TYPE OF EXPLOITATION FOUND IN THE PRODUCTION OF THE GOOD:
Exploitive/hazardous child labor
C) SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND YEARS: PACT (2009)
D) NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION: Girls as young as 8 to 10 years old are
working in cotton plantations in the Diana region, primarily around
the city of Ambilobe. Cotton is produced for local textile factories
and the export market.
E) PREVALENCE: Statistics are unavailable.
F) HOST GOVERNMENT/AUTHORITIES, INDUSTRY, OR NGO EFFORTS
SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO COMBAT FORCED LABOR OF ADULTS OR CHILDREN
IN THE PRODUCTION OF GOODS: PACT is conducting an education and
information campaign through their Kilonga project, in order to
promote the reinsertion of working children into the school system.
7/A) GOOD: Baskets
B) TYPE OF EXPLOITATION FOUND IN THE PRODUCTION OF THE GOOD:
Exploitive/hazardous child labor
C) SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND YEARS: PACT (2009)
D) NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION: Young girls aged 14 to 15 in Foulpointe
(Atsinanana region) are involved in basket-weaving and in the dyeing
of raffia, which is used as raw materials for the baskets. Goods
are primarily intended for both local consumption and foreign
tourists.
E) PREVALENCE: Statistics are unavailable; baskets are made in many
locations around the country, but PACT's research was limited to
seven target regions, and child labor was only found in Atsinanana
region for this particular good.
F) HOST GOVERNMENT/AUTHORITIES, INDUSTRY, OR NGO EFFORTS
SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO COMBAT FORCED LABOR OF ADULTS OR CHILDREN
IN THE PRODUCTION OF GOODS: PACT is conducting an education and
information campaign through their Kilonga project, in order to
promote the reinsertion of working children into the school system.
8/A) GOOD: Gravel
B) TYPE OF EXPLOITATION FOUND IN THE PRODUCTION OF THE GOOD:
Exploitive/hazardous child labor
C) SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND YEARS: PACT (2009)
D) NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION: In the Diana region, children start
working in stone quarrying as early as age 7, while those from the
Atsinanana region start later at the age of 9 to 11. Child labor
has also been observed in this sector in the Androy region. Whole
families often work in one quarry, with children helping their
parents.
E) PREVALENCE: Statistics are unavailable.
F) HOST GOVERNMENT/AUTHORITIES, INDUSTRY, OR NGO EFFORTS
SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO COMBAT FORCED LABOR OF ADULTS OR CHILDREN
IN THE PRODUCTION OF GOODS: PACT is conducting an education and
information campaign through their Kilonga project, in order to
promote the reinsertion of working children into the school system.
9/A) GOOD: Vanilla
B) TYPE OF EXPLOITATION FOUND IN THE PRODUCTION OF THE GOOD:
Exploitive/hazardous child labor
C) SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND YEARS: PACT (2009)
D) NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION: Children aged 9 to 17 are working at all
stages in the production of vanilla around the town of Sambava.
They start in harvesting, but also participate in processing,
especially on family farms.
E) PREVALENCE: PACT statistics show that 20 to 30 percent of the
harvesting is done by children.
F) HOST GOVERNMENT/AUTHORITIES, INDUSTRY, OR NGO EFFORTS
SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO COMBAT FORCED LABOR OF ADULTS OR CHILDREN
IN THE PRODUCTION OF GOODS: PACT is conducting an education and
information campaign through their Kilonga project, in order to
promote the reinsertion of working children into the school system.
10/A) GOOD: Copra (the dried meat, or kernel, of the coconut)
B) TYPE OF EXPLOITATION FOUND IN THE PRODUCTION OF THE GOOD:
Exploitive/hazardous child labor
C) SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND YEARS: PACT (2009)
D) NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION: Children aged 9 to 17 are harvesting copra
in the SAVA region. While harvesting is the most visible part of
child labor in the copra producing, PACT suspects that children are
involved in all of the processing phases. Further evidence of this
was unavailable, however, due to the fact that copra processing is
done inside family homes.
E) PREVALENCE: Statistics are unavailable.
F) HOST GOVERNMENT/AUTHORITIES, INDUSTRY, OR NGO EFFORTS
SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO COMBAT FORCED LABOR OF ADULTS OR CHILDREN
IN THE PRODUCTION OF GOODS: PACT is conducting an education and
information campaign through their Kilonga project, in order to
promote the reinsertion of working children into the school system.
11/A) GOOD: Bricks
B) TYPE OF EXPLOITATION FOUND IN THE PRODUCTION OF THE GOOD:
Exploitive/hazardous child labor
C) SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND YEARS: PACT (2009)
D) NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION: Children aged 8 to 14 are engaged in the
transport of bricks from the rice fields where bricks are made to
either the trucks or a construction site in the Analamanga region.
Generally, their parents are already working on making the bricks
and they contribute by transporting the bricks.
E) PREVALENCE: Statistics are unavailable.
F) HOST GOVERNMENT/AUTHORITIES, INDUSTRY, OR NGO EFFORTS
SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO COMBAT FORCED LABOR OF ADULTS OR CHILDREN
IN THE PRODUCTION OF GOODS: PACT is conducting an education and
information campaign through their Kilonga project, in order to
promote the reinsertion of working children into the school system.
¶3. TASKING 2/TDA: Information on exploitive child labor.
2A) PREVALENCE AND SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF EXPLOITIVE CHILD LABOR
¶1. In what sectors (not related to the production of goods) were
children involved in exploitive labor (such as domestic service,
street vending, and/or child prostitution)?
The 2007 National Survey on Child Labor in Madagascar (ENTE in its
French acronym, produced jointly by the ILO and the GOM with 2007
data, and published in December 2008) identified significant amounts
of child labor in agriculture, livestock, fishing, domestic labor,
commerce, food service, manufacturing, and mining. Agriculture,
livestock, and fishing account for 85.6 percent of total child
laborers, but domestic work and commerce (including food services)
account for sizable numbers of child laborers not related to the
production of goods: 6 percent and 4 percent, respectively. Smaller
numbers are involved in child prostitution in limited areas, but the
ENTE does not provide data on them.
¶2. Posts are requested to determine if the government collected or
published data on exploitive child labor during the period, and if
so, whether the government would provide the data set to DOL for
further analysis.
The 2007 ENTE (see 2A para 1) remains the most recent comprehensive
survey on child labor in Madagascar. In 2009, Madagascar completed
Phase I (the first five years) of its 15-year National Action Plan
to Fight Child Labor (PNALTE), which spans 2004 to 2019. An
assessment done for the PNALTE counted 17,000 children as prevented
from working and 9,000 as withdrawn from the work environment since
2004, largely under the ILO/IPEC Timebound Program that covered the
same period. This assessment also provided initial goals for Phase
II (2010-2015), but these have not yet been published. Post has
been unable to obtain a copy of this assessment, but will provide it
to DOS and DOL once it is available.
2B) LAWS AND REGULATIONS:
¶1. What new laws or regulations were enacted in regard to exploitive
child labor over the past year? If applicable, were the changes
improvements in the legal and regulatory framework?
No new laws have been enacted over the past year. Parliament has
been suspended since March 2009, following the coup, and no other
branch of government has taken any initiative on child labor in its
absence. A draft bill on the prevention of WFCL-related violations
was reportedly examined in January 2009, but no further action was
taken due to the crisis.
¶2. Based on the standards in paras 27 and 28, was the
country/territory's legal and regulatory framework adequate for
addressing exploitive child labor?
Madagascar has an adequate legal framework for addressing exploitive
child labor, but does not have the capacity or resources to
effectively implement or enforce its international commitments or
domestic agenda. A series of laws and decrees from 2003 to 2007,
and the PNALTE, have effectively translated Madagascar's
international commitments into domestic policy, but have not yet had
a significant impact on the problem itself. According to local NGO
contacts, the draft bill that was discussed in January 2009 (see 2B
para 1) would have made a difference in the fight against exploitive
child labor by providing for more effective implementation and
enforcement than currently exists.
2C) INSTITUTIONS AND MECHANISMS FOR ENFORCEMENT - HAZARDOUS CHILD
LABOR AND FORCED CHILD LABOR:
Although reftel requests separate sections concerning "hazardous"
and "forced" child labor, the GOM does not effectively discern
between the two in terms of institutions and mechanisms for
enforcement, and Post was thus unable to provide substantially
different responses to this distinction. Both elements of child
labor are included in the following 14 answers.
¶1. What agency or agencies was/were responsible for the enforcement
of laws relating to hazardous/forced child labor?
The Ministry of Labor (MOL) has the lead in the fight against child
labor, through its Office of Labor and the Promotion of Fundamental
Rights. This office provides the secretariat for the National
Committee to Fight Child Labor (CNLTE), which is in turn supported
by the Division for the Prevention, Abolition, and Monitoring of
Child Labor (PACTE).
The National Committee to Fight Child Labor (CNLTE) is an
inter-ministerial committee (working with the ministries of health,
education, and justice) created in 2004 to pursue and monitor the
implementation of the National Action Plan to Fight Child Labor
(PNALTE). It coordinates with ILO/IPEC programs, provides input on
legislation and regulations on child labor, and supports civil
society on related projects. There are also Regional Committees to
Fight Child Labor (CRLTE), subordinate to the CNLTE, in nine (out of
22) regions.
The Division for the Prevention, Abolition, and Monitoring of Child
Labor (PACTE), which supports the CNLTE, is specifically charged
with the actual coordination, monitoring, and evaluation of all
activities in the framework of the fight against child labor. It is
also responsible for communicating information related to child
labor, and conducting research and development of activities to
promote the fight against child labor.
Additionally, there are five Regional Observatories for Child Labor
(ORTE), created in 2007. They work on a regional basis in concert
with PACTE, with a similar focus on inter-ministerial coordination,
monitoring, research, analysis, and outreach.
UNICEF has been instrumental in creating commune-level "Child
Protection Networks" in 761 communes (out of 1,640 in Madagascar),
which serve as local focal points for cooperation been national and
local government, as well as NGOs/CSOs working in this field.
In 2001, prior to the creation of the PNALTE, the Ministry of Labor
(in partnership with ILO, UNICEF, and PACT Madagascar) set up the
Manjary Soa Center (CMS) in Antananarivo, in order to "improve the
situation of child laborers in Madagacar". It was designed to
demonstrate the feasibility of fighting child labor through
education and training programs that benefit the child victims,
particularly those subjected to the worst forms of child labor. To
date, according to GOM statistics, 308 children have been withdrawn
from child labor as a result. The Center still exists today, and
two additional ones were reportedly created in 2009, in Toliara and
Toamasina. The Centers are the only programs fully
government-funded, along with the Regional Observatories of Child
Labor. No further plans for the creation of new centers have been
established for 2010.
¶2. If multiple agencies were responsible for enforcement, were there
mechanisms for exchanging information? Assess their effectiveness.
Per para 1, the MOL has the lead on child labor, but at various
levels, they work with the ministries of health, education, and
justice, as well as the police, gendarme, and regional government
authorities. Labor inspectors (from the MOL) and magistrates (from
the MOJ) are in charge of enforcing laws on child labor, while
NGO/CSO partners are often charged with monitoring and follow-up.
The MOJ manages a Committee for the Reform of Children's Rights
(CRDE), which is a mechanism to exchange information among the
various actors involved in child labor. The CRDE focuses on reforms
to the legal framework for the fight against child labor.
A local NGO contact stated that these mechanisms were insufficient,
and will remain so until the draft bill from January 2009 (on
enforcement and implementation) can be passed. This continued delay
has reportedly caused frustration among those in law enforcement as
well, who are not sufficiently empowered or trained to deal
effectively with child labor violations under the current framework.
¶3. Did the country/territory maintain a mechanism for making
complaints about hazardous/forced child labor violations? If so,
how many complaints were received in the reporting period?
The Morals and Minors' Brigade, in the Gendarmerie, operates a
toll-free hotline (dial 805) to anonymously report violations and
the mistreatment of children. At the local level, the inter-agency
UNICEF-sponsored Child Protection Networks provide a mechanism to
augment the limited capabilities of the formal labor inspectors.
¶4. What amount of funding was provided to agencies responsible for
inspections? Was this amount adequate? Did inspectors have
sufficient office facilities, transportation, fuel, and other
necessities to carry out inspections?
PACTE reports that the Ministry of Labor's budget allocated to child
labor has been reduced due to the crisis, although reliable numbers
are not available. This budget -- funded by the "Public Investment
Program" (PIP) -- is divided up for the three Manjary Soa centers,
which reportedly receive no outside funding. This budget is grossly
insufficient, and does not address the logistical or operational
needs of even the few existing inspectors. PACTE noted that the
overall budget for child labor is difficult to assess, as this is a
multi-sector program, funded separately by different departments,
and they don't have firm numbers on the amounts allocated by the
NGOs and international donors such as UNICEF and ILO.
¶5. How many inspectors did the government employ? Was the number of
inspectors adequate?
The government employs 71 labor inspectors countrywide (in a nation
of over 20 million people), of which five focus on child labor.
This number is not sufficient to address even formal sector needs,
leaving the large informal labor market almost entirely outside the
reach of government labor inspectors.
¶6. How many inspections involving child labor were carried out? If
possible, please provide breakdown of complaint-driven versus
random, government-initiated inspections. Were inspections carried
out in sectors in which children work? Was the number of inspections
adequate?
PACTE reports that no complaint-driven child-labor specific
inspections have been conducted in 2009. They stated, however, that
child labor is evaluated during regular inspections, but were unable
to provide statistics on these inspections or any incidents of child
labor they uncovered.
¶7. How many children were removed/assisted as a result of
inspections? Were these children actually provided or referred for
services as a result (as opposed to simply fired)?
This data was not available.
¶8. How many child labor cases or "prosecutions" were opened?
This data was not available.
¶9. How many child labor cases were closed or resolved?
This data was not available.
¶10. How many violations were found or "convictions" reached?
This data was not available.
¶11. What is the average length of time it took to resolve child
labor cases?
This data was not available.
¶12. In cases in which violations were found, were penalties actually
applied, either through fines paid or jail sentence served? Did such
sentences meet penalties established in the law?
This data was not available.
¶13. Did the experience regarding questions 7 through 10 above
reflect a commitment to combat exploitive child labor?
The fact that the GOM is unable to provide this data is indicative
of its low technical capabilities and the apparent low priority that
the GOM accords to these activities. PACTE stated that the GOM has
gotten "more involved in prevention, education, and information
campaigns", but Post was unable to discern any measurable effect
these efforts may have had on child labor in the country.
According to a local NGO, much work remains to be done to develop
the GOM's contribution to the fight against child labor. Aside from
financing the Manjary Soa Center (see para 2), and working to
develop the PNALTE, the state doesn't directly finance any project
in this domain. The majority of the ministries involved in fighting
child labor lack the budgetary discretion to launch their own
initiatives. This weak engagement presents a serious risk to the
sustainability of activity once the donors eventually withdraw.
¶14. Did government offer any training for investigators or others
responsible for enforcement? If so, what (if any) impact have these
trainings had?
In 2008, the GOM conducted at least two workshops for labor
inspectors, which reportedly resulted in "more regular" field visits
to workplaces susceptible to child labor, although the lack of
statistics on child labor inspections makes this statement difficult
to evaluate. Post has no indication of any such trainings in 2009.
In February 2010, the ILO and the Ministry of Labor will organize a
training and capacity-building workshop for labor inspectors,
focusing on inspection techniques for evaluating child labor.
2D) INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT - child
trafficking, commercial sexual exploitation of children, use of
children in illicit activities:
2D, Section I: Child trafficking
¶1. Did the country/territory have agencies or personnel dedicated to
enforcement of child trafficking? How many investigators/social
workers/dedicated police officers did the government employ to
conduct investigations? If there were no dedicated agencies or
personnel, provide an estimate of the number of people who were
responsible for such investigations. Was the number of
investigators adequate?
The GOM has 35 agents in the Morals and Minors Brigade of the
National Police, which is in charge of all investigations related to
minors. These agents work within the Ministry of Internal Security,
as well as the six former provincial capitals, and six additional
areas considered "red zones", although PACTE did not provide the
exact locations of the red zones. Among these 35 agents, there are
judicial police officers, police inspectors, and three social
workers. This number is insufficient, particularly given their
broad mandate, the size of the problems they are charged with
addressing, and the large territory for which they are responsible.
¶2. How much funding was provided to agencies responsible for
investigating child trafficking? Was this amount adequate? Did
investigators have sufficient office facilities, transportation,
fuel, and other necessities to carry out investigations?
The budget for the Morals and Minors Brigade is part of the budget
for the Judicial Police Directorate, and a detailed breakdown was
not available. Regardless of the amount, however, it is
demonstrably insufficient, given the lack of personnel, training,
equipment (especially information technology), and means of
transportation.
¶3. Did the country/territory maintain a hotline or other mechanism
for reporting child trafficking? If so, how many complaints were
received in the reporting period?
See Section 2C para 3 - "805" is the sole hotline, and accepts calls
for all issues related to crimes involving minors.
¶4. How many investigations were opened in regard to child
trafficking? Was the number of investigations adequate?
PACTE reports that 33 complaints of child trafficking were received
and investigated in 2009. While this 100 percent rate of response
is impressive, it likely represents only a small portion of
trafficking cases. Anecdotal evidence from NGOs indicates a much
larger problem, but no statistics are available to provide exact
numbers. In addition, Post's ability to query law enforcement
bodies directly on this question was constrained by the fact that
the USG does not recognize the de facto GOM; these numbers, and
those in subsequent paragraphs, were provided by PACTE, which is
located within the Ministry of Labor (see Section 2C para 1).
¶5. How many children were rescued as a result?
PACTE states that "in 80 percent of the kidnapping cases [which are
a majority of the 33 reported cases in para 4], the child is saved".
¶6. How many arrests were made or other kinds of prosecutions carried
out?
PACTE states that out of 33 investigations, 18 were closed, but they
did not provide statistics on the outcome of these cases.
¶7. How many cases were closed or resolved?
See para 6. No further details available.
¶8. How many convictions?
PACTE was unable to report any hard convictions, although at least
seven suspects are currently in jail under a retaining writ, after
having been denied bail. They have not been convicted.
¶9. Did sentences imposed meet standards established in the legal
framework?
Lacking any convictions, no data is available.
¶10. Were sentences imposed actually served?
No data available.
¶11. What is the average length of time it takes to resolve cases of
child trafficking?
PACTE states that it can take as little as 48 hours for the Morals
and Minors Brigade to "resolve" a case, although more complex cases
"may need deeper investigations". It is not clear how this
statement squares with the low rates of closure, and the complete
lack of convictions, nor how they define "resolving" a case.
¶12. Did the government offer any training for investigators or
others responsible for enforcement of child trafficking? If so, what
was the impact (if any) of these trainings?
The GOM offered several trainings in 2008 (see Section 2C para 14),
but none in 2009. NGO contacts indicate that labor inspectors
subsequently made a concerted effort to conduct more field visits to
workplaces susceptible to child labor, but this has not had a
significant impact on their actual case statistics. PACTE states
that agents received further training on CSEC, sexual abuse, and
communicating with children, conducted by UNICEF and NGOs, but this
too was in 2008.
¶13. If the country/territory experienced armed conflict during the
reporting period or in the recent past involving the use of child
soldiers, what actions were taken to penalize those responsible?
Were these actions adequate or meaningful given the situation?
Not applicable.
2D, Section II: Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children
¶1. Did the country/territory have agencies or personnel dedicated to
enforcement of CSEC? How many investigators/social workers/dedicated
police officers did the government employ to conduct investigations?
If there were no dedicated agencies or personnel, provide an
estimate of the number of people who were responsible for such
investigations. Was the number of investigators adequate?
See 2D, Section I, para 1. Madagascar deals with all forms of child
exploitation and labor through the Morals and Minors Brigade of the
Gendarme.
¶2. How much funding was provided to agencies responsible for
investigating CSEC in illicit activities? Was this amount adequate?
Did investigators have sufficient office facilities, transportation,
fuel, and other necessities to carry out investigations?
See 2D, Section I, para 1.
¶3. Did the country/territory maintain a hotline or other mechanism
for reporting CSEC violations? If so, how many complaints were
received in the reporting period?
See Section 2C para 3 - "805" is the sole hotline, and accepts calls
for all issues related to crimes involving minors.
¶4. How many investigations were opened in regard to CSEC? Was the
number of investigations adequate?
PACTE reports one case of sex tourism, 315 cases of "corruption of a
minor", and one "incitement to debauchery" .
¶5. How many children were rescued as a result?
PACTE notes that most of the children in CSEC cases have already
been abused before any complaint has been filed, and was unable to
provide any data on how many children were "rescued".
¶6. How many arrests were made or other kinds of prosecutions carried
out?
PACTE reports one arrest for sex tourism, 190 for "corruption of a
minor", and one for "incitement to debauchery".
¶7. How many cases were closed or resolved?
No figures beyond those in para 6 are available.
¶8. How many convictions?
PACTE reports two convictions for sex tourism (the second may have
been from a previous year, given the data in para 4), 57 for
corruption of a minor, and one for incitement to debauchery.
¶9. Did sentences imposed meet standards established in the legal
framework?
PACTE states that the sentences imposed are in accordance with those
defined in the legal framework. Lacking details on the cases and
sentences, Post is unable to corroborate this statement.
¶10. Were sentences imposed actually served?
No data available.
¶11. What is the average length of time it takes to resolve cases of
CSEC?
See 2D, Section I, para 11. Same answer from PACTE.
¶12. Did the government offer any training for investigators or
others responsible for enforcement of CSEC? If so, what was the
impact (if any) of these trainings?
See 2D, Section I, para 12.
¶13. If the country/territory experienced armed conflict during the
reporting period or in the recent past involving the use of child
soldiers, what actions were taken to penalize those responsible?
Were these actions adequate or meaningful given the situation?
Not applicable.
2D, Section III: Use of Children in Illicit Activities
¶1. Did the country/territory have agencies or personnel dedicated to
enforcement of use of children in illicit activities? How many
investigators/social workers/dedicated police officers did the
government employ to conduct investigations? If there were no
dedicated agencies or personnel, provide an estimate of the number
of people who were responsible for such investigations. Was the
number of investigators adequate?
See 2D, Section I, para 1.
¶2. How much funding was provided to agencies responsible for
investigating use of children in illicit activities? Was this amount
adequate? Did investigators have sufficient office facilities,
transportation, fuel, and other necessities to carry out
investigations?
See 2D, Section I, para 2.
¶3. Did the country/territory maintain a hotline or other mechanism
for reporting use of children in illicit activities violations? If
so, how many complaints were received in the reporting period?
See Section 2C para 3 - "805" is the sole hotline, and accepts calls
for all issues related to crimes involving minors.
¶4. How many investigations were opened in regard to use of children
in illicit activities? Was the number of investigations adequate?
No information available.
¶5. How many children were rescued as a result?
No information available.
¶6. How many arrests were made or other kinds of prosecutions carried
out?
No information available.
¶7. How many cases were closed or resolved?
No information available.
¶8. How many convictions?
No information available.
¶9. Did sentences imposed meet standards established in the legal
framework?
No information available.
¶10. Were sentences imposed actually served?
No information available.
¶11. What is the average length of time it takes to resolve cases of
use of children in illicit activities?
See 2D, Section I, para 11.
¶12. Did the government offer any training for investigators or
others responsible for enforcement of use of children in illicit
activities? If so, what was the impact (if any) of these trainings?
See 2D, Section I, para 12.
¶13. If the country/territory experienced armed conflict during the
reporting period or in the recent past involving the use of child
soldiers, what actions were taken to penalize those responsible?
Were these actions adequate or meaningful given the situation?
Not applicable.
2E) GOVERNMENT POLICIES ON CHILD LABOR:
¶1. Did the government have a policy or plan that specifically
addresses exploitive child labor? Please describe.
The GOM drafted a National Action Plan for the Fight against Child
Labor (Plan National d'Action de Lutte contre le Travail des
Enfants, or PNALTE) in 2004 (see 2C para 1) that details plans
through 2019. The GOM recently conducted an interim assessment
(covering the first third of the plan, from 2004 to 2009), although
Post has been unable to obtain a copy of this report.
ILO and USG programs on child labor in Madagascar have all been
designed with this framework in mind. The most recent legislative
initiative under the PNALTE, a draft bill concerning the enforcement
and implementation of regulations on WFCL (see 2B para 1), has been
blocked due to the current political crisis.
PACTE has created a website to disseminate information on the GOM's
fight against child labor, which was reportedly developed in the
last year, although Post cannot confirm that. The site functions,
but is already out of date, and can be accessed at www.lcte.gov.mg.
¶2. Did the country/territory incorporate exploitive child labor
specifically as an issue to be addressed in poverty reduction,
development, educational or other social policies, such as Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers, etc? Please describe.
Aside from the PNALTE, exploitive child labor has figured into
several policies and strategies from the GOM since 2004, most
notably as an element of the Madagascar Action Plan (MAP), a
multi-year development strategy developed under former president
Marc Ravalomanana. The MAP is unlikely to survive the current
political crisis, but its broad focus on a wide variety of
interconnected development goals will probably reappear in some form
once Madagascar has restored a functional government.
The GOM's Education for All (EFA) program, developed in 2005,
includes an element on reducing child labor, although the focus is
on structural changes within the Malagasy education system. In
addition, 786 (out of 1,640) communes have developed an action plan
to fight the mistreatment of children in their "Communal Development
Plan", although they routinely cite a lack of resources to implement
their plans.
¶3. Did the government provide funding to the plans described above?
Please describe the amount and whether it was sufficient to carry
out the planned activities.
These programs are all funded through the GOM's "Public Investment
Program" (PIP). Although statistics are unavailable, it is unlikely
that these plans were well-funded in 2009. The de facto GOM reduced
investment spending across the board in 2009 in response to reduced
revenue (see para 1, summary), and this no doubt impacted child
labor initiatives. Even prior to the crisis, funding was
insufficient to carry out the proposed activities.
¶4. Did the government provide non-monetary support to child labor
plans? Please describe.
Post is unaware of any such support.
¶5. Provide any additional information about the status and
effectiveness of the government's policies or plans during the
reporting period in regard to exploitive child labor.
The draft legislation on WFCL in January 2009 would have represented
a significant step forward in the GOM's efforts to combat child
labor, but that project will not reappear until Madagascar has a
functioning government, and restores parliament (which was suspended
in March 2009).
According to a local NGO, the MOL created two additional Manjary Soa
Centers (in Toamasina and Toliara) in 2009, modeled after the one
created in Antananarivo in 2001.
The GOM has supported an ILO/IPEC iniative to test a new
data-collection model called the Child Labor Monitoring System
(Systeme de Suivi du travail des Enfants, or SSTE). It was launched
in the Boeny region, and is focused on improving the credibility of
data collected on child labor.
In addition, as a result of GOM lobbying and an education campaign
among industries with the support of UNICEF, ILO and other
organizations, the Ambatovy mining project (near Toamasina) now
applies a zero tolerance policy for its employees regarding child
prostitution and CSEC. Post has no data to illustrate the size of
this particular problem, but anecdotal evidence from both this and a
Rio Tinto project near Ft. Dauphin indicate that mining operations
in these areas may have contributed to an increase in demand for
local sex workers, some of whom are allegedly underage.
¶6. Did the government participate in any commissions or task forces
regarding exploitive child labor? Was the commission active and/or
effective?
Post has no information indicating GOM participation in such
efforts.
¶7. Did the government sign a bilateral, regional or international
agreement to combat trafficking?
No.
2F) SOCIAL PROGRAMS TO ELIMINATE OR PREVENT CHILD LABOR:
¶1. Did the government implement any programs specifically to address
the worst forms of child labor? Please describe.
There were no new programs in the reporting period specifically to
address WFCL. A draft bill was discussed before the coup (see 2B
para 1), but will advanced no further until parliament has been
restored.
¶2. Did the country/territory incorporate child labor specifically as
an issue to be addressed in poverty reduction, development,
educational or other social programs, such as conditional cash
transfer programs or eligibility for school meals, etc? Please
describe.
See 2E, para 2.
¶3. Did the government provide funding to the programs described
above? Please describe amount and whether it was sufficient to carry
out the planned activities.
See 2E, para 3.
¶4. Did the government provide non-monetary support to child labor
programs? Please describe.
Post is unaware of any such programs.
¶5. Provide any additional information about the status and
effectiveness of the government's activities during the reporting
period in relation to the programs described above. If the programs
involved government provision of social services to children at risk
of or involved in exploitive child labor, please describe and assess
the effectiveness of these services.
No additional information.
¶6. If the government signed one or more bilateral, regional or
international agreement/s to combat trafficking, what steps did it
take to implement such agreement/s? Did the agreement/s result in
tangible improvements? If so, please describe.
Per 2E, para 7, no agreements were signed.
2G) CONTINUAL PROGRESS:
¶1. Considering the information provided to the questions above,
please provide an assessment of whether, overall, the government
made progress in regard to combating exploitive child labor during
the reporting period. In making this assessment, please indicate
whether there has been an increase or decrease from previous years
in inspections/investigations, prosecutions, and convictions;
funding for child labor elimination policies and programs; and any
other relevant indicators of government commitment.
The ongoing political crisis, and the resulting fiscal crunch, has
had a severe impact on the GOM's ability to address child labor,
along with most other social problems. However, due to the
continued lack of reliable statistics and the sheer size of the
problem (with 1.8 million children identified as "economically
active" in the 2007 ENTE), the lack of government progress in 2009
might better be viewed in a slightly broader context: since the GOM
began addressing exploitive child labor in 2001, at no time has the
government invested substantial resources or produced significant
results (relative to the size of the problem) on this issue. The
failure to improve in 2009 will not ultimately upset the trend lines
for either government interventions or results, which have remained
decidedly flat despite a decade of attention.
Where the government has succeeded is in allowing the ILO and
international donors (including the USG) to innovate in this field.
USDOL, though local partner PACT, has launched a multi-year
initiative in seven regions to prevent or withdraw 9,000 children
from child labor.
The Government of France, through ILO/IPEC and RAF, has launched a
program providing technical and financial support for capacity
building in three regions, to provide vocational training to
children withdrawn from child labor.
The European Union, through ILO/IPEC's TACKLE program, has launched
a program in four regions to support families that are reintegrating
child-laborers in school. It has components addressing the
prevention, withdrawal, education, and mobilization elements of the
fight against child labor.
As mentioned in 2C para 13, much work remains to be done to develop
the GOM's contribution to the fight against child labor. Aside from
financing the Manjary Soa Center (see para 2), and working to
develop the PNALTE, the state doesn't directly finance any project
in this domain. The majority of the ministries involved in fighting
child labor lack the budgetary discretion to launch their own
initiatives. Although the complex inter-ministerial structures
designed to address child labor (see 2C para 1) bring all the
stakeholders into the process, they also cause bureaucratic
in-fighting, made worse by continual turn-over within each ministry
that severely impedes their long-term ability to implement the
PNALTE.