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FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
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RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0216
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE 6995
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4322

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000269 
 
SIPDIS 
 
UNVIE FOR AMBASSADOR DAVIES 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020 
TAGS: PREL KNUC ETTC ENRG IR TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR UNVIE AMB. DAVIES' FEB 22 VISIT TO 
ANKARA 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 163 
     ¶B. 09 ANKARA 1478 
 
Classified By: DCM Doug Silliman, Reasons 1.4 (B,D) 
 
¶1. (C) Thank you for taking the time to come to Turkey.  You 
will arrive very shortly after U/S Bill Burns will have left. 
 Iran will be at the top of his agenda, but your visit will 
help us advance our efforts to press Turkey to support UNSC 
sanctions against Iran and drop its opposition to the NSG 
guidelines to restrict the spread of enrichment and 
reprocessing technology. 
 
WHAT TO RAISE: 
 
-- Iran: Highlight that Iran's continuing refusal to submit 
to UNSC resolutions increases concerns about its nuclear 
program and the likelihood of a regional arms race that would 
be profoundly destabilizing for the region, including for 
allies like Turkey; emphasize that international unity and 
support for both tracks of the "dual-track approach" will be 
essential to press Iran to change its course on its nuclear 
program. (Paras 2-6) 
 
-- Ask MFA Deputy U/S Cevikoz where Turkey stands regarding 
the NSG guidelines and whether the GoT has considered the USG 
offer to guarantee on a bilateral basis Turkey's nuclear fuel 
supply; Emphasize how these guidelines are important in 
addressing our shared concerns about nuclear proliferation 
while preserving the ability of countries to pursue peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy.  (Paras. 7-9) 
 
WATCH OUT FOR: 
--------------- 
 
-- Your Turkish interlocutors may probe for signs of USG 
wiggle room on a TRR deal (para. 2) 
 
-- The Turkish press at the roundtable event (para. 10-11) 
 
Iran Nuclear Issue 
------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) Turkey continues its attempts to salvage the TRR deal. 
 FM Davutoglu is personally engaged in this effort and has 
reportedly traveled to Iran five times in the last four 
months, most recently on February 16.  We have not 
discouraged his shuttle and telephone diplomacy, but his 
efforts have produced no tangible results -- the latest 
evidence being Iran's February 17 letter to the IAEA -- but 
have given Iranian leaders an excuse to claim they are acting 
constructively to find a compromise on a TRR deal.  As long 
as Iran continues to string Turkey along with the TRR deal, 
Turkish leaders will resist engaging in discussions about 
sanctions or new action at the UNSC.  Indeed, your Turkish 
interlocutors may probe for signs of USG wiggle room on a TRR 
deal, unwilling to accept that a deal short of the October 1 
redlines is not possible. 
 
¶3. (C) The Government of Turkey has stated publicly that it 
is opposed to a nuclear-armed Iran -- often in the same 
breath as its opposition to "any countries in the region 
having nuclear arms."  Turkish officials understand that a 
nuclear-capable Iran would shift regional balances in 
profound and dangerous ways.  Yet, officials do not believe 
Iran would use these weapons even if they acquired the 
capability and would not, in any case, target Turkey. 
 
¶4. (C) The Turks are skeptical about the effectiveness of 
sanctions, are terrified of any military action against Iran 
and are ultimately worried about how new sanctions might hurt 
Turkey's economy (many believe Turkey bore a disproportionate 
burden in enforcing sanctions that targeted Saddam's regime). 
 During February 16 meetings in Washington, MFA U/S 
Sinirlioglu struck a familiar refrain: "We do not support a 
nuclear-armed Iran, but we do not believe in the merit of a 
sanctions regime due to our experience in the recent past 
with sanctions causing collateral damage." 
 
¶5. (C) Turkey remains dependent on Iran to meet about 35 
percent of its oil imports and 10 percent of its gas imports 
and uses Iran as a transit route for Turkish goods to access 
Central Asian markets.  FM Davutoglu during his press 
conference with Mottaki on Feb 16 said that Turkey hopes to 
increase bilateral trade to 30 billion dollars (from current 
levels of about USD 5 billion -- the bulk of which is 
comprised of Turkish import of Iranian hydrocarbons), a 
 
symbolic pledge rather than a realistic projection, but still 
very telling. 
 
¶6. (C)  Turkish officials, however, are also aware of the 
need for the international community to back up its talk 
about getting tough with Iran.  Sinirlioglu told Ambassador 
on Feb 1 that: "If we say something and cannot follow up it 
will be perceived as weakness."  He also added that the 
international community's failure to act would also weaken 
the position of the opposition inside Iran.  According to 
Sinirlioglu, Iranian opposition has indicated to the GOT that 
a strong international response is the only way to show Iran 
that the international community is serious (ref a).  You 
should emphasize the importance of backing our talks with 
action and the need for unified, international action, 
including sanctions, to force Iran to change its dangerous 
behavior regarding its nuclear program. 
 
NSG ENR Guidelines 
------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) Turkey remains opposed to the NSG draft guidelines to 
restrict the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology 
(ENR) and believe the guidelines would unfairly limit the 
"inalienable right" of non-nuclear weapon states to pursue 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to include enrichment. 
Turkish officials continue to argue that a distinction should 
be made between NPT and NSG countries "in good standing" and 
"problematic countries" and that the two should not be lumped 
together. 
 
¶8. (C) During a September 2009 visit to Ankara, ISN DAS Kang 
proposed a forward leaning package of incentives that would 
guarantee Turkey's nuclear fuel supplies in order to address 
concerns Turkey may have about not being able to access 
nuclear fuel on the international market (ref b).  The Turks 
pledged to consider it, but have not provided a formal 
response to the offer. 
 
¶9. (C) Turkey is aware that it is not the lone hold out and 
that South Africa also continues to have reservations about 
the guidelines.  Ankara may not be willing to seriously 
consider dropping its opposition to the guidelines until it 
is completely isolated.  Even then, statements by PM Erdogan 
trumpeting the rights of NPT members to peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy in his recent discourse related to Iran likely 
also reflect a maximalist view of what Turkey should be 
allowed to do as a NNWS NPT member.  Turkish officials have 
told us that while Turkey has made no decisions about 
pursuing nuclear enrichment, they would like to keep the door 
open to this possibility, especially given Turkey's intent to 
develop a nuclear power sector to meet its energy needs. 
 
Press Event 
----------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) The roundtable on February 22 to which members of 
the think tank community and columnists are invited will now 
also include representatives from diplomatic missions (minus 
Iran), some senior MPs and a foreign policy advisor from the 
Prime Ministry.  The event has now become a bit larger than 
originally envisioned, but would still serve to get our 
message out on the Iran nuclear program.  The event is hosted 
by a think tank called the International Strategic Research 
Organization, headed by Dr. Sedat Laciner, who is close to 
elements of the ruling Justice and Development Party.  You 
should assume that the event is on the record and that the 
Turkish press will try to find angles and may take your 
comments out of context to help sell newspapers. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The following is a list of hard questions that 
could come up during the press event: 
 
-- Does the USG support Turkey's efforts to achieve a deal on 
TRR?  Why is the U.S. unwilling to show more flexibility on 
the original proposal? 
 
-- Why is the U.S. so focused on Iran when Israel already has 
nuclear weapons and whether it is fair for the international 
community to focus only on Iran? 
 
-- How can anyone trust U.S. intelligence assessments on Iran 
when the intelligence on Iraq was so wrong? 
 
-- Does the U.S. believe Iran has renewed its nuclear weapons 
program? 
 
-- Why is the U.S. so insistent on pursuing sanctions when it 
does not believe Iran's claims about its ability to enrich to 
20 percent? 
 
-- Is Iran really violating IAEA provisions and its 
international obligations? 
 
-- What does the U.S. hope to achieve with new sanctions 
given their lack of effectiveness thus far and whether the 
Chinese are on board with new UNSC sanctions? 
 
-- Why is Congress seeking to pass the Iran Refined Petroleum 
Sanctions Act now and why did the U.S. impose new sanctions 
on Iran?  Does this signal a unilateralist approach by the 
U.S. on the issue of Iran?  Has the U.S. considered the 
likely impact of the petroleum-related sanctions on the 
Iranian people rather than the regime? 
 
-- Is the military option still on the table?  If so, how can 
we expect Iran to negotiate in good faith when it is under 
the constant threat of attack? 
Jeffrey 
 
           "Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s 
gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"