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OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #0252/01 0471359
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161359Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2134
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000252 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2020 
TAGS: CY GR PREL TU
SUBJECT: GREECE-TURKEY: A SLOW START, BUT FORWARD MOVEMENT 
 
REF: A. ATHENS 41 
     ¶B. ANKARA 57 
     ¶C. 09 ANKARA 1637 
 
Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O'Grady, for reasons: 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  Despite the eleven-week delay in Greek PM 
Papandreou's reply to PM Erdogan's October 30 overture, the 
Turkish MFA indicates that it views the response as positive 
and as a sincere attempt "to address our issues."  The MFA 
envisions a foreign minister-level bilateral meeting, 
possibly as soon as February 18, followed by a prime 
minister-level meeting no later than June.  Both the MFA and 
the Greek Embassy concur that Cyprus and the Aegean loom 
largest in the bilateral relationship, but the Greek Embassy 
also warns that illegal migration has become an "explosive 
political issue" in Greece, given the sheer numbers of 
illegal migrants intercepted there.  On Aegean issues, the 
MFA welcomed the "fresh start" to which the Greek side was 
apparently agreeing.  Greek PM Papandreou is widely admired 
in Turkey for his "seismic diplomacy" efforts in the previous 
PASOK government.  Ankara hopes to make the most of his 
return to power.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) The Turkish MFA's Deputy Director for Greece/Cyprus, 
Kerim Uras, told us that Ankara for the most part is pleased 
with the reply letter from Greece PM Papandreou to Turkish PM 
Erdogan.  It is "overall a good letter," and "tried to 
address our issues," Uras said.  The GOT had earlier grumbled 
about the significant delay for the response (Erdogan's 
letter was sent October 30 (REF C); the Papandreou reply came 
in mid-January) but said it recognizes that Athens has its 
hands full with its economic crisis, and that Papandreou also 
needed to ensure that diverse elements in his government were 
on board for his approach to Ankara.  Uras suggested that the 
Papandreou government had not expected the Erdogan missive, 
but emphasized that the GOT had not wanted to catch the 
Greeks off guard but simply sought to make a comprehensive 
overture early in the Papandreou government's tenure. 
 
¶3.  (C) Uras said the Turkish MFA actually took issue with 
several elements in the Papandreou response.  For example, 
the Greek PM's refusal to refer to "minorities" in Thrace, 
and also Papandreou's assertion that the two Cypriot 
communities should be left on their own to resolve the Cyprus 
Problem, without any outside engagement.  Uras said this 
approach seems irresponsible, given that Greece has a 
significant role as a Guarantor Power, as does Turkey. 
 
¶4.  (C) We met separately with the Turkish MFA's Deputy 
Director for Maritime and Aviation Affairs Cagatay Erciyes 
(REF B).  Erciyes (who gave us a copy of the page of 
Papandreou's letter which addressed Aegean issues) said that 
the Greek letter agreed to "re-energize" exploratory contacts 
which have taken place more than forty times over the past 
ten years.  Erciyes said that while the letter did not 
respond directly to the proposals in Erdogan's letter for new 
confidence-building measures and an Aegean "code of conduct," 
the Greek side was "ready to discuss" them. 
 
¶5.  (C) In a separate discussion, the Greek Embassy's acting 
DCM, Stavros Venizelos, confirmed that the Papandreou letter 
discouraged any outside involvement in Cyprus, but noted that 
Greece's posture is more proactive than it might appear, and 
that Greece had actually lobbied hard with Christofias to 
ensure that the Greek Cypriot leader would agree to an 
accelerated schedule of talks leading up to the "TRNC 
Presidential" elections. 
 
¶6.  (C) Venizelos declined to give us a copy of the 
Papandreou letter, but briefed us on the main themes, in 
addition to Cyprus: 
 
-- Aegean: (Erdogan had suggested re-energizing the 
exploratory talks and proposed CBMs and a code of conduct. 
(REF B))  On the former, Papandreou was receptive, but 
suggested a time limit, after which the issues would be 
brought to the International Court of Justice.  In the 
meantime, both sides should refrain from "provocative 
statements."  Ankara should cease overflights of inhabited 
islands. 
 
-- Minorities:  (Erdogan had pointed to various problems for 
the Turkish minority.)  Papandreou insisted that Greece is 
obliged to respect the human rights of all Greek citizens. 
However, this is not a question of reciprocity.  He in turn 
argued for Ankara's attention toward the Patriachate, Halki 
Seminary, and the rights of Greek Orthodox-origin Turkish 
citizens in Turkey. 
 
-- Illegal Migration:  Papandreou agreed that this is an 
 
ANKARA 00000252  002 OF 002 
 
 
important problem; welcomed the resumption of Turkey-EU talks 
on this issue; but urged improved implementation of the 
Greece-Turkey 2002 Readmission Protocol. 
 
-- Economic Relations:  (Erdogan had proposed allowing one- 
or two-day visa-free travel for Turkish citizens engaged in 
trade and commerce.)  Papandreou noted that an MFA steering 
committee is examining this issue, but that Schengen 
regulations are inflexible and the EU has already disapproved 
of such an arrangement, but that Athens would ask again. 
 
-- High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council:  (Erdogan had 
proposed an overarching structure, featuring annual meetings 
between the two prime ministers together with many of their 
ministers.)  Papandreou did not reject this proposal but 
suggested that a meeting at the FM-level begin to review it. 
He also stated that he would invite PM Erdogan to Greece 
sometime before June 2010.  (Note: The Turkish MFA confirms 
that a PM-level meeting is envisioned but said the location 
remains unclear.  End Note)  Papandreou also suggested that 
individual ministers on both sides could explore issues such 
as energy, investment, culture, environment, transportation, 
illegal migration, and organized crime. 
 
¶7.  (C) Venizelos commented that the Aegean and Cyprus remain 
the two priority issues in the Greece-Turkey bilateral 
relationship, but that illegal migration is close behind. 
The latter has become an "explosive political issue" in 
Greece, he said, not least because 75 percent of all arrests 
in the EU of illegal migrants occur in Greece. 
 
¶8.  (C) COMMENT: PM Papandreou is held in high regard by most 
Turkish political elites, who remember fondly the "seismic 
diplomacy" era encapsulated by Papandreou's constructive 
association with the late Turkish FM Ismail Cem. 
Accordingly, Ankara hopes to make the most of Papandreou's 
return to power, as another element in it's "zero problems 
with neighbors" posture.  We learned February 15 that a 
Greece-Turkey FM-level meeting might take place as early as 
February 18 in Istanbul. 
Jeffrey 
 
           "Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s 
gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"