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C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000116 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG - NARDI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER AG UN US
SUBJECT: ALGERIAN CT CHIEF PRESSES NEA DAS SANDERSON ON TSA 
LIST 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David D. Pearce.  Reasons:  1.4 (b), (d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Meeting with NEA DAS Sanderson January 25, Algerian 
Counterterrorism Coordinator Kamel Rezag Bara objected that 
putting Algeria on the list of countries subject to enhanced 
airport screening is at variance with Algeria's solid 
commitment to fighting terrorism and its close security 
partnership with the U.S.  Noting that Algerian public 
opinion viewed this measure negatively, he suggested the U.S. 
could have implemented the measure without publicizing it. 
DAS Sanderson stressed that this measure was aimed not 
against Algeria but at increasing safety for the flying 
public of all countries.  Rezag Bara portrayed AQIM as a 
global threat to security and to Algeria's and Islam's 
central message of tolerance.  The group was no longer a 
threat to the country as a whole but had a residual presence 
in the Kabylie and in the east.  It enjoyed zero popular 
support, in part due to its kidnappings of locals for ransom. 
 He said that Mali's continued reluctance to act against AQIM 
was a major Algerian worry and the reason for the 
postponement of the Bamako summit.  He asked that the U.S. 
intercede with Bamako to move it to start fighting AQIM.  He 
repeated a proposal made last October to set up a bilateral 
interagency "contact group" that would exchange security 
assessments.  Algeria would seek to follow up UNSCR 1904 in 
the UNGA and perhaps seek a resolution in the OIC.  Rezag 
Bara said that the two recent Guantanamo returnees would go 
before a judge in a matter of days.  End summary. 
 
TSA Listing 
----------- 
 
¶2. (C) NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary Janet Sanderson met 
Algerian Presidential Coordinator for Counterterrorism Kamel 
Rezag Bara at the Presidency in Algiers January 25, 
accompanied by the Ambassador, Pol-Econ Chief Bosshart and 
EconOff Wazir.  DAS Sanderson emphasized that we had built a 
strong counterterrorism partnership with Algeria since 9/11, 
which was very important to the U.S.  The USG was 
increasingly concerned by al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb's 
(AQIM) presence in the Sahel.  AQIM was one of the top 
priorities of the State Department Counterterrorism 
Coordinator.  We had heard Government of Algeria concerns 
over the TSA listing of Algeria.  This measure did not grow 
out of our relationship with Algeria but was a response to a 
new security threat. 
 
¶3. (C) Rezag Bara agreed that the security partnership with 
the U.S. was important.  However, the "listing" of Algeria as 
subject to enhanced airport screening ran contrary to that 
partnership.  Such treatment would be understandable for 
state sponsors of terrorism; or countries in areas where U.S. 
troops were fighting like Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan; or 
for countries in turmoil like Yemen and Somalia; or perhaps 
for Saudi Arabia, which had been the source of 19 of 22 
terrorists involved in the 9/11 attack; or even Lebanon, 
because of Hizballah.   But it was not understandable for 
Algeria or Libya.  Libya was one of the first states to take 
action against Osama bin Ladin.  (Note:  In addition to 
sticking up for the only other Maghrebi state on TSA list, 
Rezag Bara is a former Algerian ambassador to Libya.) 
Algeria was a prime U.S. ally in fighting terrorism.  How had 
this list been drawn up? he asked.  Rezag Bara said it might 
have been acceptable to screen, for example, Algerians who 
had visited Yemen or Afghanistan, but not all Algerian 
nationals.  He said he would not say more, but the government 
of Algeria really (he put emphasis on this last word) wanted 
the US to take Algeria off the list.  At the end of the 
meeting, he suggested the U.S. could have fortified its 
already strong airport security measures in this or other 
ways, but without publicizing them. 
 
Sahel Security - and Mali 
------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Turning to the Sahel, Rezag Bara stated that al-Qa'ida 
posed a global threat to security, the unity of Islamic 
states, and to Islam itself and its message of peace and 
tolerance.  Since AQIM was no longer a threat to Algeria's 
national security and stability as a whole, Algeria now 
focused on denying AQIM the use of "first periphery" 
countries -- Mali, Mauritania and Niger -- as sanctuaries. 
Algeria also looked to a "second periphery" of Chad, 
 
Burkina-Faso, northern Nigeria, and Darfur -- places where 
there were substantial Muslim populations and where Al-Qa'ida 
could seek to extend its influence.  Mali was a major worry. 
AQIM leaders Abu Zaid and Mokhtar Belmokhtar had some 200 
armed men and used hostage-taking to generate media attention 
and revenue to fund their operations. 
 
¶5. (C) Rezag Bara spotlighted Mali as a particular problem in 
regional counterterrorism cooperation.  He claimed it refused 
to coordinate or cooperate with Algeria on terrorism and 
lacked the will to deny terrorists the use of its territory 
as a sanctuary.  The August 2009 Tamanrasset (Algeria) 
conference of regional military chiefs of staff had decided 
to coordinate counterterrorism operations and stand up mixed 
units to patrol sensitive areas.  Algeria had agreed to help 
equip regional states.  However, a shipment of radios Algeria 
had delivered to Mali late last August had still not been 
used.  Algeria believed that Mali negotiated directly with 
terrorists or with persons representing them.  Niger and 
Mauritania, by contrast, were cooperating.  Rezag Bara said 
Algeria needed U.S. help to convince Bamako it could not 
negotiate an armistice with terror groups.  The Bamako summit 
of regional leaders could not take place until there was a 
Malian commitment to cooperate against terrorism.  There was 
no need for a summit whose success was not certain.  Asked 
whether Algeria had given Mali development assistance, Rezag 
Bara replied that Algeria still had no permission from Mali 
to give development assistance to (Tuareg) areas in northern 
Mali. 
 
¶6. (C) Rezag Bara said that the old Malian argument that the 
Tuareg threat prevents Malian movement against AQIM was no 
longer valid.  Tuareg tribes were disarmed and no longer a 
source of rebellion.  Mali also believed that the Tuaregs 
could not help in the fight against terrorism.  Tuareg 
leaders visiting Algiers earlier in January had refuted that, 
telling Algerian officials that Tuaregs wanted only 
development assistance for their region and the integration 
of some of their forces into the Malian army.  (Comment: 
Malian Tuareg leaders were in Algiers earlier this month, 
reportedly to discuss reviving the Algiers Accords of 2006. 
End comment)  He said all Tuaregs who had been in Algiers -- 
including the radical Ag Bahanga -- had supported this 
position.  Algeria wanted Mali to consider the Tuaregs not as 
a risk but as a partner against AQIM.  But any Algeria 
support to the Tuareg areas would require Malian government 
support. 
 
Security in Algeria 
------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) DAS Sanderson inquired about the security situation in 
Algeria.  Rezag Bara replied that the GOA was still worried 
about the Kabylie and the east, where small groups of armed 
terrorists numbering 8-10 each still carried out attacks 
against the security services.  However, they no longer had 
support among the local population, largely due to their 
practice of kidnapping local notables for ransom.  The main 
threat was in the south and in the countries bordering the 
south.  The government's security "doctrine" was to deny the 
terrorists the ability to act in cities.  This strategy had 
succeeded.  The government also intervened in prisons, 
mosques, schools and banks to deny these areas to the 
terrorists. 
 
Ransom Payments - UNSCR 1904 Not End of Story 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) DAS Sanderson asked about Algeria's consultations with 
European countries on outlawing ransom payments to 
terrorists.  Rezag Bara said his own consultations with the 
Russians in Moscow last October had produced agreement that 
ransom payments were a form of terrorist financing.  The UK 
also agreed with this Algerian view, but the French had been 
less cooperative.  In any case, UNSCR 1904 was an 
international legal norm making it unlawful for states to pay 
ransoms to terrorists.  He conceded, however, that others 
could pay ransoms even if states could not.  He noted that 
UNSCR 1904 was not the end of the issue.  Algeria was 
deliberating not only the possibility of bringing the issue 
of ransom payments to the UNGA, but also how to sensitize EU 
partners, and whether to work via the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC) for issuance of an "Islamic legal 
position" on the taking of hostages and ransom payments. 
 
U.S.-Algeria "Contact Group" 
 
---------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) DAS Sanderson noted that State Department 
Counterterrorism Coordinator Benjamin had asked her to 
explore how we could set up the U.S.-Algeria "contact group" 
that Rezag Bara had proposed previously and how it would 
function.  Rezag Bara said it should be an informal, 
bilateral, interagency dialogue on threat assessment.  It 
would include high-level representatives from the ministries 
of Foreign Affairs, Justice and Interior as well as defense 
and intelligence services.  Algeria already had this 
arrangement with Russia, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands 
and was close to setting something up with the UK.  The 
Algerians also included at different times representatives 
from customs, their financial intelligence unit, and other 
ministries as needed.  To set it up, the U.S. Ambassador 
could write the GOA requesting that a U.S. interagency group 
visit Algeria, or that an Algerian interagency group visit 
Washington, to sign a memorandum of understanding on 
establishing the group.  Rezag Bara emphasized that existing 
"contact groups" were informal discussion fora that did not 
make formal decisions.  (On departing the meeting, he told 
the Ambassador he himself would be interested in a visit to 
Washington sometime before May.) 
 
Guantanamo 
---------- 
 
¶10. (C) DAS Sanderson thanked Rezag Bara for Algeria's 
acceptance of a number of Algerian citizens detained in 
Guantanamo.  Carrying out the administration's commitment to 
close Guantanamo was a difficult job because many dangerous 
persons were held there.  Rezag Bara replied that, beginning 
in 2005, Algerian officials had visited some 26 or 27 
Algerian detainees in Guantanamo.  Algeria welcomed the USG 
determination to close the facility, which he said was 
contrary to U.S. values.  Algeria remained prepared to accept 
Algerians who were freed.  Two recent returnees would be 
appearing before a judge within a day or two.  But there had 
been reports that some did not want to go back.  The GOA 
wished to confirm if this were so, and specifically, whether 
some Algerian nationals at Guantanamo had explicitly 
expressed a will not to go back.  (Note:  Rezag Bara stopped 
short of saying that Algeria would accept only those 
detainees willing to return, which had been Algeria's 
previous position and which would have rolled back recent 
statements by Medelci and others indicating the Algeria was 
prepared to cooperate with the US on all remaining detainee 
cases.  End note) 
 
Morocco 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) To a question about Algeria's counterterrorism 
cooperation with Morocco, Rezag Bara responded that the two 
countries cooperated operationally on threats to each other's 
country originating in the other.  The meeting concluded with 
DAS Sanderson pointing to the upcoming visits of a Department 
of State Anti-terrorism Assistance group and a Department of 
Justice ICITAP delegation, which will work out 
counterterrorism training programs with Algerian officials. 
 
¶12. (U) DAS Sanderson cleared this message. 
PEARCE