VZCZCXRO2102
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #0388/01 0551411
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241411Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7895
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEPADJ/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 8085

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000388 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/E AND IO/UNP 
NSC FOR MGAVIN 
PARIS FOR WBAIN AND RKANEDA 
LONDON FOR PLORD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2020 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS PTER SO UN AU
SUBJECT: USAU: AFRICAN UNION STRUGGLES WITH AMISOM MEDIA 
CAMPAIGN 
 
REF: ADDIS ABABA 342 
 
Classified By: USAU CDA Joel Maybury, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Seconded UN Public Information Officer (PIO) 
reveals a "complete blockage" of African Union strategic 
communications efforts on the eve of a major planned 
offensive by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and 
Transitonal Federal Government (TFG) forces, and blames the 
Office of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of 
the Commission (SRCC) for failing to sign a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) that would release up to $22 million to 
support AMISOM's media campaign. She also identifies stratgic 
communications needs of the TFG that cannot be satisfied by 
the UN and recommends support by the AMISOM PIO and the 
Nairobi-based Military Information Support Team (MIST) to 
address these shortfalls.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) United Nations PIO Seraphine Toe (protect 
accordingly), who is seconded to the African Union Commission 
to provide support to AMISOM, reported to USAU Military 
Adviser on February 24 that, despite desperate pleas from the 
Force Commander, AMISOM's media campaign is stalled for want 
of a signature.  Toe stated that the United Nations Support 
Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) has hired two expatriate media 
experts and a staff of 10 Somalis to develop programming for 
AMISOM radio stations (one each provided by the USG and the 
UN).  UNSOA reportedly has $22 million set aside to pay 
staff, lease office space, hire technical experts, and 
produce radio messages from a remote location in Nairobi for 
transmission in Mogadishu.  The UN has offered to assume 
operational costs for both its transmitter and the broadcast 
station provided by the USG. 
 
¶3. (C) Per Toe, all that is lacking to operationalize UNSOA's 
radio programming unit and the two radio stations is the 
SRCC's signature on a MOU with UNSOA. Toe claims that this 
MOU was submitted months ago to the previous SRCC Nicholas 
Bwakira, but that bad advice from the SRCC's only PIO caused 
Bwakira to demure.  Toe states that newly-appointed SRCC 
Boubacar Diarra is aware of UNSOA's offer and is reviewing 
the MOU.  Toe was worried, however, because Diarra does not 
seem to realize the urgency of the matter and because he is 
being advised by the same inept PIO. 
 
¶4. (C) Toe proffered the following recommendations and asked 
that they be reinforced by USAU Ambassador Battle and the 
Nairobi-based Somalia Unit: 
 
- Ensure SRCC Diarra understands the urgency of a strategic 
communications plan and its linkage to the planned AMISOM-TFG 
offensive; 
- Recommend timely review and signature of the MOU to unlock 
UNSOA funding that would allow two AMISOM transmitters to 
begin broadcasting; 
- Encourage the SRCC to pressure the AU's Human Resources 
Department to hire an addtional PIO for the SRCC's Office and 
fill the PIO vacancy in the AU's Peace Support Operations 
Division; and 
- Use non-UNSOA resources to help the TFG develop its own 
media campaign plan and train Somali PIOs and radio 
broadcasters. 
 
¶5. (C) Toe reported that her conversations with the Somali 
Minister of Information suggest that the TFG has no strategic 
communication plan and is routinely missing opportunities to 
showcase TFG progress and denounce al-Shabaab activity in an 
effort to drive a wedge between the foreign extremists and 
the Somali populace.  She lamented the fact that UNSOA has no 
mandate to directly assist the TFG in developing a media 
campaign and operating Radio Mogadishu, the only functional 
FM radio station that is not influenced by the extremists. 
Toe suggested the following solutions: 
 
- Provide UNSOA training in message development to AMISOM 
Spokesperson Felix Kulaigye which he could impart to his TFG 
counterparts in Mogadishu; and 
- Use the Nairobi-based MIST to directly engage the TFG 
Ministry of Information to develop a strategic communication 
plan, radio messaging, and to exploit other media (e.g. 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000388  002 OF 002 
 
 
Internet, TFG website, and SMS text messaging). (Note: USAU 
understands that, unlike UNSOA, the Nairobi MIST has the 
authority to engage the TFG directly, although this may 
necessitate additional program funding and would require that 
all MIST-developed products be approved by US Special 
Operations Command before being used in support of TFG.  End 
Note.) 
 
¶6. (C) Comment: Toe is a faithful USAU interlocutor and a 
competent PIO.  Being seconded from the UN to the AU with no 
counterpart in the Peace Support Operations Division, 
however, she feels her influence at AU headquarters is 
limited.  She has lost faith in her PIO counterpart based in 
the SRCC's Office in Nairobi, and is nervous about 
circumventing him or pushing the new SRCC too hard.  But she 
also knows how broken both AMISOM and the TFG are in terms of 
strategic communications and would like to see improvement 
before any major AMISOM-TFG offensive in Mogadishu.  End 
Comment. 
MUSHINGI